


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Aufsätze / Articles

Máté Tóth

Preliminaries to a content-based classification of metonymy*

Abstract

Previous literature on the classification of metonymy has mainly concentrated on the relationship between source and target (e.g. Radden & Kövecses 1999, Peirsman & Geeraerts 2006a). More recent, pragmatically oriented classifications are concerned with the role of conceptual metonymy in meaning construction, i.e. at which level of meaning construction a certain metonymy is applied as an inferential tool (e.g. Thornburg & Panther 1997, Panther & Thornburg 1999). At the heart of these latter approaches is the assumption that conceptual metonymy cannot be reduced to acts of reference. Interestingly enough, no classification of metonymy has been suggested which concentrates on the type of the mental content participating in the metonymic process. In this paper I outline such a content-based approach. According to the type of the target content the following classes of metonymy can be set up: THING-, EVENT-, PROPERTY-, PROPOSITION- and speech act metonymies, which can be further subdivided based on the type of the source content. Furthermore, I argue that my content-based approach is compatible with and complementary to earlier contiguity-based and pragmatic classifications, since certain contiguity relations between source and target and certain pragmatic functions of metonymy are closely related to the type of the mental content targeted by the source content. Future investigations integrating these three aspects of metonymy may contribute to a better understanding of the phenomenon.

Keywords: metonymy, classification of metonymy, reference point, mental access, conceptual content, metonymic inference

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1 Introduction

Within cognitive semantics¹ the study of conceptual metonymy has only established itself as a significant line of investigation relatively recently (e.g. Panther & Radden 1999, Panther & Thornburg 2003a, Benczes, Barcelona & Ruiz de Mendoza 2011, Fu 2012). Up to this point one of the main goals of cognitive linguistic research on metonymy has been to provide a massive body of evidence that metonymy is a fundamental conceptual process, ubiquitous in language and thinking, even more so than metaphor (e.g. Barcelona 2000, Dirven & Pörrings 2002, Panther, Thornburg & Barcelona 2009). The cognitive linguistic literature on metonymy abounds in metonymy definitions which differ in certain details and refinements,² but their commonalities are best grasped by the definition of Radden and Kövecses (1999: 21): "Metonymy is a cognitive process in which one conceptual entity, the vehicle, provides mental access to another conceptual entity, the target, within the same idealized cognitive model." Their definition relies heavily on Langacker's conception of metonymy as a reference point phenomenon (1993), whereas the metonymic source serves as a reference point to the intended target, i.e. it provides mental access to the target.

This very broad notion of metonymy and the primary concern of contemporary cognitive linguistic research on metonymy to establish it as a fundamental cognitive operation means that it has become almost all-encompassing, covering an extremely broad range of linguistic and cognitive phenomena. In order to avoid the risk of the notion becoming so broad that hardly any generalizations can be made about the diverse phenomena it describes, classifications of metonymy have been established with the aim of forming homogeneous classes of metonymy that can be accounted for in generalizable terms.

The cognitive linguistic and pre-cognitive linguistic literature on metonymy is at least as abundant in classifications of metonymy as in metonymy definitions. The most widely used basis for setting up a typology of metonymy is the relationship between the source and the target (see for example Norrick 1981, Kövecses & Radden 1998, Radden &

¹ All through the paper, whenever I use the terms 'cognitive linguistics' or 'cognitive semantics' I refer to holistic cognitive linguistics in the tradition of George Lakoff and Ronald W. Langacker.

² For finer-grained definitions of conceptual metonymy see, for example, Panther & Thornburg (2004) or Barcelona (2002).

Kövecses 1999, Peirsman & Geeraerts 2006a). Classifications conceived in this tradition can never be exhaustive. Due to their very nature, there are always borderline cases; the labels of different classes and sub-classes and their taxonomies often alternate; the boundaries between sub-classes are fuzzy and sometimes even minor inconsistencies arise. These flaws arise naturally, if we keep in mind the fact that these classifications eventually attempt to list, describe and classify all existing and conceivable relationships between two concepts within the same knowledge structure (or Idealized Cognitive Model).

Other classifications are concerned with the pragmatic function of metonymy (e.g. Warren 1999, 2002, Panther & Thornburg 1999, 2003b). These approaches emphasize that metonymy is not necessarily connected to an act of reference (e.g. Barcelona 2005, 2009 and 2011) and they accordingly treat referential metonymy as a – prototypical and very common – sub-class of metonymy and point out that non-referential cases of metonymy are far from being exceptional. Warren (1999, 2002, and 2006) distinguishes between referential and propositional metonymies, based on their linguistic features and truth-conditionality. Thornburg and Panther (1997) and Panther and Thornburg (1999) divide metonymies into classes based on their pragmatic characteristics; they speak of propositional metonymies with referential and predicational sub-classes and illocutionary or speech act metonymies. Radden (2012) makes a distinction between referential and EVENT metonymies.

Interestingly enough, no typology of metonymy has been set up that is based on the conceptual content involved in the metonymic process, i.e. on the conceptual nature of the target accessed and that of the reference point serving as the metonymic source. In this paper I set out to propose a preliminary classification of metonymy that focuses on the type of the target and the source content. The question I investigate is how metonymy can be classified on the basis of the type of conceptual content involved in the metonymic process. I argue that well-defined and homogeneous classes of metonymy can be set up according to what type of conceptual content is accessed through what type of metonymic reference points.

My argumentation is structured as follows. In Section 2 I briefly sketch out a notion of metonymy in which metonymy is necessarily connected to an act of reference. The section also provides a brief outline of the types of conceptual content that can be referred to, and hence can be targeted by metonymy (target content) and those that can

serve as metonymic reference points (source content). In Section 3 I set up the following classes of metonymy based on the type of the target content: THING- (3.1), EVENT- (3.2), PROPERTY- (3.3), PROPOSITION- (3.4) and speech act metonymies (3.5). In Section 4 I argue that my classification of metonymy is compatible with and can complement a contiguity-based classification (Peirsman & Geeraerts 2006a, 2006b) and that it is in accordance with some of the above mentioned pragmatically oriented classifications of metonymy (Panther & Thornburg 1999, 2003b). My results are summarized in Section 5.

2 A referential view of metonymy and the conceptual content involved in metonymy

It is a widely held view among cognitive linguistically oriented metonymy researchers that metonymy cannot be reduced to acts of reference (among others Barcelona 2011, Sweep 2009, Panther & Thornburg 2004, Panther 2005, Ruiz de Mendoza 2000). As a consequence, they consider referential metonymy to be only a sub-class, and distinguish it from non-referential cases. This sub-class embraces almost exclusively nominal metonymies or metonymies whose target is a THING (the only possible referent in the traditional view). Elsewhere (Tóth in preparation) I argue that the reason for this almost consensual view³ concerning the referentiality of metonymy is that these approaches implicitly accept a traditional notion of reference⁴ that is too narrowly conceived for cognitive linguistic purposes.

I plead (*ibid.*) for a broad notion of reference that is more in line with the aims of cognitive linguistics; namely I equate the act of reference with the mental activation of certain conceptual contents with the help of linguistic reference points, with the aim of further purposes of meaning construction (e.g. combining them into larger units of conceptual content, arriving at propositions, drawing further inferences). According to this notion, referents are not elements of the extra-linguistic reality but of a construal of this reality, and they are

³ A minority of cognitive linguists maintains that metonymy is of referential nature; see for example Croft (1993/2002).

⁴ Although this 'traditional' view of reference is almost never described explicitly in cognitive semantic research on metonymy, it seems to me that it is even more conservative than that of Searle (1969).

not restricted to THINGS. In other words, I argue that mental access can be provided to any type of conceptual content, i.e. we do not only refer to our concepts of THINGS; accordingly in my approach every metonymy is considered to be referential.⁵ The referential view of metonymy outlined here conceives metonymy at least as broadly as the standard view of conceptual metonymy (Radden & Kövecses 1999); as a result homogeneous classes of metonymy need to be established about which certain generalizations can be made. The type of conceptual content accessed by the metonymic reference point (the intended referent or target) offers itself as a basis of this classification, while the type of the conceptual content that serves as the reference point (the source) can serve as a criterion to set up sub-classes within the classes.

This proposal calls for a consideration of the question of what types of conceptual content can be distinguished. The referents of different linguistic units are different types of conceptual content, and vice versa, different linguistic units provide mental access to different types of conceptual content.⁶ Noun phrases usually activate THINGS or abstract entities that are very often construed as THINGS with the as-

⁵ It is important to note that the view that the target of a metonymy is not restricted to THINGS, and the class of metonymic expressions cannot be narrowed down to nominal cases is widely shared in cognitive linguistics. My approach differs in the notion of reference it relies on. I do not see a difference in the *mode* through which different types of mental content are accessed for further inferential purposes; hence I regard the mental activation of any type of content to be an act of reference. This is not to say that I would deny that there are differences regarding the *purpose* of this mental activation, for example arriving at an implicitly intended referent, singling out a THING for predication, singling out an EVENT to be predicated of THINGS, constructing propositions, arriving at conversational implicatures or figuring out the illocutionary purposes.

⁶ A similar view is proposed by Mihatsh (2009), who points out the correlation between nouns and THINGS. See also Langacker (1987a). The following enumeration is in need of elaboration. My claims here are rather intuitive than empirically well-founded. The types of conceptual content require further research in cognitive linguistics, cognitive psychology and neuroscience. It is even questionable whether it is justified to gather all of these contents under the umbrella term 'conceptual'; it is, for instance, hard to draw the line between conceptual and propositional content. What I outline here is mainly in accordance with Langacker's (1987b) and Radden and Dirven's (2007) findings and with the types of conceptual content they name, but I do not follow their terminology strictly. I claim here merely that any kind of mental content can be made available through reference points. This is the only common feature of the listed contents I argue for, the specifics of their structure and characterization are left out of consideration. I do not claim that they could be listed, characterized and classified exhaustively.

sistance of ontological metaphors (Lakoff & Johnson 1980). THINGS can be organized into taxonomically built categories or can belong to functionally structured DOMAINS, FRAMES or SITUATIONS. These can also be made available by noun phrases, but can also be accessed through verbs. THINGS can have certain PROPERTIES, usually accessed through adjectives serving as linguistically manifest reference points. The referents of adjectives are SCALES, against which certain PROPERTIES of THINGS or EVENTS are measured.

THINGS can interact with each other, can be related to each other, and can be involved in various relationships. They are very often parts of EVENTS, they are in certain STATES, can go through CHANGE and participate in SITUATIONS. These contents are most readily available with the help of verbs serving as linguistic reference points. Accordingly, verbs provide mental access to contents in which THINGS can be embedded or in which they are related to each other, for instance EVENTS, ACTIONS or STATES. These can be further characterized by certain circumstances or PROPERTIES, for example MANNER, PLACE, TIME, to which we refer with the help of adverbs and various morphologic and syntactic tools.

Along these lines it is not unreasonable to assume that linguistic signs that have traditionally been assigned an exclusively functional role, in fact mentally activate some kind of conceptual content. This is in line with the assumptions of cognitive linguistics that we do have concepts of, for example, PERSON, NUMBER, TENSE, ASPECT, POSSIBILITY, ACTUALITY, GENERICITY etc. In my view, although these concepts are usually expressed by grammatical elements, only relational and organized very differently than more easily graspable concepts (for instance THINGS), they are still made available or accessed during meaning construction and contribute to the overall construal of a situation.

Similarly, complex expressions provide mental access to complex contents; in this sense even PROPOSITIONS and relations between PROPOSITIONS (e.g. with the help of connectives) can be referred to.

3 A content-based classification of metonymy

The classification I propose here rests on the rejection of the implicit assumption of the above cited classifications that an act of reference is restricted to nominal expressions with THINGS as intended refer-

ents, i.e. metonymy is considered to be of a referential nature, in the above proposed sense of the notion 'reference'. As a result of this view it is reasonable to assume that the category of metonymy can be divided into classes according to the type of the conceptual content accessed and the type of the linguistic sign or conceptual content providing access. It follows that both conceptual and linguistic metonymies can be classified according to the type of their reference points and the conceptual content they activate. The classes of metonymy are arranged along a continuum ranging from classes displaying more prototypical features of referentiality and metonymicity⁷ (THING-metonymies) through ones displaying less prototypical features (PROPERTY- and EVENT-metonymies) to almost marginal cases (PROPOSITION-metonymies).

The prototypical structure of the category 'metonymy' is due to the organization of the category 'act of reference' on which it is based. I assume this latter category to be radially structured with members at the center displaying more prototypical features and with members at the periphery displaying less prototypical features. At the core are instances where nominal linguistic expressions access individual THINGS, and at the periphery, cases in which a PROPOSITION provides access to another PROPOSITION. Based on these assumptions, according to the conceptual content involved in the metonymic relationship the following major metonymy-types can be distinguished (without making any claim to completeness).

3.1 *THING-metonymies*

The expressions I label as THING-metonymies are basically cases called referential metonymies in other approaches.⁸ The reason I start establishing classes of metonymy with THING-metonymies is twofold. First, they seem to be the prototypical type of metonymy, as has been pointed out in connection with referential metonymies (e.g. Barcelona 2002, 2005 and 2009 or Warren 2006). And second, they are applied at an initial stage of meaning construction,⁹ i.e. they are used as a

⁷ For the degrees of metonymicity see Barcelona (2002) and (2011).

⁸ For various distinctions between referential metonymy and other metonymic phenomena see Stallard (1993), Panther & Thornburg (1999) and Warren (1999 and 2002).

⁹ For the role of metonymy in meaning construction see Panther & Thornburg (2004) and Panther (2005); for the role of metonymy at different layers of concep-

mechanism of reference-fixing; in other words these metonymies are used to target and to find conceptual content of which something is predicated or said.

THING-metonymies are metonymies whose target (or intended referent) is a THING, which is accessed with the help of a reference point content that is related to it within the same Idealized Cognitive Model.¹⁰ Indirect mental access can be provided to a THING through other THINGS, through a PROPERTY of the THING, or through its role or function in a situation or frame. Accordingly, THING-metonymies can be divided into sub-classes based on the conceptual type of the source through which they are accessed. THING-THING-metonymies are exemplified by the following expressions:

- (1) *The ham sandwich is waiting for his check.* (Lakoff & Johnson 1980: 35)
- (2) *The first violin has the flu.* (Panther & Radden 1999: 9)
- (3) *The kettle is boiling.* (Warren 2002: 116)
- (4) *He played Mozart.*
- (5) Hun. *A 126-os szoba mindig vidám.*
'Room 126 is always happy.'

Examples (1-4) are well-known and often analyzed in the literature. In (1) the meal (HAM SANDWICH) ordered by the customer provides mental access to the CUSTOMER who ordered it within the frame or ICM of a RESTAURANT. In (2) the musical instrument (FIRST VIOLIN) serves as a conceptual reference point to the person who plays the first violin

tual, linguistic and communicative organization see Radden (2005) and Barcelona (2005 and 2010).

¹⁰ The nature of the relation between target and source has been extensively studied both in rhetoric and cognitive linguistic approaches to metonymy and it has often been selected as the basis of classifications of metonymy (see the works cited in Section 1). According to Peirsman and Geeraerts (2006a) it is a contiguity relation, while Barcelona (2002 and 2011) calls it a pragmatic function.

For the notion of Idealized Cognitive Model (henceforth ICM) see Lakoff (1987), though some authors prefer the terms 'domain' or 'frame', I use these expressions interchangeably.

The relationship between target and source and the knowledge structure they belong to also serve as criteria in most approaches to distinguish metaphor from metonymy, but for lack of space I cannot pursue the issue any further; for some of the problems involved in distinguishing metonymy from metaphor see for example Barnden (2010) and Tóth (2011 and 2012).

(VIOLINIST). In (3) the CONTAINER of the water (KETTLE) mentally accesses the CONTENT of the kettle (WATER) within a culturally entrenched model of TEA-MAKING, embedded in Anglo-Saxon tradition. It is important to note that this frame is highly culture dependent. In other cultures WATER and KETTLE do not constitute such closely related entities within the TEA-MAKING frame as in the Anglo-Saxon model. This could be the reason that, for example, the German and Hungarian word-for-word translations would sound odd: Ger. **#Die Kanne kocht** and Hun. **#Fő a kanna**, though the most natural Hungarian translation that would come closest to the English version would also be metonymic: Hun. **Fő a tea**. 'The tea is boiling', where the TEA to be made from the boiling water provides access to the WATER, whereas the literal version (Hun. **Fő a víz**. 'The water is boiling') would not convey that the frame against which the sentence is interpreted is the frame of TEA-MAKING. Example (4) is an instance of the well-known AUTHOR FOR WORK metonymy, in which the composer (MOZART) refers to a piece of music composed by him (MUSIC BY MOZART). The selection of these expressions may give us a glimpse of how diverse the relationship between a metonymic target and source can be, but they all have in common that they involve THINGS connected by a relationship that is relevant within a given frame or ICM.

The Hungarian example (5), where the place (ROOM 126) stands for its INHABITANTS or the people working there, and the fact that it can readily be translated with the help of the same metonymy into English indicate that THING-metonymies are widely applied among typologically otherwise unrelated languages. Brdar (2009) argues, based on his earlier cross-linguistic investigations into specific metonymies (see for instance Brdar & Brdar-Szabó 2003, 2009 and Brdar-Szabó 2009), that referential metonymies tend to be more widely spread among languages than non-referential metonymies. The same might well apply for THING-metonymies. These results point towards the idea that THING-metonymies are indeed the prototypical cases of metonymy. In my approach the prototypicality of THING-metonymies can be traced back to the conceptual properties of THINGS (being relatively stable, autonomous and salient) as the most ideal referents. This view is also supported by the findings of Mihatsch (2009) and the psychological experimental results cited there.

As opposed to the examples discussed so far, THINGS can be accessed not just via other related THINGS, but also by their relevant

PROPERTIES as in (6), where the German family name *Klein* is motivated by a PROPERTY-THING-metonymy:

- (6) Germ. *Klein* 'short' (Jäkel 1999: 215)

A slightly more complex example is provided in (7):

- (7) Secretary on the intercom, introducing a visitor: *Mayor, that's your ten o'clock.*

The target of the metonymy at hand is a person; hence it is a THING-metonymy. The way the target is accessed is a little more complicated than the rest of the examples. *Ten o'clock* can be considered a PROPERTY of the target only if first the EVENT content of the frame MEETING is activated. Within this frame the TIME of the MEETING is singled out to serve as reference point for a PARTICIPANT of the MEETING, consequently it may be classified as a ROLE IN A FRAME for A ROLE IN A FRAME for A THING metonymic chain. In a more traditional classification the expression would be classified as a PART-FOR-PART metonymy, where a part of the MEETING frame (PARTICIPANT) is accessed through another part of it (TIME).¹¹

As already pointed out, the class of THING-metonymies in my classification mostly coincides with the class of referential metonymies in earlier classifications, though it must be noted that this is not always the case. Let us consider the following expressions.

- (8) *I'm your gunshot.*¹²
 (9) *She is just a pretty face.* (Lakoff & Johnson 1980: 37)
 (10) *I'm the tiramisu.* (Langacker 2008: 69)

¹¹ Some authors deny that there are part-for-part metonymies. For instance Ruiz de Mendoza and Díez Velasco (2002) distinguish only source-in-target and target-in-source metonymies and leave space in their classification only for part-for-whole and whole-for-part metonymies ruling out part-for-part metonymies. My analysis of (7) would appear problematic according to these approaches, unless we consider ten o'clock to be a property of the person whom the mayor meets, in which case it would be part of the person's domain matrix, i.e. a source-in-target metonymy.

¹² The example is from Showtime's television-series *Nurse Jackie* (Season 2 Episode 8), where it is uttered by a patient with a gun-shot wound to a doctor who is looking for a patient she cannot find.

These metonymies would qualify as predicational metonymies in pragmatically oriented classifications of metonymy (e.g. Barcelona 2009 and Panther & Thornburg 1999 and 2003b), since they are part of the predication. In my interpretation, in these cases a THING-type content is metonymically identified with another THING-type content, i.e. the target is reduced to, or metonymically identified with, one of its salient aspects which is especially relevant in a given frame or ICM. In (8) a PATIENT is accessed through her INJURY within an EMERGENCY ROOM frame, in (9) a PERSON is somewhat pejoratively reduced to one of her BODY PARTs and in (10) the same relationship applies within the same frame as in (1), the only difference being that here the CUSTOMER is reduced to and identified with one of its salient aspects (the MEAL she ordered) which is particularly relevant in the RESTAURANT frame. As to the mode, the mental access is provided with the help of the reference point, and as to the contents involved, these expressions do not differ from those in (1-5); they are all THING-metonymies, only differing in the role they play during meaning construction, i.e. they are applied when the propositional meaning is being constructed (see fn. 6.).

Finally, a closing remark should be made on the linguistic nature of the referent points of THING-metonymies. A brief glance at the expressions analyzed throughout Sub-section 3.1 suggests that the linguistic manifestations of THING-metonymies are overwhelmingly noun phrases or, in a relatively smaller number of cases, adjectives, leaving a few exceptions of other linguistic expressions (for instance *ten o'clock* in (7)).

3.2 *EVENT-metonymies*¹³

EVENT-metonymies are metonymies whose target (or intended referent) is an EVENT which is accessed with the help of a reference point content that is related to it within the same ICM or SITUATION.¹⁴ The

¹³ Up to these two classes Radden's classification (see Section 1) is reminiscent of mine with the difference that he does not consider EVENT metonymies to be referential and due to the low number of his major classes (only referential and EVENT) they form larger and more heterogeneous groups than mine.

¹⁴ It should be noted that in the view of Radden and Dirven (2007) events are conceptually represented by so called EVENT-schemas which include the necessary participants and elements of the EVENT at hand. They form the conceptual core of a situation which they constitute together with so called peripheral elements

category label EVENT is used here very broadly; a more fine-grained analysis would require its differentiation. I do not make a distinction between ACTIONS, CHANGES, EVENTS etc. and subsume all these under the umbrella term 'EVENT'. An EVENT can be accessed through one of its PARTICIPANTS (THING), through its PROPERTIES (i.e. its CIRCUMSTANCES, MANNER etc.), through one of its SUB-EVENTS (EVENT) or through its PRE-CONDITIONS or CONSEQUENCES (with these also usually being EVENTS).

In the following examples an EVENT is accessed by a THING that describes either a circumstance (11-12) or a participant of the EVENT (13), hence they can be considered THING-EVENT-metonymies.

(11) *Rick, I get it, you don't want to risk another **Woodbury**.*¹⁵

(12) Hun. *Az őszi nyárban nagyon élveztem **a vízpartot**.*

'In the autumn summer I enjoyed the waterside very much'

In (11) and (12) the PLACE where an EVENT (or series of events) occurred refers metonymically to the EVENT (or series of events), the only difference being that in the first case the event is known to the hearer and does not need to be described any more specifically, while in (12) the events that took place at the waterside need not be specified since it is deducible from our world knowledge that they are probably EVENTS (ACTIVITIES) typically associated with the PLACE.

(13) Hun. *Utálom **a fogorvost**. Azaz, hogy fogorvoshoz kell menni. Na, értitek?!*

'I hate the dentist. I mean having to go to the dentist. You get it?!'

Example (13) is a somewhat more complex case. In the first sentence, the EVENT of GOING TO THE DENTIST is accessed by the GOAL of the GOING EVENT-schema, namely the DENTIST (a THING), which serves as an ideal metonymic reference point, since people are more readily ac-

(non-necessary elements describing an event). Although I do not follow their terminology strictly, since in my view the metonymic targeting of certain peripheral elements of an event such as its actuality or potentiality tends to result in PROPOSITION-metonymies, my points are basically in line with their approach. For the difficulty of distinguishing EVENT- and PROPOSITION-metonymies see Subsection 3.4.

¹⁵ The example is taken from the comic book *The Walking Dead* (Issue 68, p. 13).

tivated as the object of the feeling HATE than EVENTS. It must also be noted that in the second sentence the event of GOING TO THE DENTIST (a SUB-EVENT in a larger frame) provides mental access to another SUB-EVENT of the frame, namely the procedures a patient has to suffer at a dentist. The two metonymies form a metonymic chain. What makes the example all the more interesting is that after using a THING-EVENT-metonymy the speaker tries to provide a resolution of the metonymy she has just used but in doing so she uses another metonymy, namely one of the EVENT-EVENT type. Without this remark in which she corrects herself, her first THING-EVENT metonymy would probably be interpreted as meaning that she actually hates the procedures she has to suffer at the dentist, based on our knowledge of the DENTIST frame which includes the idea that the most painful part of the scenario is the procedure done by the dentist (i.e. it may be interpreted as an AGENT-FOR-ACTION metonymy). In other words the interpretation of the first metonymy would not require a chain of metonymies, but the second metonymy is inserted as an attempt at resolving the first metonymy. What the speaker wants to achieve is probably to make sure that she does not hate the dentist as a person, but the event that takes place at the dentist, i.e. it is enough to shift from a THING-EVENT metonymy to an EVENT-EVENT metonymy, and she does not have to correct herself in the form of a literal expression.

As can be seen from the analysis of (13), complex EVENTS can be referred to with their SUB-EVENTS serving as reference points (EVENT-EVENT-metonymies). The initial SUB-EVENT of a complex EVENT is very often picked as a reference point for the whole EVENT:

(14) *to go to bed* 'to have sex' (Radden & Kövecses 1999: 22)

(15) Hun. *Már rég gyújtottam rá.*

'I haven't lit up for a long time' i.e. 'I haven't lit a cigarette for a long time.'

The expression in (14) shows that the initial SUB-EVENT (GOING TO BED) for an EVENT (HAVING SEX) metonymy can be lexicalized. In (15) the initial SUB-EVENT of LIGHTING A CIGARETTE metonymically accesses the complex EVENT of SMOKING. The Hungarian sentence is a perfectly natural expression of the content that the speaker has not smoked for a long time, i.e. the initial and cognitively most salient SUB-EVENT (LIGHTING A CIGARETTE) refers to the whole EVENT of SMOKING.

The reverse path of providing access to EVENTS is also possible, i.e. SUB-EVENTS can be accessed through whole EVENTS:

- (16) *He **came** at precisely 7:45 PM.* (Langacker 2008: 70)
 (17) Hun. *Pontosan mikor **mentek** Debrecenbe?*
 'When exactly are you going to Debrecen?'

In Langacker's example, the complex EVENT of COMING provides access to one of its SUB-EVENTS, namely to its terminal component of ARRIVAL (the metonymic shift is indicated by the use of the point-like temporal expression *7:45 PM*, which facilitates the metonymic interpretation). In other words, COMING refers to the relatively prominent SUB-EVENT of ARRIVAL; the expression is a linguistic manifestation of the conceptual metonymy EVENT FOR ITS SUB-EVENT. The Hungarian example (17) is similar with the only difference that here GOING stands for another prominent SUB-EVENT, namely DEPARTURE.

Other peripheral elements of an EVENT may also serve as a metonymic reference point to an EVENT:

- (18) *She **was able to finish** her dissertation.* (Panther & Thornburg 1999: 334)

Panther and Thornburg analyze (18) in terms of the very abstract POTENTIALITY FOR ACTUALITY metonymy. Here the subject's ability to finish her dissertation (a PRE-CONDITION) refers to the actual accomplishment of finishing it.

As the variety of the examples discussed indicates, EVENT-metonymies are manifested on the level of linguistic expressions in an extreme heterogeneity of forms due to the immense variety of the cognitive reference points which can provide mental access to EVENTS. EVENTS are very complex conceptual structures in the sense that they are influenced by a large number of factors (participants, location, time, manner, intent etc.), they can be broken down into a theoretically infinite number of sub-events and they are connected to a principally infinite number of other EVENTS (among others their conceivable causes and effects). Their complexity opens up a wide range of choices between the possible cognitive reference points for

providing mental access, which in turn increases their variety regarding their linguistic manifestations.¹⁶

3.3 PROPERTY-metonymies

The target of PROPERTY-metonymies is a PROPERTY, or more precisely a SCALE against which a PROPERTY can be measured or a part of a PROPERTY-SCALE. A good example is provided in (19):

(19) *high temperature* (Radden 2002: 409)

A PROPERTY of a scale measuring temperature (the vertical extension of the mercury in the thermometer) provides mental access to a PROPERTY of the temperature measured. In this case mental access is provided to the PROPERTY of a THING by another PROPERTY of another, though related, THING.¹⁷ A case in which a PROPERTY of a THING provides mental access to another PROPERTY of the same THING would be the use of *tall* in (20), where the quantity of the whiskey is accessed through its vertical extension in a glass.

(20) *Pour me a nice tall whiskey.*

Other well-known examples can be analyzed along these lines:

(21a) *How tall are you?* [vertical extension of the body]

(21b) Hun. *Milyen magas vagy?*

(22a) *(body) height*

(22b) Hun. *testmagasság*

(23a) *How old is your brother?* [age]

(23b) Hun. *Milyen idős a testvéred?*

¹⁶ Their formal diversity is also indicated by the results reported in the literature concerned with the role of conceptual metonymy in grammar. The examined grammatical phenomena are very often based on conceptual metonymies that would be candidates for EVENT-metonymies in my classification, or are at least based on EVENT-schemas (see for example the contributions in Panther, Thornburg & Barcelona 2009 or Radden & Dirven 2007).

¹⁷ The expression in (19) may well be analyzed as a so called representational metonymy (for this notion see Warren 2006 or Barnden 2010): a property of the representation of temperature provides mental access to a property of the temperature.

- (24) Germ. *Wie **spät** ist es?* [time]
 Literally: 'How late is it?'
 'What time is it?'

In (21-24) one end of a SCALE serves as mental reference point to the whole SCALE. In (21) and (22) the upper end of the vertical extension scale (*tall, height*) refers to the whole scale. The same applies to (23), where instead of inquiring neutrally about one's age, the upper end of the SCALE is exploited metonymically.¹⁸ The German example (24) can be analyzed in a similar fashion: asking about time is performed with the help of referring to the upper SCALE of time measurement (*late*).

Based on the account of Radden and Kövecses (1999: 31-32) concerning the metonymic exploitation of the SCALE ICM it can be safely stated that not only the PROPERTIES of THINGS but also the PROPERTIES of EVENTS may be accessed with the help of one end of the SCALE:

- (25) *Henry is **speeding** again.*

In (25) the verb *to speed* expresses MOTION by verbalizing it in terms of the MANNER-OF-MOTION. The conceptual motivation of the noun-verb conversion may be considered as a special case of a conceptual metonymy, namely an EVENT-metonymy where a PROPERTY serves as cognitive reference point. The expression is furthermore based on a PROPERTY metonymy, in which the UPPER-END-OF-THE-SCALE is picked out as reference point for the WHOLE-SCALE. Radden and Kövecses accommodate the metonymy at hand as a case of PART-WHOLE metonymy. They argue as follows: "Scales are a special class of things and the scalar units are parts of them" (Radden & Kövecses 1999: 31-32).

Finally I would like to point out that it is also possible to provide mental access to a PROPERTY with the help of its opposite, and since a PROPERTY and its opposite are part of the same SCALE (ICM), this shift can also be considered metonymic. According to this view, verbal

¹⁸ The fact that two typologically unrelated languages (Hungarian and English) use the same strategy of conceptualizing a property may indicate that the upper end of a scale is widely used by languages to refer to whole scales, and that it is preferred to the lower end of the scale as a reference point to the whole scale.

irony motivated by conceptual metonymy can be considered as a sub-case of PROPERTY-metonymies:¹⁹

- (26a) *That's **great** news!* [bad news]
 (26b) Hun. *Ez **nagyszerű** hír!*
 (27) *That's **terrific** news!* [good news]

In (26) a positive PROPERTY accesses its negative counterpart. The reverse of the direction of the shift from positive to negative is also possible, especially in colloquial language, where they can be lexicalized as in (27). In both cases we can talk about PROPERTY-PROPERTY-metonymies.

Though their research is somewhat neglected in cognitive semantics and the data and analyses are rather scarce, my examples suggest that PROPERTY-metonymies are overwhelmingly manifested in the form of adjectives or adverbs on the level of linguistic expressions.

3.4 PROPOSITION-metonymies

In my definition, PROPOSITION-metonymies are metonymies whose target is a PROPOSITION, i.e. in these metonymies a PROPOSITION is being referred to. I use the term 'proposition' here in a very broad, pre-theoretic sense: I define a PROPOSITION as a type of conceptual content that is more complex and specific than the more general and schematic content of an EVENT, hence my notion has less to do with truth-values, or the possibility of assigning a truth value to a proposition, than with the elaborate construal of a specific situation. PROPOSITIONS can be accessed through other PROPOSITIONS and through their own PARTS (partial PROPOSITIONS or PARTICIPANTS of a PROPOSITION):

- (28) [How did you get to the party?] *I hopped on a bus.* (Lakoff 1987: 79)
 (29) A: *How did you get to the airport?*
 B: *I waved down a taxi.* (Gibbs 1999: 66)

¹⁹ For a proposal for assigning (at least partial) metonymic motivation to ironic expressions see Radden (2002: 416); for an approach that argues for a compatible but more complex treatment of irony see Voßhagen (1999).

(28) and (29) are well-known examples of the cognitive linguistic literature on metonymy. (29) originates from Gibbs, but has also been analyzed by Warren (1999: 121) to demonstrate the difference between referential and propositional metonymies. Both examples are instances of PROPOSITION-metonymies in which a PROPOSITION is used as a reference point in order to mentally access another related PROPOSITION (that is why I highlighted no particular part in the expression). In (28) 'I got to the party in a bus' (proposition B) is accessed through the proposition 'I hopped on a bus' (proposition A), where proposition A is a necessary pre-condition of proposition B which leads to the realization of B with a high probability. The same applies to (29), where proposition A 'I waved down a taxi' leads to a probable realization of proposition B 'I got to the airport by taxi'.

It has also been pointed out by Warren (1999, 2002, and especially 2006: 7-11) that the propositions in a propositional metonymy are linked by a weak if-then relation, i.e. proposition A does not necessarily lead to proposition B.²⁰ However, if proposition B holds, proposition A is so to say presupposed by proposition B, and the link between them is strong enough that mentioning proposition A allows us to mentally access proposition B with ease. Warren traces back the strength of the relation between A and B to conceptual and communicative/pragmatic factors.

The production and processing of expressions like (28) and (29) are made possible, according to Warren, on the one hand, because the two propositions are conceptualized as being contiguous, and on the other, because the context makes the interpretation B more relevant than A. The first prerequisite is clearly in accordance with my view that PROPOSITIONS as conceptual content are not completely different from THINGS as conceptual content. If PROPOSITIONS can be conceptualized as being contiguous (though I suppose in a metaphorically extended sense²¹) it may not be too far-fetched to claim that they can also be referred to. The consideration of the second prerequisite may be very fruitful. The role of relevance in the choice of the target and source in metonymy has already been pointed out (for instance Raden & Kövecses 1999: 50-51 or Ruiz de Mendoza & Díez Velasco

²⁰ This claim is in accordance with Panther and Thornburg's view on the contingent nature of metonymy (Panther & Thornburg 2004 and 2007, Panther 2005).

²¹ For the metaphorical extension of the category 'contiguity' see Peirsman and Geeraerts (2006a and 2006b) and the brief discussion of their approach in Section 4.

2002), and any further research into the question may lead to the systematic integration of Relevance Theoretic aspects and those of holistic cognitive linguistics, which may in turn bring new insights.²²

Examples (30) and (31) are cases where it can be assumed that a PROPOSITION is accessed through one of its elements (hence the highlights).

(30) *I don't want to end up **with a bullet in my brain**.*

(31) ***Jones** would be unlikely to sue us.* (Langacker 1999: 200)

In (30) a proposition ('I have a bullet in my brain') provides mental access to a larger proposition ('I die as a result of having a bullet in my brain'). The Subject-to-Subject raising construction in (31) has already been analyzed in terms of metonymy by Langacker (1999: 200), and his analysis strongly supports my claims regarding the possibility of referring to NON-THINGS: "the "raised" nominal (*Jones*) stands metonymically for the clausal event (*Jones sue us*) that participates directly in the main-clause relationship (be unlikely). Its *referent* is a kind of local topic for purposes of construing the infinitival complement [...]" [my italics M.T.]. In other words, a proposition ('Jones sues us') is accessed through one of its elements (*Jones*).

Finally, two comments should be made on PROPOSITION-metonymies. First, some EVENT-metonymies – especially those where an EVENT serves as a metonymic reference point to a related EVENT – are hard to distinguish from PROPOSITION-metonymies (consider for example Langacker's wording "for the clausal event" and my classification of (31) as a PROPOSITION-metonymy). The boundaries between the two categories are rather fuzzy. Until we have further psychological or neurological evidence for distinguishing between these two types of conceptual content the distinction remains only intuitive.

Secondly, though these expressions are motivated by conceptual metonymies and trigger metonymic inferential processes, they cannot readily be considered linguistic metonymies. A piece of propositional information may serve as input for further inferences in any form (not even expressed linguistically). For instance, let us consider (29)

²² Serious attempts have been made to integrate elements of Relevance Theory and cognitive linguistics into a hybrid theory in the field of metaphor research (Tendahl & Gibbs 2008 and Tendahl 2009). For a critical analysis and evaluation of these attempts see Csátár (2014: Chapter 4). A similar integrative framework regarding metonymy could also prove to be profitable.

again briefly: Speaker A makes a metonymy guided inference based on what Speaker B expresses with linguistic means in the form of a proposition ('I waved down a taxi') and arrives at B's intended proposition ('I got to the party in a taxi'). In another situation A may very well draw the same conclusion with the help of the same metonymic inference schema based on the same information coming from a non-linguistic source, for example she sees B waving down a taxi, and later on meeting B at the party, she may conclude that B arrived in a taxi. Note that the only difference is the linguistic vs. non-linguistic nature of the input information of the inference. In the first case it is a linguistically expressed proposition (a linguistic reference point) and in the second it is a piece of perceptual information (serving as a cognitive reference point for mentally accessing another PROPOSITION).

Accordingly, these cases, assuming that they are analyzed as being motivated by conceptual metonymy, may be instances of metonymic inferences and metonymic thinking, rather than metonymic language. Not considering these cases as linguistic metonymies is further supported by the fact stated by Warren (1999, 2002 and 2006) that propositional metonymies do not violate truth conditions, hence they can be taken literally, in which case they do not trigger further inferences, i.e. they do not provide indirect access to other conceptual contents, unlike referential metonymies. In other words, in the case of PROPOSITION-metonymies there are no linguistic clues that would lead the hearer to elaborate a metonymic interpretation, as opposed to the majority of referential metonymies, where linguistic clues – for instance phenomena similar to Pustejovsky's type coercion (Pustejovsky 1991, 1995) – indicate that a metonymic interpretation is called for. What triggers the metonymic interpretation in cases like (29) is information from our world knowledge and general pragmatic principles such as the principle of relevance proposed by relevance theorists.²³

²³ It is important to note that I do not deny that the possibility of metonymic interpretation is also dependent on language specific factors, i.e. the degree of conventionality and the applicability of some metonymic paths (or natural inference schemas) can differ from language to language to a considerable extent (see for example Panther & Thornburg 1999, Brdar 2009 or Radden & Seto 2003).

3.5 *Speech act metonymies*

The last type of metonymy I am concerned with in this section is so called speech act or illocutionary metonymy (Thornburg & Panther 1997, Panther & Thornburg 1998, 1999 and 2003b). In this type a certain communicative intention is accessed with the help of a linguistic form otherwise associated with a different communicative intention, i.e. they make it possible for the hearer to infer an implicit intention of the speaker disguised in the form of another intention, or in other words, seeming intentions provide mental access to other intentions. In Panther and Thornburg's (1999: 346) analyses, (32) – as an instance of the POTENTIALITY FOR ACTUALITY metonymy – qualifies as an example.

(32) *Can you pass the salt?* (Panther & Thornburg 1999: 346)

The question form seemingly indicates the intent of the speaker to get information about the ability of the hearer to do something, but with the help of the context and a metonymic inference schema the speaker's implicit intention to make a request is accessed indirectly.²⁴

It is important to note that my second comment on PROPOSITION-metonymies also applies to speech act metonymies, in that they are not exclusively connected to linguistic forms (it is enough to mention gesticulation, facial expressions or simply when intentions are expressed by and inferred on the basis of methods other than speech acts).

4 **A contiguity-based and a pragmatic classification of metonymy**

Before concluding my paper it is worthwhile to compare and contrast my approach with other cognitive linguistic approaches to the classification of metonymy. In this section I would like to compare my approach based on the type of the conceptual content involved in metonymy with a contiguity-based definition and typology of metonymy

²⁴ The 'Can you/Could you X' construction is conventionalized in English as a construction associated with making requests, which seems to indicate that the speech act metonymy described here has become a conventionalized part of the pragmatic meaning of the construction at hand.

(Peirsman & Geeraerts 2006a, 2006b) and a pragmatically oriented classification (Thornburg & Panther 1997, Panther & Thornburg 1999, 2003b, 2003c, 2007).

The classification of Peirsman and Geeraerts (2006a and 2006b) is based on an insight formulated by John R. Taylor as follows: "This character suggests a rather broader understanding of metonymy than that given by traditional rhetoric. *The entities need not be contiguous, in any spatial sense.* Neither is metonymy restricted to the act of reference." (Taylor 1995: 124, my italics M.T.). Peirsman and Geeraerts examine the relationship between contiguity and metonymy and have elaborated on the notion of contiguity. Namely, they systematically consider cases of conceptual contiguity in its spatial and non-spatial senses. The essence of their approach is that they define contiguity on a conceptual level, i.e. their notion of contiguity is not restricted to a spatial sense, although they consider it the central case of the prototypically organized category of contiguous relationships. They extend the core of the category along three dimensions (strength of contact, boundedness and domain) which deploy different degrees of prototypicality, often using metaphoric strategies of category extension.

Accordingly, in their approach, the prototypical contiguity relationship between two conceptual entities is a part-whole relationship (i.e. the absolute proximity on the strength of contact scale) between two bounded entities in a spatial domain. Less prototypical cases are located further away from the core along the three above mentioned continua (weaker contact between less bounded entities in non-spatial domains). Peirsman and Geeraerts argue that this notion of contiguity as a prototypically organized category accounts for a great majority of metonymic patterns within the framework of cognitive linguistics, i.e. in the analytic sections of their paper they define and classify metonymy in terms of their extended notion of contiguity.

As can be seen, Taylor points out that two notions traditionally considered to be definitional properties of metonymy (contiguity and referentiality) cannot be applied without any further reflection to the notion of metonymy in the light of the results of the cognitive linguistic research done in the field. The idea that the application of the notion of contiguity as it had been used in traditional approaches to metonymy (in a strictly spatial sense) is not adequate to describe the conceptual processes assumed to be metonymic by cognitive linguists is clearly reflected by his adding the remark "in any spatial sense".

What Peirsman and Geeraerts' work achieves is a cognitive linguistically more applicable notion of contiguity which can be used for a systematic account of earlier uncovered metonymic patterns.

Elsewhere (Tóth in preparation) I have attempted to do the same with the notion of referentiality. In its present form I cannot readily agree with Taylor's observation that metonymy cannot be restricted to an act of reference. As pointed out in Section 2, in my view the formulation would require the same remark as "in any spatial sense" in the case of contiguity, accordingly I accept the above mentioned observation in a slightly modified form, namely I share the assumption that metonymy cannot be restricted to an act of reference in the traditional sense of the term 'reference' and I argue that an act of reference cannot be restricted to cases where a nominal expression singles out a piece of the extra-linguistic world, or more precisely a THING-type conceptual content.

My approach and that of Peirsman and Geeraerts are in accordance but they consider different aspects of metonymy. They need not be measured against each other; they are complementary rather than mutually exclusive. What they have in common is that both approaches consider metonymy as a prototypically structured category whose prototypicality is a natural consequence of the prototypical organization of the categories with the help of which they are defined, i.e. a prototypically organized category of contiguity in Peirsman and Geeraerts' approach and a prototypically organized category of referentiality in my approach, but it is not unreasonable to assume that the category 'metonymy' may be organized along multiple axes regarding its properties which show prototype effects.

The differences lie in the perspective the two approaches take to the aspects of metonymy. Peirsman and Geeraerts concentrate on the relationship between the conceptual contents connected by metonymy whereas I have focused on the nature of the conceptual content connected by the metonymic relationship. In this latter respect it is important to note that the prototypical case of the zero contiguity relation (part-whole) between two bounded conceptual entities in the spatial domain is compatible with the prototypical case of reference where a prototypical THING is used to provide mental access to another prototypical THING. Peirsman and Geeraerts' classification also makes use of the type of the conceptual content connected by a contiguity relation, since the 'boundedness' of a conceptual entity is defined by the type of conceptual content it belongs to.

The major difference between their approach and mine is which aspect of the metonymical relationship is emphasized: Peirsman and Geeraerts concentrate on the contiguity-based relationship connecting conceptual contents whereas my approach concentrates on the nature of the conceptual content connected by the metonymic relationship. The fact pointed out by Peirsman and Geeraerts that NON-THINGS can also stand in a contiguity relationship (a property traditionally associated with spatial objects) also indicates that THING-like and NON-THING-like conceptual contents are not completely different in certain respects, which in turn further supports my claim that basically any type of conceptual content can be mentally accessed, i.e. referred to.

Among the pragmatic classifications of metonymy the most widely held and applied is Panther and Thornburg's (Thornburg & Panther 1997, Panther & Thornburg 1999, 2003b, 2003c, 2007). In their view, conceptual metonymies serve as natural inference schemas, i.e. more or less conventionalized paths leading from source to target, which facilitate inferences drawn at every level or phase of meaning construction. They classify metonymies according to their pragmatic function, i.e. at which level of the meaning construction a certain metonymy is applied.

Referential metonymies such as *the ham sandwich* in (1) are cases of indirect reference, their function is to refer to things (in the traditional sense) and make them available for predications. Predicational metonymies as in (8-10) are employed in the interpretation of metonymic predicates. These two types are labeled by Panther and Thornburg as propositional metonymies,²⁵ since they are applied during the construction of propositions. The third group of metonymies consists of so called illocutionary metonymies which are inference schemas that guide us by arriving at explicatures and implicatures. Panther and Thornburg also point out that metonymies with different functions can co-occur in the interpretation of the same expression and that "conceptual metonymies often cut across the pragmatic types" (2007: 247).

Despite the different notions of reference they rely on, the content-based approach proposed here and Panther and Thornburg's classification are not incompatible, but focus on different aspects of meton-

²⁵ It can be noted that their use of the term differs from that of Warren (see Subsection 3.4 and Warren 1999, 2002 and 2006).

ymy. If we set aside what is understood by reference, it still remains a fact that at different levels of the pragmatic meaning construction process different types of conceptual content are accessed. During reference-fixing (in the traditional sense) we mentally activate THINGS; when we interpret predications, usually EVENTS are accessed; the construction of propositions calls for the combination of THINGS, EVENTS and PROPERTIES; and in order to arrive at explicatures and implicatures we access PROPOSITIONS or parts of PROPOSITIONS.²⁶

5 Conclusion

My argumentation has been founded on the assumption that any type of conceptual content can be accessed by a reference point; hence the target of an act of reference cannot be reduced to THINGS. Consequently any type of conceptual content can be made available metonymically, and conceptual metonymies can be classified based on the type of the target and source content. The preliminaries of such a classification were outlined in Section 3. I have tried to show that the notion of referentiality proposed in Section 1 can provide us with the basis of a typology of metonymy according to what type of conceptual content is accessed indirectly through what type of cognitive and linguistic reference points. My classification suggests that the prototypicality of metonymies depends heavily on the type of conceptual content accessed and the type of conceptual content that serves as the reference point.

The content-based approach to the classification of metonymy turns out to be compatible with already established classifications based on the relationship between source and target and those based on their pragmatic function. My aim was not to challenge pre-existing classifications of metonymy, but to show that the consideration of a somewhat neglected aspect of conceptual metonymy (the content involved) is a promising line of investigation. It seems that the different

²⁶ What I have outlined here is far from a fully-fledged model of pragmatic meaning construction that can accommodate conceptual metonymy as one of its general principles. My aim was simply to show that the two approaches are compatible and that the question of how conceptual metonymy can be accommodated within, or reconciled with, current theories of general pragmatic meaning construction is a promising line of investigation.

aspects focused on by the different classifications (relationship between source and target, content type of source and target, and pragmatic function) are interrelated and heavily interdependent. Different types of contents can be related by different contiguity-based connections, and certain types of content are accessed during certain phases of pragmatic meaning construction.

It must be noted that my classification is somewhat preliminary and, of course, in need of further refinements and stronger empirical foundations. As can be seen, the data on which my argumentation has been built come from three sources. The majority of the examples discussed are well-known from the literature (most of them created by other authors), some of them have been created and analyzed based on my own intuition and introspection, and a minority of them has come to my attention sporadically. Further systematic, empirically founded case studies applying a content-based classification would shed more light on the general applicability, deficiencies and possible benefits of the approach.

Finally, it has to be admitted that my content-based approach does not suffice to describe all aspects of conceptual metonymy; systematic case studies should be conducted in an integrative way taking into consideration (i) the type of the conceptual content accessed by the metonymic reference point; (ii) the type of the conceptual content serving as the reference point; (3) the relationship between the target and the source content and (4) the role the metonymic activation of a certain content plays in pragmatic meaning construction, i.e. the pragmatic function of the metonymy. These integrative investigations may shed light on the ways in which these aspects are interrelated and dependent on each other, which in turn may contribute to a better understanding of metonymy as a conceptual mechanism, as a meaning construction device and as a linguistic phenomenon.

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A contrastive study of English and Hungarian discourse markers in mediatised interviews and natural conversations*

Abstract

In the present case study we will take a discourse-pragmatic as well as contrastive approach to some of the most frequently used discourse markers in spoken interaction: English *I mean, of course, oh, well, I think* and *you know*, and Hungarian *hát* (~'well'), *mondjuk* (~'let's say'), *ugye* (~'is that so?') and *amúgy* (~'otherwise', ~'by the way'). We will examine their use in three corpora: (1) a corpus of political interviews broadcast by the BBC and CNN between 2003 and 2011, (2) a corpus of different types of media discourse (including political interviews and panel discussions) broadcast between 2009 and 2012 by the Hungarian TV channels Duna TV, ATV, Hír TV, MTV and TV2, and (3) the HuComTech corpus, an annotated collection of informal Hungarian dialogues. The major question we would like to answer is whether or not the uses of the selected discourse markers differ across the various discourse types/genres (natural conversations, different types of political interviews and panel discussions). After a short introduction to the characteristics of the political interview as institutional, political and media discourse, we will briefly outline the state of research into the functional class of non-conceptual items that we refer to as discourse

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markers (henceforth DMs). We will argue that DM research can contribute a great deal to the study of media discourse, since several DMs are used strategically (at times manipulatively) in political interviews, thus, our secondary aim is to uncover the underlying strategies behind such DM uses in the empirical sections of the study. *Keywords:* discourse markers, pragmatic markers, media discourse, political discourse, genre analysis

1 Introduction – the political interview as a genre

A mediated political interview can be defined as a dyadic encounter between an interviewer (henceforth IR) and an interviewee (henceforth IE), directed at a public audience (Fetzer 2008). The nature of the political interview is best understood in terms of its formal-functional characteristics as institutional talk, (cf. Heritage & Greatbatch 1991) political discourse and mediated as well as mediatised discourse. The participants' roles, functions and underlying motivations are determined by the institutional setting in which political interviews are produced. As a result, the IR's role is to represent a media organization (in our corpora, the BBC, CNN and Duna TV, ATV, etc.) in accordance with the specific guidelines set forth (such as guidelines for impartiality, accuracy, integrity, etc.), whereas the IE represents a political organization (political party, government, civil society, etc.) with a clear purpose to spread and propagate the organization's concepts, views, activities and slogans. Regarding the mediation of political interviews, it is commonly observed that in political interviews there are two different frames of interaction that occur simultaneously: a first-frame interaction between the IR(s) and the IE(s), as well as a second-frame interaction between the first-frame participants and the audience, either present in the studio or in front of their television sets (cf. Fetzer 2000). Thus, the political interview can be best described as a dialogue-within-dialogue scenario (cf. Fetzer 2008). Ideally, the IR voices the whole spectrum of public opinion, or at least, that of the target audience of the TV channel, while the IEs' aim is to gain favour with the audience, influence their views, beliefs, decisions, actions, etc. in a way that is beneficial to the organization represented.

From a structural-organizational perspective, political interviews can be described as dyadic with a very specific turn-taking mechanism and set of constraints: there is an asymmetrical relationship between the IR and the IE in that the former invariably produces the

first-pair part of adjacency pairs¹ (usually a question prefaced or followed by a comment), selects the IE as the next speaker, who produces the second-pair part (a response / reaction to the IR's preceding question or comment), while the two roles are almost never reversed. Due to the genre-specific norms of interviews as well as a set of expectations on the part of the audience, the content of the IE's turns always have to, at least, appear relevant to the IR's first-pair part. If, however, the IE's second-pair part is dispreferred (e.g. it expresses disagreement) or appears irrelevant, it is duly noted by the IR, a feature that is clearly different from the mechanisms of other genres such as naturally-occurring conversations. Moreover, the avoidance of direct/straight answers – usually introduced/marked by DMs, such as *well* – is also typical of political interviews. While political interviews are expected to proceed in a series of Q-A pairs, informal conversations are more likely to proceed in a less predictable manner and are intertwined with lengthy elaborations, narratives and side sequences as the speakers jump from one topic to another in a sometimes unmotivated way. Due to the different scenarios followed in these different discourse types, the functional spectra of DMs are also likely to differ in the discourse genres under scrutiny (natural conversation, political interview, panel discussion). Typical participants of everyday, casual conversations usually aim at gaining favour with their interlocutors. In other words, their goal is to save their own and their partner's face, i.e. to avoid or reduce the force of face-threatening acts. In contrast, most types of political interviews typically include face-threatening acts such as impolite, direct questions.

The above features of political interviews result in a set of pragmatic-linguistic realizations that are specific to this genre, the use of DMs being one of them. Before we discuss the genre-specific use of DMs in mediated discourses, however, let us briefly sum up the features of this class of linguistic items.

¹ We use the terms adjacency pair, first- and second-pair part as in Schegloff (1972).

2 The study of discourse markers and their significance in genre analysis

Discourse markers (DMs)² are generally seen as a subclass of pragmatic markers (Fraser 1996, 2009) and can be defined as sequentially dependent elements which bracket units of talk (Schiffrin 1987), or metalinguistic items that provide information about the segmentation and operation of a discourse (Fraser 1999: 931). In other words, they signal the functional organization of discourse, the kinds of relations a speaker perceives between different parts of the discourse. Fraser (1999) suggests that such metalinguistic items link two sentences or clauses together. Redeker (1991, 2006) proposes that DMs connect not only adjacent clauses and sentences, but utterances and their contexts as well. Moreover, coherence relations expressed by DMs can even hold between utterances or topical units further apart from each other. Accordingly, Lenk (1998) distinguishes between local DMs (marking utterance-level relations) and global DMs (marking topic relations). Global discourse markers (GDMs) may establish connections between different types of topic: they may refer back to a prior topic (retrospective GDM) or they might signal to the hearer that the speaker wants to insert something and they indicate what kind of contribution is likely to follow (prospective GDM). Following yet another terminology, Redeker (2006) talks about coherence-oriented marker uses, referred to as discourse operators, the definition of which is similar to discourse connectives in Relevance Theory (Blakemore 1992). Over the past few decades DMs have been researched from a variety of perspectives and theoretical frameworks such as Relevance Theory, Rhetorical Structure Theory, Construction Grammar, coherence-based studies, Interactional Sociolinguistics, Conversation Analysis, Speech Act Theory, Grammaticalization theories, Natural Semantic Metalanguage, Computational Pragmatics, etc. To highlight only one of the most significant of these approaches, Relevance Theory (Sperber & Wilson 1986/1995) draws attention to the role of DMs in facilitating the hearer's task of decoding the message. In this respect, DMs contribute to "relevance understanding by reducing the processing effort needed by the hearer to reach the in-

² Discourse markers have been called by a host of different names such as discourse connective, discourse operator, discourse particle, cue phrase, pragmatic marker, pragmatic force modifier, pragmatic expression depending on the approach taken to the linguistic items under discussion.

tended interpretation" (Aijmer & Simon-Vanderbergen 2009: 16). In the framework of hearer-oriented models (focusing on interpretation), the role of markers is to provide instructions to the hearer on how to integrate the DMs' host utterances into a developing mental model of an optimally coherent discourse. From a cognitive perspective, DMs play an important role with regard to the processes of pragmatic inferences, in other words, in guiding hearers in their efforts to find out what is not explicitly stated but is implied by a given utterance. Because of DMs' potential to restrain the number of possible interpretations, a piece of discourse without discourse markers is often more ambiguous than intended. In Schiffrin's view of multilayered interaction, DMs create contextual coordinates that indicate for the hearer how an utterance is to be interpreted (1987). On the other hand, in the framework of speaker-oriented models of communication, DMs – which Östman calls pragmatic particles – implicitly convey the speaker's attitudes and emotions (Östman 1995). Similarly, in Schourup's view, these items are involved with a disclosure of covert thinking (1985).

Due to DMs' extreme multifunctionality and context-dependence, their study is especially relevant to genre-based analyses. Therefore, it is surprising that, in spite of the widespread interest in DMs in a variety of research fields including genre analysis, very few studies have investigated the role of DMs in mediatised political discourse. In the following section we will provide a brief overview of some of the most relevant case studies pertaining to English and Hungarian political interviews. After the description of our research corpus in section 4, we will try to narrow down the above mentioned empirical gap in section 5 by describing some of the most frequent English DMs' genre-specific use in BBC news interviews along with some Hungarian DMs' use in natural conversations as well as in several types of media discourse.

3 Previous studies

3.1 Previous research on mediatised political discourse

Political interviews have been studied from several semantic, pragmatic and discourse-organizational perspectives, such as information structure, overlapping speech, discursive modes and manipulative language strategies, to mention but a few. However, as mentioned

above, very few studies have focussed specifically on the role of DMs. A notable exception is Zovko (2012), who compared the use of DMs in interviews with presidents of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the functions of DMs in interviews with US presidents. There are a number of additional case studies, which, however, concentrate on particular DMs, such as *of course* or *really*, rather than the functional distribution of a set of DMs, cf. e.g. Simon-Vandenberg et al. (2007) or Simon-Vandenberg (1988).

The functional distribution of a set of DMs has not been studied in Hungarian political interviews, either. Zimányi (2008: 116-8), for example, analyzes manipulative language use in general, using Hungarian parliamentary speeches as data, and points out that politicians do not aim at providing factual information, instead, for the most part, they try to manipulate the emotions of the audience by asking face-threatening questions and giving face-threatening replies with a view to painting an unfavourable picture of the political opponent. In addition, Schirm (2010) analysed the use of the Hungarian *vajon* (~*I wonder*) in parliamentary speeches and followed it up with an analysis of multi-party talk shows (2011), as well.

3.2 Previous accounts of the selected DMs in non-politicized discourse

DMs have been predominantly studied in terms of their role in the organization of discourse structure in argumentative dialogues, sociolinguistic interviews (Schiffrin 1987), phone conversations, dialogues of highly interactive nature, and conversations at various (mostly business) meetings. Most studies focus on the analysis of a single DM, such as *I mean* or *well*. In what follows we will briefly sum up the relevant findings of some of the most prominent DM researchers on the English and Hungarian DMs we are going to analyse in the empirical part of our paper.

I mean, along with *well* and *you know*, is probably one of the most widely researched DMs. Crystal and Davy (1975) demonstrate that *I mean* can be glossed as 'in other words', 'what I have been saying amounts to the following', or 'my specific meaning is that'. Its major role is to clarify the meaning of the speaker's immediately preceding stretch of speech or an expression that the speaker is reformulating. The inserted DM (*I mean*) is typically preceded by an interruption point, which disrupts the intonational contour of the utterance. Fur-

ther functions include signalling a paraphrase or assessment of the previous utterance, performing an act of explanation or elaboration and/or providing a fresh angle about a previous topic as well as expressing a second thought/change of mind. Schiffrin defines *I mean* as a marker of the "speaker's upcoming modification of the meaning of his / her own prior talk" (Schiffrin 1987: 296). Its two main functions are "expansions of ideas" and "explanations of intention" (Schiffrin 1987: 296). Similarly, Swan argues that *I mean* introduces explanations, additional detail, opinion statements and corrections, while it can also serve as "a general-purpose connector or 'filler' with little real meaning" (Swan 1997: 159). Other functions include "softening" and "gaining time" (Swan 1997: 159).

Of course, similarly to *I mean*, has been described from a variety of perspectives: Holmes (1988) looks at the distribution of *of course* with respect to gender differences, Lewis (2006) takes a diachronic perspective and discusses rhetorical motivations for the development of a variety of its discourse-pragmatic functions. While Simon-Vandenberg (1992) highlights the utility of *of course* in conversation management, Simon-Vandenberg and Aijmer (2002/03) analyze *of course* from a cross-linguistic perspective as well as in the framework of Bakhtin's (1987) notion of heteroglossia.³

As for previous studies on Hungarian DMs, both formal analyses (e.g. Gyuris 2008) and functional analyses have been carried out, including the synchronic (e.g. Kiefer 1988, Németh T. 1998) and sometimes even diachronic description of individual DMs. Mention has to be made of, for example, Dér (2005) on *mellesleg* (~'by the way') and *más szóval* (~'in other words'), Dömötör (2008) on *úgy mond* (~'so to speak') and *hogy úgy mondjam* (~'so to speak'), and Shirm (2011) on *hát* (~'well'), and the rogative particles *-e*, and *vajon*.

For the purposes of the present case study of contrasting English and Hungarian DMs, we have selected Hungarian DMs which are frequent in spoken interaction but are, nevertheless, less widely researched. What is more, none of the three DMs under scrutiny (*mondjuk* ~ 'let's say', *ugye* ~ 'is that so?', *amúgy* ~ 'otherwise') have been described in corpus-based case studies. In what follows we describe the meanings and functions of the selected Hungarian DMs as they are described in dictionaries and other reference books with a view to contrasting such descriptions with the individual DMs' actual

³ Bakhtin (1987) quoted in Simon-Vandenberg & Aijmer (2002/03).

roles and functions in corpora based on casual conversations and different types of media discourse.

We have used three sources to map their meanings, two Hungarian monolingual dictionaries (Ittzés 2006, Pusztai 2003) and a historical linguistic volume on the development of Hungarian grammar (Benkő 1992).

In addition to its conceptual use as an inflected form of the verb 'mond' (~ 'we say', 'we are saying', 'we call', 'let's say'), *mondjuk* (~ 'let's say') is much more frequently used in spoken interaction as a verbal particle with procedural meaning. Two meanings are given in the entry of this verbal particle in Pusztai's monolingual dictionary (2003): it can be glossed either as 'for example' or 'let's suppose/assume/say' (assumption/presumption). However, Pusztai does not mention its commonly observed function of marking concession or contrast that we have managed to identify in our corpora.

As far as *ugye* (~ 'is that so?') is concerned, it is classified into various syntactic categories in different dictionaries, such as adverb, modifier, question word/tag question and (rogative) particle. Based on the meanings listed in Pusztai (2003), (1) it marks the expectation of cooperation and agreement (positive answer), (2) it expresses politeness / makes a question sound more polite, (3) it introduces explanations and excuses, (4) it can be used to emphasize (the validity of) facts (5) it is also often used as a simple filler without any specific meaning. In the course of our corpus analysis we will point out the significance of *ugye* (~ 'is that so?') in marking evidentiality, a function that is completely missing from dictionary entries. Secondly, its role in connection with narratives/story structure as well as lists identified in the empirical part of our study is also absent from reference books.

As for the last Hungarian item under scrutiny, *amúgy* (~ 'otherwise') has several related meanings listed as an adverbial in Pusztai (2003), including (1) 'in a different way' ('in another way'), (2) 'in a typical way' ('typical of somebody or an activity'), and (3) 'in an unusual way'. Besides these adverbial meanings, Ittzés (2006, volume II) also lists its non-conceptual/DM uses that can be glossed as 'otherwise' and 'besides this'. It is important to point out that its role in the thematic control of conversations is not mentioned in either dictionaries although *amúgy* is frequently used to introduce topic shifts and to mark comments, opinions and side sequences.

4 The research corpus

The corpus we compiled for the analysis of English DMs consists of 37 political interviews broadcast on BBC. The individual interviews are between 30 minutes to 60 minutes long, thus, this corpus comprises a total of 79,225 words \pm 2%, allowing for technical / transcript-specific information such as the indication of participants' names. In our BBC corpus, IEs talk, on average, 71% of the time, while IRs' turns take up 29% of the interview time.

The analyses of Hungarian DMs have been carried out on two different types of spoken corpora which are comparable in terms of their size: one involving natural, informal conversations and one comprising different types of mediated political discourse. The natural speech subcorpus comprises 20 informal/casual dialogues on everyday topics (approximately 20-25 minutes each) extracted from the multimodal HuComTech corpus (altogether approximately 450 minutes (7.5 hours), with a constant participant talking 44% of the interview time, and 20 other participants talking 66% of the interview time). This subcorpus of the HuComTech corpus contains 195 tokens of *mondjuk* (~'let's say'), 60 tokens of *ugye* (~'is that so?') and 33 tokens of *amúgy* (~'otherwise'). The second Hungarian subcorpus involves a variety of media discourses:

- a collection of seven formal/confrontational evening political interviews broadcast on ATV (each of them last for approximately 60 minutes and feature one constant IR and seven different IEs.),
- two more casual "breakfast" political interviews (broadcast on TV2),
- two interviews from news reports (one broadcast on MTV, the other on Hír TV)
- two panel discussions (broadcast on Duna TV).

This media subcorpus also comprises altogether approximately 450 minutes (7.5 hours), collected from mindroom.hu, an automatic media observer website. It includes 135 tokens of *mondjuk* (~'let's say'), 98 tokens of *ugye* (~'is that so?') and 25 tokens of *amúgy* (~'otherwise'). The majority of the Hungarian media interviews that we analysed were taken from two programmes that can be contrasted in terms of their different scenarios and the different strategies employed: one is *Egyenes beszéd* ('Straight talk') broadcast on Hungarian ATV and the other is *Törzsasztal* ('Customary table') aired on Duna TV. On the one hand, the typical scenario that unfolds in *Egyenes beszéd* is a series of

questions posed by the IR and the corresponding answers produced by the IE. Here we can observe an asymmetry in power relations in that the IR directs the flow and the topics of the conversation. *Törzsasztal*, on the other hand, is a panel discussion featuring acknowledged experts with symmetrical power relations. Even though these panel discussions also feature a host who tends to allocate speaker turns, all panel members have the opportunity to take the floor at any time, and defend their views against those of other panel members. The topics of the show centre on various controversial social, political and cultural issues that usually trigger interesting discussions and clashing viewpoints.

5 Comparison of the use of DMs in naturally-occurring conversations and political interviews

In the present section we discuss the results of a series of corpus-based analyses and provide the classification of DMs according to different contexts of use. The subsections describe the various textual relations/contextual factors DMs may mark in discourse. The relations and functions in question include elaboration/expansion, modification/specification, response-marking vs. marking questions, evidentiality, heteroglossia, ventriloquizing as well as a variety of minor strategic uses. Our assumption is that independently of the language of interaction, the functional spectrum of a DM varies in different contexts and genres. Particular discourse functions are performed/expressed in different proportions in media discourse as opposed to casual talk. One of the reasons for this functional variation may be the norm that an interviewer reacts/interacts not only on his own behalf in the conversation, but also animates the potential questions and reactions of the audience.

5.1 DMs marking frames and contrasting roles

The IR's and the IE's respective roles in political interviews can be contrasted from the perspective of information management as well as conversational mechanisms. As for the former, we can approach the function of *I mean* from the perspective of processing information along the lines of Jucker and Smith (1998), who distinguish between *reception markers* (e.g. *oh, okay*), which mark reactions to first-pair

parts in adjacency pairs (e.g. statements, questions), and *presentation markers*, which elaborate on and/or alter the information provided by the previous speaker. Information-centered presentation markers, such as *like* modify the unit of information itself, while addressee-centered presentation markers, such as *I mean* relate the information to the assumed knowledge state of the addressee.

On the basis of tagging 143 tokens of the lexical item *mean* in our BBC corpus, the following patterns can be observed:

1. *mean* is a content word in 29 cases, but is a part of the DM *I mean* in the remaining 114 tokens;
2. *I mean* is primarily used by IEs (101 times), there are only 13 examples where an IR utters *I mean*, which is low, even considering the fact that IRs' talking time is shorter than that of IEs (cf. section 4 above);
3. *I mean* functions as a filler in only 2 tokens, it marks false starts 17 times and cancels the content or the implicature of the previous utterance 9 times;
4. in the majority of cases (54 times in the case of IEs and 13 out of 13 times when uttered by an IR) *I mean* functions as a marker of explanation and / or elaboration.

Finding 1 above underscores the conversationalization of the genre under scrutiny: the high D-value⁴ of *mean* clearly indicates that present-day British political interviews bear the mark of conversational style. This tendency has been noticed by several researchers. Fetzer and Weizman (2006), for example, state that "politics has undergone dramatic changes [in that] the primarily monologue-oriented mode of discourse, which prevailed in the fifties, sixties, seventies and eighties, is no longer considered to be appropriate in the western and Anglo-American contexts" (Fetzer & Weizman 2006, 146).

Findings 2 and 3 are related to yet another aspect of the asymmetrical role between IRs and IEs: the higher incidence of *I mean* used by IEs can be explained, on the one hand, by the fact that the more comfortable one feels in a particular institutional setting, the less likely

⁴ The categorial multifunctionality of DMs is described in terms of their "D-function ratio" or D-value (a term proposed by Stenström 1990), i.e. in terms of their discourse function in relation to their function as grammatical or content words. The D-value of *oh*, for example, is 100% in the London-Lund Corpus, since it is used exclusively as a DM, whereas *well* showed a D-value of 86%.

s/he needs to resort to discourse-monitoring uses of DMs,⁵ such as stalling or lexical search. On the other hand, it is also related to the degree of planning that is involved on the part of IRs and IEs. Unplanned discourse is characterised by an increased number of discourse-monitoring DMs, this is why IEs are likely to use more tokens of *I mean* in general and more reformulative (rather than explanative) and opaque (i.e. semantically bleached) tokens of *I mean* in particular.

With regard to finding 4, two distinct structures can be observed as the most typical genre-specific uses of *I mean*: IRs most often use it in a [question preface + *I mean* + question] format (cf. example 1), while IEs tend to use it in an [answer preface / short answer + *I mean* + elaboration / example / explanation] structure (cf. example 2):

example 1

IR: She's asked you about deaths of innocent people, ***I mean*** as a Christian how do you feel about innocent people dying? (BBC *Newsnight* 2003-02-06)

example 2

IR: You said this year, the concept of profit can and should play an increasing role in improving the quality of public services - how do you justify that?

IE: Well there are two things I'd say about that, ***I mean*** if you take the National Health Service for example 90 per cent of ... (BBC *Politics Show* 2005-11-13)

Among Hungarian DMs, *ugye* (~'is that so?') also marks the contrastive roles of IRs' and IEs'. On the one hand, IRs often insert it into yes-no questions to signal that they expect to receive a preferred response/agreement. In this position, its function is similar to that of an English tag question and its meaning can be glossed as 'right?', 'do you agree?'. On the other hand, IEs tend to use *ugye* (~'is that so?') in their explanations in order to emphasize the validity/importance of their arguments. With respect to these two functions, *ugye* (~'is that so?') can be considered as the functional equivalent of *I mean* in English. Concerning its use in questions, two distinct ways of use can be described in our corpus of Hungarian political interviews and panel discussion in terms of whether or not the speaker actually expects a

⁵ Cf. e.g. O'Barr & Atkins's (1980) study of the use of DMs in courtroom settings.

reply. If s/he does not, that is, if the question is not directly addressed to the other speaker, *ugye* (~'is that so?') marks a rhetorical question aimed at manipulating the audience's perception of the validity of an argument.

Similarly, *mondjuk* (~'let's say', 'or say') also operates on the level of participation framework, most of the time anchoring the speaker's productive role, therefore, it can also be seen as a *presentation marker* (Jucker & Smith 1998), a *marker of expansion* or a *marker of modification* (cf. Saz Rubio 2007: 97-98). It commonly functions as a presentation marker modifying a unit of information, rather than a reception marker signalling a reaction to the other speaker's utterance(s) (for more on the distinction between presentation markers and reception markers cf. Jucker & Smith 1998). As a reception marker, it may stand alone ('*Mondjuk.*') in the second pair part of an adjacency pair (with only 3 occurrences in our corpus) marking a reaction of partial agreement with the statement, opinion or yes-no question of the other speaker. Alternatively, *mondjuk* (~'let's say') may introduce a second-pair part marking the speaker's attitude and framing the entire subsequent utterance as its host unit as in the following example:

example 3

IE: Ha jól gondoljuk és a kutatásoknak hiszünk, akkor nem valószínű, nem biztos, vagy csak ötven százalékban tekerik át a reklámblokkokat. (*If we are right and if we can believe the opinion polls, it's not likely... we can't be sure that people fast forward commercials only 50% of the time*)

IR: Ez **mondjuk** meglepő számomra, ez a szám! (*This is **DM**^{mondjuk} a surprise for me, this data*) (TV2 *Mokka* 2013-03-26)

5.2 DMs marking coherence relations

This subsection analyses the various subtypes of elaboration and expansion, namely, modification, specification and explanation. In general terms, the elaboration of a previous aspect or aspects of the preceding discourse segment can take the form of clarification, specification or definition in terms of the notion or the idea conveyed in the previous discourse segment. We will, first of all, see if all these functions are expressed by *I mean* in English and *mondjuk* (~'let's say') in Hungarian in our respective corpora.

González (2004) describes the functions of DMs, including *I mean*, with reference to story structure. Her research shows that the two

most common functions of *I mean* in narratives are to mark (1) reformulation of previous information and (2) internal evaluation of the events presented in the narrative.

Similarly, applying Shiffrin's (1987) framework (involving various planes of talk) to describe the functional spectrum of *mondjuk* (~'let's say'), one of its primary functions is to mark information state transitions. It is often inserted when the speaker replaces a unit of information with another one. *Mondjuk* (~'let's say') can also be analysed on the action structure plane of talk (cf. Shiffrin 1987: 315-317) since it usually prefaces actions such as clarification/specification/approximation (example 4), correction/self-repair (example 5), modification (example 6), compression (example 7), as subtypes of reformulation (c.f. Saz Rubio 2007: 84-98), or disagreement.

example 4

gyorsan megy a motorom **mondjuk** 120-140-nel (*my bike is really fast, it can do $DM^{mondjuk}$ 120-140 kmphs*) (HuComTech, 017)

example 5

ez egy éve lehetett vagy **mondjuk mondjuk** 10 hónapja (*this happened about a year ago or $DM^{mondjuk} DM^{mondjuk}$ ten months ago*) (HuComTech, 002)

Based on our corpus, the use of *mondjuk* (~'let's say') as a DM is common in political interviews (see examples 6-7.), although somewhat less frequent (18 tokens/hour) than in naturally-occurring conversations (26 tokens/hour).

example 6

IE: Nagyon sokan nem fogják fel és elhiszik ezt a fajta, **mondjuk** úgy hogy finoman szólva is butítást (*a lot of people won't understand and they will fall for this, $DM^{mondjuk}$ to put it mildly, stupification*) (Gazdasági Rádió *A nap vendége – Dióslaki Gábor* 2010-08-26)

example 7

IR: Jó, de nyilvánvalóan jelentős hatása lesz egyébként ez a médiapiacra is, mármint a médiapiacnak az offline-részére, tehát **mondjuk** az írottra, igen. (*Let's say you're right, this will still have an enormous effect on the media market, I mean the off-line*)

segment of the media market, so **DM^{mondjuk}** the written segment)
(TV2 *Mokka* 2013-03-26)

The strategies of elaboration and explanation also frequently involve the expression of assumption, in these cases *mondjuk* (~'let's say') preserves some of its original, conceptual meaning, which can be glossed as 'let's suppose', as in the next example:

example 8

Úgy történik ez, hogy mondjuk tudjuk, hogy lesz egy sajtótájékoztató, nyilvánvaló az nem titok. (This is how it works: DM^{mondjuk} we know that there will be a press conference, it is obviously not a secret) (ATV Egyenes Beszéd 2010-12-02)

The functions of reformulation, correction, specification, approximation, giving example and lexical search are more frequent in informal conversations than in political interviews due to the unplanned nature of casual talk. Natural conversation is a type of spontaneous, informal, unplanned discourse, without any specific scenario to be followed, in contrast, political interviews are pre-planned events where the IR follows a pre-determined set of questions and has a pre-allocated sequence of turns and topical units in mind. Similarly to the IRs, most IEs also prepare for the interview since their goal is to gain favour with the audience. Therefore, it is not surprising that media discourses generally contain fewer instances of reformulation and lexical search.

5.3 *Markers of evidentiality: of course vs. ugye (~'is that so?')*

As described above, there are two different layers of interaction present in political interviews: a first-frame interaction between the IR(s) and the IE(s) and the second-frame interaction between the first-frame participants and the audience. For the most part, there is a mismatch between the background information available to the IR and the (public) knowledge available to the audience whose voice the IR represents. The use of evidential markers makes this knowledge gap between the first-frame and second-frame participants explicit. The most common DM of evidentiality is *of course* in English and *ugye* (~'is that so?') in Hungarian, therefore, they will be described in the present section.

Of course has been variously classified as an expectation marker / marker of expectation (Simon-Vandenberg & Aijmer 2002/03), expectation evidential (Chafe 1986), marker of speaker commitment (Lewis 2006) and marker of shared knowledge (Holmes 1988). Holmes (1988) proposes that *of course* acts "as an overt signal that the speaker is assuming that the hearer accepts or is already familiar with the propositional content of her or his utterance" (Holmes 1988: 53), while Wichmann et al. state that "*of course* has three broad levels of meaning: (1) epistemic / evidential – glossed as 'naturally', (2) interpersonal – glossed as 'shared knowledge', and (3) indeterminate" (Wichmann et al. 2010: 118).

Markers of evidentiality are much more common in political interviews than in natural conversations. Our Hungarian corpus of naturally-occurring talk contains 36 tokens of *ugye* (~'is that so?') expressing evidentiality, while the Hungarian political corpus contains 61 tokens of *ugye* (~'is that so?') serving the same purpose, making it the most common function of this DM. The most probable explanation is that the speakers (both IR and IE) assume that the piece of information introduced by *ugye* (~'is that so?') is an obvious/evident fact (known to both interlocutors in the first frame of the interaction), however, they still find it necessary to explicitly point it out to the audience. In the panel discussion programme, *Törzsasztal*, broadcast by Duna TV, participants use an especially large number of evidential markers since their use implies that the subject matter of the discussions in general as well as the arguments and examples that are provided in particular are well-known to the first-frame interactants, who are all highly educated, widely acknowledged experts from similar fields. At the same time, the use of evidential markers is also justified by the fact that the first-frame participants feel a need to mention certain details for the sake of the audience who have a more limited knowledge on the subject:

example 9

IE: Valószínű, hogy az irodalom is ugyanilyen problémákkal küzd, tehát **ugye** egy nagyon jó fordító kell hozzá, egy nagyon jól kiépített marketing kell hozzá, tehát nem elegendő lefordítani valamit. (*The book market probably faces the same problems, so **DM**^{ugye} you need a well-built marketing strategy as well as an excellent translator, it is not enough to provide a good translation*) (Duna TV *Törzsasztal* 2010-11-28)

example 10

IE: ... a realisabb makrogazdasági pálya, tehát a fél százalék körüli, vagy stagnáláshoz közeli gazdasági növekedés, illetve hát most **ugye** a 299 ft os euro árfolyamra átszámított költségvetés. (*we need a more realistic macroeconomic projection, that is, a projected growth of about 0.5%, or stagnation, I mean, right now **DM^{ugye}** the budget is calculated on an exchange rate of HUF 299 to the Euro*) (ATV Egyenes Beszéd 2011-12-27)

example 11

IE: **Ugye**, set-top-boxnak hívják, amit ők beépítenek a rendszerbe, vagy olyan televízió, amibe már be van építve. (*This is called **DM^{ugye}** a set-top box, which is built into the system, or there are TV sets that already include them*) (TV2 Mokka 2013-03-16)

A further function of *ugye* (~'is that so?') which is salient in political interviews is emphasis. This function is more frequently expressed in the corpus of political interviews than in the corpus of natural conversations since the use of *ugye* (~'is that so?') strategically signals the validity of facts and the importance/force of the content of the utterance, thus its primary function is to convince the audience that the speaker's arguments are valid:

example 12

IE: ...az összes hiba, mindaz ami **ugye** recesszióba sodorja a gazdaságot (*all the mistakes they've made, all the things that have **DM^{ugye}** lead the economy into recession*) (ATV Egyenes Beszéd 2011-12-27)

example 13

IE: Ezenkívül, hogy együttműködünk, ahogy a beszélgetés elején is elhangzott, együttműködünk fogyasztói tudatosságot elősegítő kampányokban is, **ugye** nagyon fontos, hogy a hatóságok munkáját közvetítsük a fogyasztók felé. (*In addition, we cooperate, as was said at the beginning of the interview, we cooperate in campaigns that are aimed at raising consumer awareness, **DM^{ugye}** it is very important that we inform the consumers about the authorities' activities*) (MTV Ma reggel 2013-03-07)

5.4 CA perspectives in the analysis of the functional spectrum of DMs

Discourse markers are often used to regulate verbal interaction. It has been shown in a number of studies (cf. e.g. Petukhova & Bunt 2009) that discourse structure and coherence are maintained and expressed by various verbal markers. Coherence relations establish various links between discourse segments, and these relations are frequently expressed by DMs, such as *well*, *you know*, *I mean* or *by the way*. Besides marking boundaries, transitions and transition relevance places between discourse segments, DMs also signal the communicative function(s) of their host units. On the one hand, *I mean*, *well*, *mondjuk* (~'let's say') and *amúgy* (~'otherwise') signal that the speaker has not finished his or her turn, but needs some time in the production process. On the other hand, hearers also use it to interrupt the current speaker's turn, signalling that the participant uttering the DM wishes to take the floor. Marked interactional behaviors such as taking the floor (grabbing a turn) by uttering a dispreferred second part or shifting the discourse topic have to be announced before they occur. Marked behaviors are labelled as dispreferred because the speakers are required to give an account of their acts in order to inform the listeners about the circumstances of / reasons for the unexpected response. Dispreferred answers such as disagreements are usually of 'No-plus' form (cf. Sacks 1992: 414) since they elaborate on the reasons for the negative reply (e.g. *Actually, ...*; *Well, ...* or *Igazából ..., Hát ...*). The following three examples illustrate dispreferred seconds introduced by the DM *hát* (~'well') which acts as a response marker as well as a disagreement minimizer in these examples:

example 14

IR: Dehát mindjárt lejár a mandátuma. (*His mandate will expire soon*)

IE: **Hát** az még több mint egy év, 2013. február. (**DM^{hát}** *that'll be in more than a year, in February 2013*)

example 15

IR: ...MOL részvények vásárlásán... (*... such as buying MOL shares*)

IE: Amin sokat nyertünk. (*We can make a lot of profit that way*)

IR: **Hát** eddig veszítettünk rajta, kb. olyan 600 milliárdot. (*DM^{hát} so far we've made losses, about HUF 600 billion*) (ATV *Egyenes Beszéd* 2011-12-27)

example 16

IE: Azokat a média kollégákat szeretem, akik váratlan dolgokat kérdeznek. (*I like colleagues in the media who ask unexpected questions*)

IR: Frappíroznak? (*Those who like to startle people?*)

IE: **Hát, mondjuk** egy bizonyos adrenalin szint kell ahhoz, hogy ne legyen unalmas. (*DM^{hát} DM^{mondjuk} you need a certain level of adrenaline not to be boring*)

(ATV *Egyenes Beszéd* 2012-01-23)

We can observe the same pattern in English as well, as illustrated by the following example:

example 17

IR: You think the public expects her to...

IE: **Well**, not the public. The jury. (CNN *Larry King Live* 2004-02-27)

The high incidence (401 tokens in an approximately 80,000 word corpus) and high D-value (82%) of *well*, once again, underscores the conversationalization of political discourse. We find turn-initial *well* most frequently prefacing IEs' answers to IRs' (often overly direct) questions.

As the above examples from political interviews also suggest conversational turn openers can set up a frame for the entire turn, thus allowing interlocutors to predict what is going to come next in the conversation. In addition, turns that consist of a single DM can express a terse reaction to the previous turn. Heritage (2002), for instance, claims that turn-initial *oh* can indicate 'epistemic independence', in other words, the suggestion that the idea following *oh* was formulated by the speaker independently of the current conversation. Moreover, *oh* typically introduces an agreement rather than a disagreement with the previous turn. In contrast, as the examples demonstrate, *well* in turn-initial position usually signals disagreement.

Before we move on to the analysis of topic orientation markers, let us define the concept of discourse topic. Fraser (2009) provides a general definition of discourse topic as "what the discourse is currently about, what the participants recognize they are talking about from what has been contributed to this point". Chafe (1994)

defines *discourse topic* in terms of the notion of semiactive information, and adds that the fact that speakers use DMs (e.g. *you know, well* or *amúgy* ~'by the way') before introducing a new topic suggests their awareness of a need to raise consciousness about their next move. In the following example *well* marks the speaker's intention to change the topic:

example 18

IR: Back to the big question. **Well**, could there be a president with MS? (CNN *Larry King Live* 2004-03-06)

Topic changes marked by DMs in our Hungarian corpus are more frequent in informal conversations than in our corpus of Hungarian political interviews. The main reason for this is that while political interviews mostly centre on a focal topic, speakers in informal conversation tend to move from one topic to another and often completely change the topic of talk in an unmotivated way, which is usually made explicit by the use of DMs. On the other hand, the introduction of unsolicited opinion statements, additional information and side sequences is more common in political interviews than in informal conversation due to the high significance of expressing personal opinion, giving background information, listing arguments and opposing viewpoints in political interviews:

example 19

IE: Úgy gondoltam, hogy erről érdemes könyvet írni. **Amúgy** is ma Magyarországon rengeteg hasonló vállalkozás van. (*I thought this was worth writing a book about. DM^{amúgy} there are a lot of similar attempts in Hungary at present.*) (A nap vendége 2011-08-22)

example 20

Ezért nem is azt mondtuk, hogy ez a törvény, ami **amúgy** a Lázár-féle benyújtott javaslatban ne lett volna tárgyalható, hanem attól, hogy ... (*This is why we don't say that this act of Parliament, which DM^{amúgy} could've been discussed together with Lázár's motion, but because [sic]*) (ATV Egyenes Beszéd 2011.05.09)

Furkó (2007) found that in the Larry King Show *of course* appears in contexts where its primary function is conversation management, for example, it serves as a response marker, feedback signal or topic change signal. In other contexts *of course* plays a role in information management: it marks, for example, lists / sequences, new infor-

mation or shared background knowledge. *Of course*, similarly to *I mean*, occurs in narratives, where it can mark side sequences or new developments in the narrative. The interpersonal functions that were salient in the corpus based on *Larry King Live* corresponded to and co-occurred with personal-centre switches, persuasion and solidarity, while in a few instances *of course* marked self correction, lexical search, or simply functioned as a filler.

The differences in the functional spectrum of *of course* in *Larry King Live* and the other mediatized interviews in our corpus can be traced back to the differences between two types/subgenres of political interviews. TV broadcasts such as *Larry King Live*⁶ are of a less confrontational type, while several political interviews (especially *Newsnight*, *Hard Talk* and *Question Time*) take a more confrontational approach. From a discourse-pragmatic perspective, both subgenres of political interviews are characterized by a repetitive sequence of adjacency pairs (Q-A-[comment]-Q-A-[comment], etc.) and a specific, asymmetrical role-distribution between IRs and IEs. However, as Lauerbach notes, in the case of *Larry King Live* the IR and the IE "collaboratively produce a consensual point of view" (Lauerbach 2007, 1388), while in more confrontational political interviews the IR "in asking the questions, takes into account what a sceptical audience would like to know" (Lauerbach 2007, 1394), exposing vagueness, evasiveness, and argumentative fallacies.

The confrontational quality of most of interviews in the corpus is underlined by the fact that it is not only in terms of heteroglossia (i.e. anticipating objections and counterpoints) that *of course* is used differently in the two sub-genres, but we can observe differences in terms of the interactional uses of *of course*, as well. While *of course* mostly marks strong agreement and/or feedback in the Larry King Corpus, it is, for the most part, used to express token agreement in the BBC subcorpus, as is illustrated by examples 21 and 22, respectively:

example 21

IR: Give it any thought, because that was a big rumor ...

IE: ***Of course.***

IR: Rumors always come around. (CNN *Larry King Live* 2004-03-17)

⁶ According to Lauerbach, *Larry King Live* belongs to the "soft and feel-good genre" of "celebrity interviews" (Lauerbach 2007: 1388).

example 22

IR: The party was born from the unions wasn't it?

IE: ... *of course, but* we govern for the whole country. (BBC *Politics Show* 2004-09-12)

5.5 *Miscellaneous strategic uses: marking changes in cognitive states and ventriloquizing*

Voicing the discourse of others is a device by which speakers can distance themselves from what is being said, and position themselves in voices of others rather than their own (White 2000). Goffman (1981) speaks of "say-foring" or ventriloquizing when one's own words are put into the mouths of others. According to Goffman's (1981) definition, through the process of "say-foring", a figure other than the speaker is being animated without the speaker being understood to be either the author of the words or to be responsible for them.

Tannen (2010) investigated the phenomenon of ventriloquizing as a device of indirectness in family interaction. She argues that ventriloquizing "creates meaning by abduction, as speakers borrow others' identities and thereby temporarily assign to themselves characteristics associated with those whose voices they borrow" (Tannen 2010: 307). She also argues that ventriloquizing can be understood as a type of indirectness, one that is very frequent in everyday interaction (Tannen 2010: 311).

Lauerbach (2006: 150) analyzed the practices of voicing and ventriloquizing and concluded that they have the effect of personalizing and dramatizing political discourse and implicitly construct identities and relations in the interplay between IR and IE. She describes ventriloquizing as "a particularly vivid way of enacting one's own discourse through another", which, in addition, "greatly increases the strategic potential of communicators" (Lauerbach 2006: 199).

Based on our corpus, the ventriloquizing use of *oh* in political interviews is more salient than in the discourse genres⁷ that are traditionally studied in DM research. Examples 23 and 24 illustrate such uses:

⁷ The ventriloquizing pattern of use of *oh* in political interviews is different from typical discourse functions in other discourse genres e.g. naturally-occurring conversation (Stenström 1994), or sociolinguistic interviews (Schiffrin 1987).

example 23

IE: Yes, to some extent. It's rather an odd situation we have here where the, the government are trying to legislate, or the House of Commons is trying to legislate very very quickly, that this is a bill that passed all its stages in the House of Commons, minimum of debate in one day, and then they say, **oh** it doesn't need to come in to effect for eighteen months or two years. (BBC *Politics Show* 2004-10-10)

example 24

IE: When you talked about disenchantment with politics John, there's an awful lot of disenchantment with political coverage and Margaret talked about 'trial by ordeal', which is basically the media thinking, if we keep this story going long enough, eventually Tony Blair is going to say, **Oh** my god, I can't be doing with this, let's get rid of them. (BBC *Politics Show* 2006-03-12)

In these examples *oh* introduces statements and opinions that are attributed to people other than the IE (usually political opponents) in an effort to mock such opinions and/or make them sound ill-founded.⁸

In yet another strategic use of *oh*, we can find it in the phrase *Oh come on*, which plays down the import of the previous speaker's (in this case the IR's) or an opponent's statement:

example 25

IR: The polls ... (overlaps)

IE: As I say, we're actually – **oh** come on Jeremy, you're talking about one poll that happens to have been taken recently. (BBC *Politics Show* 2004-07-11)

Naturally, there are a range of additional DMs that are used strategically in political interviews and whose description would deserve separate sections. Because of space considerations, however, in this section we will briefly illustrate the strategic use of *well*, *hát* (~'well'), *mondjuk* (~'let's say') and *you know* in our corpus of political interviews, focussing on the patterns that have not emerged in studies based on other types of discourse.

⁸ At the same time, it might be argued that *oh* is a component of the fixed expression *oh my god* rather than a ventriloquizer. In either case, *oh* in this example simultaneously introduces the statement of someone other than the speaker and expresses surprise and frustration.

Turn-internal uses of *well* show an interesting genre-specific pattern: we find a large number of utterances where *well* introduces ventriloquizing, once again, making the IEs' discourse more vivid and increasing its strategic potential (cf. Lauerbach 2006: 199 quoted above). However, unlike in the case of *oh*, the ventriloquizing uses of *well* introduce statements, positions or internal thoughts that are attributed to people (at times the speakers themselves) whose opinions are actually favourable to the IE (and the audience), thus there is no negative stance towards the ventriloquized utterance:

example 26

IE: over the past 18 months, the eurozone governments have rather let us down, given us, you know, wonderful hope on the basis of the thrust of what they've been saying and then we've seen the fine print we've thought, "**well, actually**, there's rather less to all of this than we hoped." (BBC Radio 4 *Today Programme* 2011-09-06)

example 27

IR: But what happens if an employer says, **well** all well and good, but we don't really want to see these union leaders, we've got better things to do. (BBC *Politics Show* 2004-09-12)

Practices of ventriloquizing are also found in Hungarian political interviews and are used strategically mostly by IEs. Ventriloquizing in Hungarian is invariably introduced by *hát* (~*well*), rather than *ó* (~*oh*) as the following two examples illustrate:

example 28

IE: ...beterjesztett fejezeti előirányzatoknak egy ilyen automatikus fűnyíró szerű csökkentése, erre is azt lehet mondani, jó, **hát** éljék túl a megszorításokat. (*when you see such a drastic reduction in the statement of costs, you might as well say, DM^ó, DM^{hát} let them survive the austerity measures*)

example 29

IE: És akkor jött egy vándor edző, Turay nevű, valamikor válogatott volt, és ő említette meg, hogy **hát**, belőled még lehet válogatott játékos is, így mondta. (*Along came a wandering coach, by the name of Turay, who used to be a representative player, and he said, DM^{hát} you might become a representative player, that's what he said*) (Hír TV *Sziluett* 2011-04-30)

Somewhat similarly, the non-conceptual and turn-internal use of *mondjuk* (~'let's say') generally indicates that the speaker has undergone some kind of a change concerning either his local knowledge state on the level of information management or her/his views and attitudes in the interpersonal domain of interaction. It may express the speaker's (subjective) orientation towards the topic or the other speaker's utterance (e.g. in the case of partial agreement, disagreement/contrast, modification). We can find several examples for subjective reorientation in naturally-occurring dialogues, exemplified by 30 below:

example 30

... nem volt kellemes bár **mondjuk** ilyenektől is tanul az ember
(*it wasn't very pleasant, but **DM**^{mondjuk} you can learn from such experiences*) (HuComTech, 017)

Finally, as for the various strategic uses of *you know*, let us concentrate on two specific uses that, on the basis of our corpus, occurs as salient in confrontational types of political interviews. The first (example 31), once again, involves ventriloquizing:

example 31

IE: I understand that and I know there's a lot of concern because people say **well look, you know** ... get rid of all the targets for waiting lists and our life would be easier. (BBC *Newsnight* 2003-02-07)

The second salient function of *you know* is a strategic use subsequent to which speakers (usually IEs) let their voice trail off, without finishing a point they were making before, or without drawing a (usually embarrassing) conclusion:

example 32

IE: it's not true to say that there's nothing getting better, and all I can talk about in terms of personal experience is my own constituency where I would say undoubtedly, **you know**... but if you look at the new North Durham Hospital, I mean that is a better hospital than what was there. (BBC *Newsnight* 2003-02-07)

5.6 Markers of concession

Concession is a discourse-pragmatic relation whereby the speaker signals or foregrounds (among other things) that a new proposition needs to be reconsidered in terms of a previously mentioned or pre-supposed proposition. This relationship is often marked with a DM such as *mondjuk* (~'let's say') in Hungarian or *of course* in English.

We must also consider the influence of situational parameters that affect the frequency of the realization of concessive relations. It might seem logical that concession prevails in written modes of discourse due to the availability of a lot of time for planning and editing. In spite of this assumption, we have identified a large number of concessive relations in the speech corpora, as well.

It is a common monologic argumentation strategy to introduce one's own concessions, thus, minimizing their salience and emphasizing one's own preferred course of argument, but we can observe it in dialogues, as well, especially in shorter narrative or argumentative parts of the IEs' speech in political interviews as well as in naturally-occurring conversation. Both dialogic (example 33) and monologic (example 34) concession are frequent in both types of discourse (political interviews and casual conversations, respectively):

example 33

IE: az igazi kérdés, hogy ez hogyan megy tovább, **mondjuk** éppen a klímaváltozás témájában is 2010-ben lesz egy következő nagyon fontos találkozó (*The real question is how we can go on, **DM**^{mondjuk} there will be a major conference on climate change in 2010*) (Duna TV *Törzsasztal* 2010-01-17)

example 34

szeretek a belvárosban élni **mondjuk** elég nagy a szmog (*I like living in the city centre **DM**^{mondjuk} the air is polluted*) (HuComTech, 017)

Markers of contrast and concession have been found to be slightly more frequent in political interviews than in natural conversations. Two explanations can be offered for this difference. On the one hand, speakers are more cooperative (and less confrontational) in informal conversations on the other hand, the relation of concession might be more explicitly marked by DMs in political interviews due to Bakhtin's (1987) notion of heteroglossia (cf. also section 5.7 below).

Mondjuk (~'let's say') can also be considered as a marker of emphasis, used to point out/accent the personal perspective and opinion of the speaker as in the following example:

example 35

speaker 1: persze rengeteg nemzetiséggel lehetett találkozni (*DM^{persze} you can meet a lot of minorities around here*)

speaker 2: én **mondjuk** ha kimennénk biztos azt várnám hogy na találkozzak ilyen tipikus angolokkal (*as for me, DM^{mondjuk} if I travelled to England, I would expect to DM^{na} meet typical British people*) (HuComTech, 023)

As the examples suggest, the markers of concession listed above are multifunctional, occurring in various different rhetorical contexts, often combining concessive function with backgrounding, opposition, topic change, and so on. Rare uses of *of course* and *mondjuk* (~'let's say') involve distancing the speaker from the proposition, expressing irony or disapproval; however, these functions are more frequent in naturally-occurring casual talk than in media discourse. In such contexts, the DM reinforces the implicature that the ideas are presented ironically.

5.7 Heteroglossia / alternative viewpoints

Simon-Vandenberg et al. argue that the use of presupposition in general and its marking by *of course* in particular is a tactic employed by IEs in political interviews, because "by using *of course* the speaker recognizes that the context is heteroglossic, s/he is presented as responding to prior utterances, anticipating a response / alternative viewpoints" (Simon-Vandenberg et al. 2007: 35ff). They reach the conclusion that (1) *of course* confirms solidarity with the like-minded, (2) construes solidarity with those who need to be persuaded; (3) conversely, *of course* can serve an oppositional function; and, finally, (4) *of course* contributes to the image of the speaker being 'in the know', its use gives the speaker "a temporary advantage in the battle for scoring with the audience." (Simon-Vandenberg et al. 2007: 66)

The findings based on the corpus of political interviews used in the present study underscore Simon-Vandenberg et al's conclusions: only 16 out of 85 tokens of *of course* are interactional, the remaining 69 tokens are used in anticipation of a contrasting viewpoint, and / or the IR's objections. We found it useful to categorize heteroglossic uses

of *of course* into different degrees of anticipation and contrast: there are utterances where *of course* simply backgrounds the statement in its host unit, while in other cases it can be glossed as 'that's not the point' or 'that's totally irrelevant' as in examples 36, 37 and 38, respectively:

example 36

IE: No I actually am more interested in not having a whole lot of time wasted for police and courts, as well as victims, with people uselessly maintaining their innocence. Some of them ***of course*** will get away with it 'cos they'll find a jury that believes what they say. I'm more interested if people are guilty that they show a bit of contrition, stop making things worse and admit straight away. (BBC5 Live 2011-05-18)

example 37

IE: Undoubtedly it does. Look, T. B. is right to say, as he did recently, that what happens in the Gaza Strip should not be an excuse for anyone to be radicalised. And ***of course*** that's right, but we have to deal with the world as it is. (BBC *The Andrew Marr Show* 2009-01-11)

example 38

IR: Do you... If you were in No. 10 at the moment and Nissan came to you, the other carmakers came to you and said, "We've done a very, very good job for this country. We've created a lot of employment. We need some help in the short-term", what would you tell them?

IE: ***Of course*** I want to help. But let's take Nissan because what... (BBC *The Andrew Marr Show* 2009-01-11)

6 Functional correspondences among English and Hungarian DMs

Table 1 provides an overview of the functional (rather than semantic) correspondences that have been described in terms of the English and Hungarian DMs under scrutiny. The individual functions are classified into four larger functional categories: (1) discourse-level, coherence marking functions; (2) interpersonal/interactional functions; (3) refer-

ential functions where the referentiality of the content of the utterances is the distinguishing factor; and (4) attitude marking functions.

Based on our corpus analyses, we have found that *I mean* and *ugye* (~'is that so?') perform several parallel functions at coherence marking and interactional levels, including prefacing questions and marking explanations. *I mean* also shares functions with *mondjuk* (~'let's say'), especially in terms of different types of reformulation, such as modification, specification, correction and cancellation. Furthermore, *of course* and *ugye* (~'is that so?') have been found to share the salient functions of marking evidentiality and shared knowledge. *Of course* and *mondjuk* (~'let's say') are similar in their concessive meaning, while *mondjuk* is similar to both *well* and *of course* both in terms of its turn-initial position and its functional spectrum.

Functional category	Function	English	Hungarian
COHERENCE MARKING (AND ILLOCUTIONARY) FUNCTIONS	reformulation, correction, clarification, specification, explanation	<i>I mean</i>	<i>mondjuk</i> (~'let's say'), <i>mondjuk inkább</i> (~'rather say'), <i>ugye</i> (~'is that so?')
	concession	<i>of course, well</i>	<i>mondjuk persze</i> (~'say of course'),
	topic shift	<i>of course, well</i>	<i>amúgy</i> (~'otherwise, by the way')
	referring back to a piece of information mentioned earlier	<i>oh</i>	<i>ugye</i> (~'is that so?')
INTERACTIONAL/ INTERPERSONAL FUNCTIONS	question preface	<i>I mean</i>	<i>ugye</i> (~'is that so?')
	reception marker	<i>oh, well, of course</i>	" <i>Mondjuk.</i> " (~'we can say so')
	alternative viewpoint	<i>of course</i>	<i>mondjuk</i> (~'let's say')
REFERENTIAL FUNCTIONS	marker of evidentiality	<i>of course</i>	<i>ugye</i> (~'is that so?')
	marker of shared knowledge	<i>of course</i>	<i>ugye</i> (~'is that so?')

ATTITUDE MARKER FUNCTIONS	marker of both cer- tainty and uncertain- ty	<i>I think</i>	<i>mondjuk</i> (~'let's say')
	attitude towards the other speaker and towards the content of the utterance of the other speaker	<i>oh, well, of course</i>	" <i>Mondjuk.</i> " (~'we can say so') (partial agreement) " <i>Ugye-ugye?</i> " (~'is that so?')

Table 1: Functional correspondances between English and Hungarian DMs

7 Conclusions

Regarding the comparison of the frequency of the Hungarian DMs in the two different discourse genres, we have found *mondjuk* (~'let's say') to be more common in informal conversations (with 195 occurrences) than in political interviews (with 135 occurrences). Since the number of tokens in each corpus varied, we normalized the frequency to tokens per hour of interaction. Figure 1 presents the comparison of the frequency of the selected DMs. The reason for the difference most probably has to do with the conversational, colloquial nature of this DM. Its counterparts in a more formal register could be either *tegyük fel* ('let's suppose'), *például* ('for instance') or *ellenben* ('however', 'although').




Figure 1: Frequency of Hungarian DMs in two discourse genres

Concerning the frequency of *ugye* (~'is that so?'), we have found a different tendency as it is significantly more frequent in our corpus of political interviews than in informal conversations. This finding is most probably related to a salient feature of political interviews discussed in section 1, that is, the fact that there are two different frames of interaction: one between the IR and the IE and one between the first-frame participants and the audience. As we outlined earlier, the difference in the available background information and the degree of shared knowledge between the IR and the audience is explicitly expressed by *ugye* (~'is that so?') in order to let the first-frame participants know that the speaker is aware that they are familiar with the facts under discussion.

It is also important to point out that we have not found significant cross-genre differences in the frequency of *amúgy* (~'otherwise'), although it is somewhat more commonly used as a DM in informal conversations than in political interviews. The reason for this might be the conversational, colloquial nature of this DM. Further research might prove that political interviews are characterized by more formal counterparts of *amúgy* (~'otherwise, by the way'), such as *egyébként* ('otherwise', 'furthermore') or *mellesleg* ('besides').

It can be concluded that both types of corpora display recurrent coherence sequences. Some of these, such as question and answer sequences, are more often associated with interviews, while others, such as explanation, specification, approximation or example, are more likely to be associated with naturally-occurring talk. The analysis of DMs reflect on the fact that in mediated discourse, especially in news interviews, the turn-taking mechanism can be characterized as more mechanistic and predetermined than in natural conversations. We have also seen that the higher frequency of evidential markers such as *of course* and *ugye* (~'is that so?') in news interviews with non-interactive functions might be explained by the fact that by using evidential markers the speaker recognizes that the context is heteroglossic, s/he is presented as responding to prior utterances, anticipating a response expressing alternative viewpoints. Therefore, genre seems to be a powerful variable in the production of discourse relations as well as the resulting patterns in the functional spectra of DMs.

We are fully aware that we have not even started to scratch the surface of what the cross-fertilization between genre analysis and DM research has to offer to both disciplines. What we hope to have illustrated is that DMs make an important contribution to the interpretation of various discourse segments, and that a primarily discourse-

pragmatic, corpus-driven perspective on the functional spectra of individual DMs is a more fruitful approach than either semantic-taxonomic or systemic-functional methods, often adopted in the pertinent DM literature.⁹ Naturally, further research is needed (cross-cultural as well as cross-linguistic, quantitative as well as qualitative) in order to substantiate our findings about, for example, DMs' contribution to heteroglossia, stance-taking and ventriloquizing, so that we can gain new and deeper insights about the functional spectrum of DMs as a heuristic tool for genre (or literary) analysis.

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⁹ For the primarily discourse-pragmatic, corpus-driven perspective, cf. e.g. Fraser (1996), as for the semantic-taxonomic or systemic-functional methods, cf. Halliday & Hasan (1976) and subsequent analyses.

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**Rezensionsartikel /
Review articles**

Judit Bihari

Approaches to the notion of grammaticalization*

Renata Szczepaniak's textbook, *Grammatikalisierung im Deutschen (Grammaticalization of German)* aims to introduce the reader to the basics of grammaticalization and explain some of its representative examples from the German language. As an introductory work, the book provides a definition and overview of the grammaticalization theory, clearly utilizing many different approaches to the field of linguistics in question. It is an interesting task to investigate which approaches the author exemplifies and on the basis of which interpretations she constructs her definitions. Furthermore, from a metatheoretical point of view, it is also highly relevant, whether, how, and to what extent the diverse definitions and perspectives relate to, or differ from, each other, and how scholars bridge the gap between them. Due to the limits of the genre, I am not intending to answer all these questions comprehensively, but rather to raise and delineate them for the purpose of further research.

Regarding the history of grammaticalization, it is incorrectly assumed to be a young subfield of linguistics, even though its core ten-

* Review article on Szczepaniak, Renate: *Grammatikalisierung im Deutschen. Eine Einführung*. Tübingen: Narr Verlag, 2011, 229 Seiten.

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ets date back to the 19th century. Nevertheless, modern linguistics is informed by this interpretation of language change since the 1970s, when Givón's famous slogan, "Today's morphology is yesterday's syntax." (Givón 1971: 12 in Narrog & Heine 2011:1) revolutionized the study of grammatical evolution (Narrog & Heine 2011: 1). Since then, manifold definitions have been offered for the term *grammaticalization* itself, as well as for the approach and its key points, some of which are represented in Szczepaniak's monograph. The central idea of the approach, as presented by the author, is the following: Grammaticalization attempts to account for language change by placing *change or shift in function and form* at the centre of attention. More precisely, lexical items – free morphemes with more or less concrete meaning and *denotative* function – gain a new function, namely the *relational* one, as items carrying grammatical information at an abstract level. At the same time, they gradually lose their status as free morphemes; thus, a change in function is accompanied by one in form. Of course, such a change does not come about overnight but over the course of centuries. Narrog and Heine point out that "grammaticalization is far from being a uniform concept, and various definitions have been proposed." They offer a twofold classification of these: on the one hand, ample approaches highlight the pragmatic functions of linguistic material and grammaticalization as a diachronic change which turns secondary discourse functions into primary ones. More general approaches, on the other hand, allow grammaticalization to cover anything relating to grammar, basically anything that has to do with bearing a certain function within a grammatical system. Furthermore, Narrog and Heine refer to the possibility of approaching phenomena within a synchronic framework of grammaticalization. Still, "[F]or most students of the field, grammaticalization is understood to be a diachronic process, and, hence, findings can be verified or falsified by means of historical evidence" (Narrog & Heine 2011: 2-3). Diewald takes an opposing viewpoint by claiming that grammaticalization, following from its research object as a panchronic phenomenon, is inevitably engaged in inquiring into matters of synchronic *and* diachronic character, and combining the two perspectives (Diewald 2008: 151). We might argue that whichever approach we take to the broad definition of grammaticalization, the *function of linguistic items* – or even a shift in function – will be an issue that must inevitably be dealt with. Since Szczepaniak's reading clearly focuses on the functional, pragmatic and diachronic

aspects of grammaticalization, we may conclude that she belongs to the majority of scholars Narrog and Heine refer to. As we will see later on, she does utilize historical material and puts a great emphasis on the shift in function of linguistic items.

Unlike some other scholars, Szczepaniak devotes her approach for the most part to the very process of grammaticalization. Presumably for the sake of simplicity, the author does not go into detail concerning the multiple possible readings of the very word *grammaticalization*. This contrasts with Lehmann, for instance, who directs his readers' attention to the possible misinterpretation of the term: the derivational pattern of the word grammaticalization might suggest that a grammaticalized item becomes grammatically more correct – which has nothing to do with the field of study in question. It should much rather be read as a notion referring to an item making its way from the lexicon to the grammar; to be part of the latter to a greater extent than other items (Lehmann 2002: 8). Hopper and Traugott point out that by *grammaticalization* they wish to refer to two distinct things, namely a *research framework* on the one hand, and *language phenomena*, for which this framework is intended to account, on the other. As a research framework, they grasp grammaticalization as an approach to language change, which seeks to explain how lexical items and constructions become able to serve grammatical purposes or how grammatical items gain new grammatical functions. As a language phenomenon, it denotes the process where items become more grammatical. As such, it is part of a wider framework of structuration, which allows combinations of forms to become fixed in particular functions with time (Hopper & Traugott 1993: 1). Hopper and Traugott's views on grammaticalization as a research framework are shared with Diewald, who also highlights that the point where grammaticalization differs from historical linguistics is its perspective: the continuity and flexibility of a grammatical system is the core principle of the field (Diewald 1997: 1).

Nonetheless, Szczepaniak does seem to utilize diverse ideas formulated by pioneers of the field. Lehmann, Hopper, Traugott or Heine & Kuteva apparently grasp the gist of grammaticalization from different perspectives, which Szczepaniak organizes and incorporates in her volume in a justifiable and well-motivated fashion. Lehmann's interpretation focuses on the gradual loss of autonomy of the grammaticalized sign both on the syntagmatic and on the paradigmatic level. He offers a set of parameters – taken over by Szczepaniak – as a

guideline to identify the grade of grammaticalization of an item. Hopper – who coined the notion of *emergent grammar*, claiming that discourse and grammar mutually shape each other in face-to-face interactions – underlines that grammar is by no means a rigid system, but much rather one in constant alternation and motion. Heine and Kuteva emphasize the significance of the interaction between pragmatic, semantic, morphosyntactic and phonetic factors within the process of grammaticalization. Traugott captures grammaticalization as a means of problem-solving employed by language-users in communication. In Traugott's view, language-users have recourse to two main strategies by problem-solving, namely metonymy and metaphor (Mroczynski 2012: 42-84). Szczepaniak, as the author of an introductory work, simplifies and unites the ideas of prominent scholars in the field, and employs them to account for phenomena present in the German language. We can suggest that her work contributes to the mainstream studies of grammaticalization; yet, it is original: firstly, because it is a textbook written *in German*, and secondly, because it comments on the grammaticalization phenomena *of the German language*. In what follows, I attempt to provide a brief summary of the book chapter by chapter.

A glimpse into the structure of the book is offered in the preface, where the author points out that the work is an introductory one. It is meant to be a textbook of grammaticalization of the German language at an entry-level, comprehensible if the reader is familiar with the elementary terminology of linguistics. Apart from the *Introduction*, where some basic linguistic concepts are clarified, the monograph consists of two main parts: *Concepts of grammaticalization* and *The most important grammaticalization-processes in German*. Both parts are further divided into chapters and subchapters.

The *Introduction* starts in an "in medias res" fashion, with a striking example of the very process of grammaticalization: '*haben*', an auxiliary verb that has its origins in a full verb. The difference between *function words* and *content words* is clarified in accordance with the idea of function-assignment: the former have a relational function, while the latter a denotative one. The author accounts for the components of language by using *the onion-model*, where phonological, morphological and syntactical features of language use are represented in the core, the lexicon between pragmatic knowledge and the core, and the extralinguistic reality at the skin. Szczepaniak relies on the definition of the pioneers of the approach by describing

grammaticalization as a process in which grammatical morphemes occur, develop and finally descend (pp. 5). In practice, it is either a lexical item that develops to carry grammatical information, or a grammatical morpheme that acquires an even more abstract meaning. The author exemplifies this with the phenomenon of '*bekommen-passive*' and other instances from diverse historic periods of German.

Part I, *Concepts of grammaticalization*, targets a precise description of the approach to language change at hand. Szczepaniak argues that the shift in function of the linguistic sign – from denotative to relational – is followed by a change in form. She supports her claim with the example of the verb '*tun*', claimed to be the root of the past tense suffix '*-te*'. The author highlights four processes responsible for the systematic change of function and form: *desemantisation*, *extension* of context, *deategorialization* and *reduction* of the phonetic substance. For a linguistic sign, going through grammaticalization means to switch from an open system of lexical items to a much more closed one, the system of grammatical signs. The very process in which this switch takes place, and in which a once free morpheme thus becomes conventionalized as a bound one, is a very complex one consisting of several phases. The author makes use of Lehmann's 1995 grammaticalization scale to represent these phases and the components of grammar in which they take place. As a first step, a content word from the discourse-component, the placement of which depends more or less entirely on the speaker's intentions, becomes syntactically bound to a sentence structure. This syntactically bound element is *morphologized* in the second phase, i.e. it loses its status as a free morpheme and thus becomes bound. In this long process, a *periphrase* develops: an intermediate stage between a free morpheme and an inflectional element, or even lexical collocations and a single morpheme (Hopper & Traugott 1993: 122). *Clitics* (bound appearances of a free grammatical morpheme, for instance *mit dem Fahrrad* → [*mim*] *Fahrrad*), results of *coalescence*, also appear in this first sub-phase of morphologization and may further develop to be *affixes*, fully bound morphemes. Affixes may further undergo *fusion* into *agglutinating affixes* showing a one-to-one correspondence between affix and syntactic function. In the course of *demorphemisation*, the third phase of grammaticalization, agglutinating affixes develop into *flexives* and, as such, become integrated in the stem, lose their function and, in the last phase of grammaticalization, disappear entirely.

It is obvious that the degree of grammaticalization of an item is in inverse proportion to its autonomy. To be able to give a more precise account of this, the author relies on Lehmann's three dimensions of the autonomy of linguistic signs: semantic and formal *weight*, *cohesion* and *variability* (Lehmann 1995: Chapter 4 in Szczepaniak 2011: 19). When a linguistic sign is grammaticalized, its weight is reduced, its cohesion is increased and its variability is, again, reduced. Together with the two dimensions of sign-usage, namely *paradigmatic* and *syntagmatic*, the dimensions of autonomy result in six parameters of grammaticalization: paradigmatic weight or *integrity* (in inverse proportion to the degree of grammaticalization), *structural scope* (the quantity of the construction in which the sign occurs), *paradigmatic cohesion* (the degree of the systematic and formal homogeneity of a paradigm), *syntagmatic cohesion* (the degree of fusion with other elements), *paradigmatic variability* (the degree to which an item can be substituted by others), and *syntagmatic variability* (the degree to which an element can be moved freely). The subprocesses of grammaticalization, as established by Lehmann, are represented in an expressive and detailed chart on pp. 23. These lead to an irreversible loss of semantic components; the development from a lexical item to a grammatical one takes only one direction. Thus, Szczepaniak highlights the *principle of unidirectionality*, which does not allow *degrammaticalization*. There are, however, ample examples of *lexicalization* which come about in diverse ways: *idiomatization* and *compounding*, *fossilization*, *development of derivational affixes* (although they are bound morphemes they possess lexical meanings) and *transformation* of grammatical morphemes into affixable words.

From the point of view of the speaker, Szczepaniak – in agreement with Traugott – explains grammaticalization as a solution to communicative problems: whenever a language lacks a construction, the *creativity* of the community bridges the gap with the help of two cognitive and, at the same time, communicative, strategies. Grammaticalization makes use of *conceptual metonymy* operating on the syntagmatic level on the one hand, and *categorical metaphor* operating on the paradigmatic level on the other. Conceptual metonymy, as defined by Panther and Thornburg 2004, is a non-necessary relation within one conceptual domain between a source meaning and a target meaning, in which the former provides mental access to the latter (Panther & Thornburg 2004: 1). The information conveyed by the target meaning is not solely its semantic meaning; it is enriched by the

hearer's intuitions about the speaker's intentions, i.e. conversational implicature. The author relies on the Gricean Cooperation Principle and its four maxims: that of quantity, quality, relevance and modality. Conversational implicature comes into existence if the maxims are flouted or violated. Furthermore, an implicature may well be conventionalized if it appears frequently enough. Thus, a new meaning of the item at hand occurs and may replace the old one entirely. Categorical metaphors are sense-relations conveying meaning based on similarity of form and function between the source and the target domain. Thus, concrete concepts, which are easier to grasp and process, may substitute abstract ones, or, in other words, more prototypical concepts may substitute less prototypical ones. Source items are usually basic-level terms, such as, for instance, parts of the human body, while target meanings can be represented on a scale from concrete to abstract: person – object – activity – space – time – quality.

Szczepaniak highlights two mechanisms of the grammaticalization process, namely *reanalysis* and *analogy*, both of which are based on the already described two cognitive strategies, metonymy and metaphor. Reanalysis, a semantic and structural reinterpretation of an ambiguous expression triggered by violation of the Gricean conversational maxims, is based on conceptual metonymy. It is the most important mechanism of grammaticalization; however, despite its being the very process that initiates enrichment of information content and thus changes in language use, it is invisible on the surface. It is analogy that brings about visible changes by extending the new usage patterns to new contexts till they become independent forms.

The author argues that due to the universal presence of these cognitive strategies and mechanisms, the channels of grammaticalization are very similar in the most divergent languages. In practice it means that the lexical items undergoing the process of grammaticalization are not picked in a random fashion; they are much more systematic: the lexical item is conceptually related to the abstract meaning it is about to stand for.

Part II of the book is devoted to the most important grammaticalization processes of the German language: negation, the NP, the VP and syntactic alternations. Due to limitations of space, not all the processes are summarized in this review.

Regarding negation, the author argues that since Old High German (OHG) the position, form and quantity of negation words have experienced significant changes. Concerning verbal negation, OHG

was a mononegative system having the negation word '*ni*' at its centre. In the passage of time from OHG to the present, a complete grammaticalization cycle (Jespersen-cycle) took place. From the OHG obligatory element '*ni*', a clitic developed, which turned into a new free morpheme in Middle German. From the combination of this free morpheme and the clitic ('ne...nich'), the clitic element disappeared, and thus the cycle resulted in today's sentence-level negation word, '*nicht*'. As for nominal negation, the variety of negation words capable of replacing a noun in a contemporary German sentence, are rooted in the OHG obligatory element '*ni*' as well. '*Ni*' already merged in the OHG period with indefinite pronouns into so-called n-indefinita, such as, for instance, '*nioman*', combining the meaning of their components. Thus, scholars argue that the development of n-indefinita is much rather a process of lexicalization than of grammaticalization.

Regarding grammaticalization in the noun phrase, Szczepaniak highlights the vicissitudes of the plural, the articles, the prepositions, and of the NP itself. The first subchapter is devoted to the development of the nine plural allomorphs in today's German. These came into existence by the reanalysis of existing grammatical morphemes already deprived of their original functions. The author exemplifies this grammaticalization process by the plural suffix '-er', which originates in the OHG syllable '-ir'. '-ir', as in '*lembiro*', was already in Germanic a functionless suffix of the stem, thus, in the OHG period it was erased in the singular forms, but kept in the plurals. The motivation of this process is not a phonological one, but much rather analogy, following the pattern of other inflectional classes, namely, stem + suffix. The reanalysed suffix '-ir' became productive and spread by substantives with neutral grammatical gender and by borrowings as well. It is, in today's form '-er', not productive any more. Now, since the Germanic '-ir' was itself a product of a grammaticalization process which lost its grammatical function with time and was loaded with another one just before it was to disappear, the question arises as to whether the development of the plural suffix under scrutiny is a grammaticalization process at all. In the author's view, it is much rather a *degrammaticalization* process, in which, opposing the principle of *unidirectionality*, the empty morpheme made its way into the grammar again. The process is defined as *exaptation*, i.e. refunctionalizing. If the plural of a noun is suffixed by '-er' and the stem vowel is capable of *Umlaut*, the vowel alternation takes place, meaning that the degree of cohesion between stem and suffix is high. An-

other degrammaticalization process can be observed by weak masculine nouns, which, unlike feminine ones, kept their historical suffix '-n'. In this case it was not the suffix that became grammatically loaded again. Quite the opposite: belonging to the class of nouns carrying the inflectional element is bound to the semantic criterion of being animate.

The next chapter is dedicated to the development of the definite and indefinite articles and thus that of the category of definiteness.

In the OHG period, German lacked articles. The information +/- *definite* had to be expressed at the syntactic level, by means of word-order (topic / comment structure: what is known is definite, what is unknown is indefinite), verbal aspect (perfective – definite / imperfective – indefinite), object case (accusative – definite / genitive – indefinite), position of the genitive attribute (prenominal – definite / postnominal – indefinite), declension of the adjective (weak declension – definite / strong declension – indefinite) and by determiners. The definite article developed from the OHG deictic element '*ther*' ('dieser'). This process, having a *less grammatical* element instead of a lexical one as its starting point, is referred to as *secondary grammaticalization*. After its weakening as a demonstrative, the item took over the function of the definite article, and is now, as such, a bound morpheme on the one hand, and capable of fusion with other elements, for instance prepositions ('zu dem' → 'zum') on the other. During this process, the demonstrative gradually loses its ability to immediately refer to a single object, its so-called *pragmatic definiteness*. Parallel to this, its semantic usage contexts as a definite article gradually extend. An independent definite article may occur in abstract-situative usage and in associative-anaphoric usage. Szczepaniak provides a detailed description of how the German definite article witnessed this very process on pages 73-78.

It is obvious that with the occurrence of the opposition between referring to definite and indefinite objects, expressing indefiniteness also finds its way into everyday language use. The German indefinite article '*ein*' stems from the numeral '*eins*'. In the first place, the accent was shifted from pointing out the exact quantity, namely one, of the item referred to by the NP containing the numeral, to referring to *some* item of a class of similar things. In the next step, the element took over the real function of an indefinite article: from this point on it has been able to refer to things unknown to the listener. As a last phase, a so-called generic indefinite article developed by extending its

usage to referring to objects of the same class. Apart from the generic meaning, a predicative one (*Sie ist eine gute Lehrerin.*) and a non-specific meaning (*Ich suche einen Stift.*) arose in the Middle High German period. These latter grammaticalization processes are, however, not yet complete.

As for the capacity for syntactic cohesion of German articles, the author points out that a tendency towards the definite article fusing with prepositions can be clearly observed. Yet, this grammaticalization process – however long it has been in progress – has not yet been completed. Differences in meaning are not only to be found between cliticized and independent occurrences of the definite article, but even between usages of the cliticized form itself. For instance, a definite meaning is expressed by 'Sie geht *zur Schule*' referring to *one certain school*, while in 'Sie geht gern *zur Ausstellung*' a generic reading is preferred, meaning *any exhibition*. This grammaticalization process of the cliticized definite article is referred to by the author as "*Grammatikalisierungsbaustelle*", a "building site" of grammaticalization.

Interestingly enough, open grammaticalization processes can be explored even through prepositions, which are commonly assumed to build up a closed system. The author supports this point by manifold salient examples, such as '*links des Rheins*', '*nahe dem Ufer*', '*im Laufe des Gesprächs*' or '*kraft des Amtes*', where the lexical items in italics – whichever part-of-speech category they belong to – are to be read in a relational function. These are referred to as secondary prepositions, highlighting the opposition to the well-known primary ones. The group of primary prepositions, with the highest degree of grammaticalization, is indeed a closed one, as Szczepaniak argues. She relies on Lindquist's ideas (1994) by pointing out the most important features of prototypical prepositions, i.e. the primary ones: government of the accusative or the dative case; pronominal word order; brevity; syntactic multi-value; semantic multi-value; monosegmentality and lack of capitalization. In the author's view, it is not necessary that all the German prepositions undergo a complete process of grammaticalization, which is exemplified by that of the preposition 'wegen' on pages 97-103.

As regards the grammaticalization of the whole noun phrase, the syntactic fixation of the elements determiner, adjective and noun took place such that they acquired a firm position and grew in morphosyntactic cohesion. The author presents processes as a result of

which the NP may be claimed to have a high degree of grammaticalization.

Grammaticalization processes of the Verb Phrase are the focus of chapter 6. An extensive account is given of the vicissitudes of the so-called weak verbal suffix, the dental '-te', which marks regular past-tense forms and is still productive. Its roots are to be found in the Germanic verb '*dōn' ('tun'), meaning 'to do'. According to Szczepaniak, the probability of a grammaticalization process is much higher in the case of verbs with such general meanings as 'to do' than in the case of those with more specific ones. Thus, '*dōn', in all likelihood, even served as the basis for manifold grammaticalization processes in different Germanic languages, as, for instance, for the auxiliary 'do' in English, or for the auxiliary reading of 'tun' in dialects of German. Since weak verbs were derived from items of other part-of-speech categories, they consist of more than one syllable, and are not capable of a stem-vowel alternation as are strong verbs. Thus, expressing the past tense of weak verbs was made possible by an auxiliary-like reading of the verb 'tun': '*wecken tat*'. In a subsequent phase of the grammaticalization process, the meaning of the verb 'tun' was semantically bleached and reanalysed, then its usage context extended and thus the full verb was decategorized, i.e. it lost most of its morphosyntactic features. The erosion of the form took place early on in the Germanic, and clitics substituted the full verb. These, in the OHG period, developed the whole paradigm of the dental suffix.

Personal pronouns are in German obligatory elements of the verb phrase, since in their absence the verbal suffixes are ambiguous. The grammaticalization process, which resulted in this feature of pronouns, began in the OHG period. The factors catalysing this development are summarized in five points: sentence structure, person, word order, textual pragmatics and mood. Pronouns have remained free morphemes up until the present day; however, dialectal records of German show a tendency towards their cliticizing (as in '*meinste*' – '*meinst du*'). It is remarkable that this is the very phenomenon that supplied the basis for the grammaticalization process of verbal suffixes: clitics of pronouns were reanalysed.

Regarding politeness-forms, the author points out that today's binarity of the formal 'Sie' and informal 'du' has developed in five phases. In Germanic, the address system counted only one form, whereas from OHG on, there were at least two different ones. In Old and Middle High German the opposing forms were '*du*' and '*ihr*'. From the

17th century on, the pronouns '*er/sie*' were the means of exclusively polite address, since '*ihr*' became more frequent among lower social classes as well. The 18th century saw even more varieties with the occurrence of today's formal '*Sie*', the pronoun '*dieselben*' and the continuous usage of the creations of the previous century. In the 19th century, this complex system collapsed, and today's address-forms, '*du*' and '*Sie*' were selected to remain in usage.

The analytical past-tense forms and the grammaticalization process of the auxiliary '*haben*' are reflected on again, this time from the point of view of the VP. Pertaining to the lexical origins of the auxiliary, the author suggests that it roots in the possessive verb '*haben*'. As a result of the structural reanalysis of the VP containing the auxiliary in question, the Subj-'*haben*'-O_d-V sequence was assigned two readings. Initially, the O_d was read as a complement of '*haben*', the possessive verb. However, ambiguous constructions made a new interpretation available, namely one in which the O_d is a complement of the V. In OHG, this latter reading referred exclusively to the present, with a perfective component of the meaning. In MHD, the time reference shifted to today's denotation, although initially the auxiliary matched only with transitive verbs with an obligatory O_d. As soon as the O_d became optional, it made room for combination with intransitive verbs and, at the same time, for a resultative interpretation. Unlike in English, the German perfect tenses make reference to the past; furthermore, they are on course to supersede the analytic past form 'Präteritum'.

Subchapter 6.4 is devoted to the polygrammaticalization of the multifunctional lexeme '*werden*'. Five different functions are attributed to what was only a copula, all of them having their own route of grammaticalization:

- copula, as in '*Sie wird krank.*'
- passive-auxiliary, as in '*Du wirst gefragt.*'
- future-auxiliary, as in '*Wir werden schweigen.*'
- subjunctive-auxiliary, as in '*Ich würde kommen.*'
- epistemic modal verb, as in '*Sie wird es ihm (wohl) gesagt haben.*'

All these functions stem back to the OHG full verb, '*werdan*', which itself had already been subjected to meaning change, namely from the concrete meaning 'to turn' to the more abstract one, 'to happen, to come into existence'. From this intransitive meaning the copula '*wer-*

den' arose, bringing a second semantic change: from 'to happen' its meaning turned into 'to change'. The author argues that this latter semantic content, the implicature of 'something turns into something', is the catalyst of the rest of the grammaticalization processes.

Pertaining to the grammaticalization of the passive construction, in Szczepaniak's view, it developed as early as the OHG period. The ingressive meaning, referring to the occurrence of a new *passive* condition, was transferred by the combination of '*werdan*' and a participle. With the high degree of the so-called *Vorgangspassive*'s grammaticalization, the *sein-passive* – which was already an established construction in OHG – gradually lost its significance, until, in the 17th century, it concluded its development as today's 'Zustandspassiv'.

There are several rival hypotheses explaining the grammaticalization path of the modal-like future construction 'werden' + infinitive. Szczepaniak accounts for the process by placing the ingressive semantic content in the centre. She refers to OHG 'werden' + participle constructions as phrases denoting the abrupt occurrence of a new condition ('werden') and pointing towards the future (participle). In MHG, the ingressive meaning component was replaced by an inchoative one, which no longer implied an abrupt, but rather a slow change from one condition to another. Parallel to this semantic change, the infinitive supplanted the participle, and thus, in early New High German times, the construction acquired its current form. Unlike in other Germanic languages, the grammaticalization of a future form built by a modal verb and an infinitive hit barriers in German. However, *subjectification* did play a significant role in the evolution of the future form. It exhibits the speaker's justification to the proposition at hand; thus her prognosis in the case of future events.

The analytical subjunctive form, 'würde' + infinitive, appeared as a rival form of the synthetic subjunctive as late as the Early New German period. The construction is based on the condition-consequence relation of conditional sentences, and at the outset of its grammaticalization process it appeared exclusively with reference to unrealistic conditions.

The next subchapter discusses the vicissitudes of the so-called *recipient passive*, where a verb with an inherent meaning of possession change (such as 'bekommen', 'erhalten', 'kriegen') is read as an auxiliary in combination with a participle in order to aim at a passive interpretation. As opposed to 'werden'-passive, which represents a rival form to this ongoing process of grammaticalization, it is the receiver

who occupies the subject position in a recipient passive phrase. Thus, while in the case of *Vorganspassiv* an accusative conversion takes place, the recipient passive requires a dative conversion relative to an active construction. Concerning the structure of the recipient passive, it contains two predicates: a primary one (a verb like 'bekommen') and a secondary one, a participle, such as 'geröstet' in the sentence 'Ich bekomme den Kaffee geröstet'. The ambiguity which set the grammaticalization process in motion is obvious: the one reading focuses on the subject receiving the coffee *roasted*, while the other highlights that the coffee is roasted *for the subject*. In the passive interpretation, the participle behaves like a verb with three argument places: subject, theme and recipient. Thus, the primary predicate loses its relevance as a full verb and functions as a passive auxiliary instead. The range of application is broadening: not only concrete direct objects, but abstract ones, may be featured; inanimate subjects can now constitute a well-formed recipient passive, and, on top of everything, there is a tendency to omit the direct object (as in 'Ich bekomme [ein Buch] vorgelesen') which clearly indicates that this grammaticalization process is not yet complete.

As opposed to English, the German verb tense system does not include an obligatory present continuous. This, however, does not mean that uttering information about the moment of speaking is impossible. Quite the contrary: the creativity of the users of the language has found a way to fill this gap, namely by the combination of the once merely locative preposition 'am' and a substantivized infinitive, as in 'Sie ist *am Essen*.' The so-called 'rheinische Verlaufsform' is the most widespread of the four progressive constructions: 'am + infinitive + sein', 'beim + infinitive + sein', 'im + infinitive + sein' and 'dabei + infinitive with zu + sein'. The gist of Szczepaniak's argumentation regarding the grammaticalization of these progressive constructions is that they stem from locative prepositional phrases which allowed twofold interpretations: a locative and a progressive one. In the first place, only some so-called activity-verbs could build up a prepositional phrase with a progressive meaning in the present day; however, the construction is extended to non-additive verbs expressing a change in condition as well. Stative verbs, on the other hand, are only capable of connecting to the 'am-progressive'. In the latter, the infinitive gradually loses its nominal status, which indicates that however high its level of grammaticalization, the process is not yet complete.

In subchapter 6.7, the grammaticalization of German modals is discussed, with special emphasis on the distinction between objective and subjective modality. After a brief summary of the nature of both modality-types, the author makes the point that the number of modal verbs grew from the OHG three ('*skulan*', '*wellen*' and '*mugan*') to six ('*können*', '*dürfen*', '*müssen*', '*sollen*', '*wollen*', '*mögen*'). All these verbs require an infinitive. Furthermore, '*nicht brauchen*' is developing a modal function, inasmuch as it is used with an infinitive and a facultative 'zu' as a rival form of '*nicht müssen*'. Special emphasis is put on the grammaticalization of the epistemic modality, which proceeded from the MHG period on. Prior to that, the means of expressing the speaker's estimation of a situation had been the first subjunctive form. Like other grammaticalization paths, that of epistemic modality was started by the occurrence of conversational implicature while using modal verbs in their *untypical contexts*. The already familiar implicature reading is repeated in *critical contexts*, until it becomes established on its own in *isolating contexts*.

The last chapter of the volume is devoted to grammaticalization processes on the syntactic and discourse-pragmatic levels. After enlightening the reader about some basic concepts related to subordinating conjunctions, the conjunction '*dass*' and its development is elaborated on. It roots in the demonstrative pronoun '*thaz*' originally occupying the object position of one of two independent sentences. Whether these two sentences were read in an anaphoric or cataphoric relation to each other depended on the position of '*thaz*'. Determining the order of the two sentences involved was the first step to a higher degree of syntactic cohesion, from *parataxis* to *hypotaxis*. As soon as the subordinated object sentence was integrated into the main clause – something which had already occurred in OHG –, the conjunction became available for other types of subordinate clauses, such as subject, final, causal or consecutive clauses. Regarding the causal subordinating conjunction '*weil*', the author points out that in MHG, before its grammaticalization process started, it had the function of a time adverb referring to an unspecified duration. As the latter was located in MHG, the primary subordinating conjunctions, beside which '*(al) die wile*' was a secondary conjunction specifying the relation of the subordinate clause to the main one, gradually disappeared. From the 15th century on, the now primary conjunction, that knotted two clauses denoting actions taking place in parallel or following each other, was capable of evoking the implicature of a cause-effect relation. In-

terestingly enough, the grammaticalization of '*weil*' is not complete yet: in recent decades, it has been developing a discourse-marker function, which is elaborated on in subchapter 7.3. Firstly, as opposed to the sentence structure required by the conjunction, '*weil*', as a DM, is syntactically independent, and thus occurs with a verb-second-clause, and secondly, it is semantically bleached. As a linking phrase, it may connect an utterance to previous ones signaling that the speaker wishes to hold the turn. As regards the development of '*weil*' as a DM, this is referred to as a process of *pragmaticalization*. Thus, the author seems to share the view that in order to be able to count it as an instance of grammaticalization, the concept of *grammar* has to be revised. She suggests that grammatical forms should be called *open forms*, which may be used to express a reasonable concrete meaning only in relation to other words. A DM is such an open form, which gains its actual function only when uttered in context. Along the lines of the newly introduced definition of open forms, the author captures grammaticalization as a development process which yields items with a flexibly utilizable function, much rather than heavily context-dependent units.

Subchapter 7.2 covers the grammaticalization processes on the sentence level, marked by significant changes in verb placement. According to the model of topological fields, other elements of a sentence are placed in accordance with the position the finite verb occupies. Main clauses of declarative sentences have developed a verb-second structure from OHG to MHG, while polar questions already had a verb-first structure in OHG. Thus, the left sentence field, the one preceding the finite verb, had been located by MHG. The middle field and the right field (the field that follows the infinitive) on the other hand, were only fixed by the Early New German period. The subordinate clause, which in today's German is introduced by a conjunction and terminated by a finite verb, was only one of the available structures in OHG which prevailed towards the end of the period. Regarding the order of the elements of the analytic verb form, the development process stretched right into the NHG period.

A General index, an Index of abbreviations and a list of References conclude the volume, offering the reader useful help with the orientation within the monograph itself and in further research.

Szczepaniak's volume offers a comprehensive overview of the gist and most important notions of the study of grammaticalization. Given that the monograph is a textbook, the author confines herself to a

clear-cut and straightforward presentation of the field at an entry-level, which promises to be intelligible for readers with an elementary background knowledge of linguistics. This is, on the one hand, due the fact that it refrains from the extensive usage of puzzling notions; and on the other to the way it provides ample explanation and examples of newly introduced termini. Also in line with the textbook-character of the work reviewed, the author concentrates on offering an introductory demonstration of the very process of grammaticalization. She places mechanisms, strategies and the very procedure of grammaticalization at the centre of attention and elucidates these in a reasonable and transparent fashion. Elaborating on the mechanisms of grammaticalization of the German language at an elementary level makes the volume a novel, innovative and complementary addition to the study of the field. In comparison to Diewald's significant 1997 introductory textbook on grammaticalization written in German, Szczepaniak provides a more detailed and diversified account on actual grammaticalization phenomena. Regarding the structure of the book, the author proceeds with prominent examples of the grammaticalization of German, organizing the phenomena on the basis of syntactic categories: starting at the word level, she discusses the vicissitudes of negation; on the phrase level those of the noun and the verb phrase, and, last but not least, at the sentence and discourse-pragmatic levels. This logical and advantageous structure helps the reader comprehend the gist of the approach step-by-step. Unlike other monographs on the subject, Szczepaniak does not go into detail regarding the history of research into grammaticalization, but refers to her predecessors' work with relevance to individual phenomena. This is helpful for the reader wishing to find immediate clues to further research. However, a passage describing the evolution of a subfield of science has the advantage of making it more transparent for the reader. In such an overview, the author might also find space to refer to examples from other languages, further facilitating the understanding the essence of the subject.

The extent of the volume, 219 pages, with a well-proportioned division of the chapters and subchapters, is suitable for an introductory textbook.

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Das Entweder-oder-Prinzip im Denken über Kontradiktionen¹

1 Einleitung

1.1 Erhebung des "State-of-the-Art"

"Controversy is the breath of science and when we all agree it will be only because our science is dead" – so beschreibt der Linguist Emmon Bach im Jahr 1965 den Charakter der geistigen Fortentwicklung in der Wissenschaft (Bach 1965: 128). Demnach müssten die Forschungen über Kontradiktionen sehr produktiv sein, denn auf den ersten Blick ist deren Diskussion von einer Geschichte umhüllt, die zentrale Streitpunkte nicht gerne gegen Einverständnis eintauscht. Die Frage, ob Widersprüche, in welcher Form sie auch auftauchen mögen, anerkannt und geduldet werden dürfen, spaltet dieses Forschungsgebiet.

In der durch den Bedarf nach Reinheit, Universalität und ontologischer Neutralität geprägten klassischen Logik gilt das Prinzip des *ex contradictio quodlibet*, nach dem aus einem Widerspruch jede belie-

¹ Rezensionenartikel über:
Elena Ficara (ed.): *Contradictions. Logic, History, Actuality*. Berlin & New York: de Gruyter, 2014, 221 Seiten.

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bige Aussage folgt und dadurch das jeweilige System von Aussagen trivial wird: für jede Aussage A und B gilt, dass $\{A, \sim A\} \supset B$. Als Konsequenz daraus ergibt sich, dass jede Inkonsistenz gleichermaßen verheerend und unhaltbar ist. Eine etwas mildere Auffassung wird von den Vertretern der sog. parakonsistenten Logik befürwortet: obwohl sie nicht behaupten, dass die Kontradiktionen, die in einem Aussagensystem auftreten, wahr sind, erklären sie ein derartiges inkonsistentes System nicht auf Anhieb für nichtfunktionsfähig, trivial oder chaotisch. Trivialität wird nicht ausgelöst, weil die beiden einander widersprechenden Aussagen nicht unter den gleichen Bedingungen, sondern lediglich separat wahr sind, d.h. unter verschiedenen Voraussetzungen. Da solche inkonsistente Ansätze nicht zwangsläufig trivial verlaufen, lassen sie sich ebenso logisch rekonstruieren, wie Systeme, die dem Prinzip des *ex contradictio quodlibet* im Sinne der klassischen Logik entsprechen. Im Unterschied zur klassischen Logik und den parakonsistenten Logiken, die Inkonsistenz entweder ausschließen oder in jener spezifischen Form höchstens dulden, findet man aber auch eine Tradition, die eine gänzlich andere Sichtweise vertritt und die Realität von Widersprüchen anerkennt. Eine Ausprägung dieser Sichtweise ist der Dialetheismus², der besagt, dass es wahre Widersprüche gibt – d.h. wahre Aussagen, deren Negation unter denselben Voraussetzungen ebenfalls wahr ist – die jedoch keine Trivialisierung der Logik implizieren.³ Auch solche dialetheischen Systeme lassen sich mit logischen Mitteln darstellen.⁴

² Der Begriff 'Dialetheismus' ist ein von Graham Priest und Richard Routley erfundenes Kunstwort und wurde aus den griechischen Wörtern *di* (für "Zwei") und *altheia* (mit der Bedeutung "Wahrheit") zusammengesetzt.

³ An dieser Stelle muss man anmerken, dass zwar im Dialetheismus Kontradiktionen immer eine gewisse Art von Realität zugesprochen wird, aber diese nicht unbedingt mit dem metaphysischen Realismus einhergeht.

⁴ Zum Verhältnis von Dialetheismus und Parakonsistenz im Allgemeinen siehe etwa: Priest (2002), Priest et al. (eds.)(2004), Priest & Berto (2013), Priest et al. (2013), Tanaka et al. (2013); zum Problem von Widersprüchen in den Wissenschaften siehe Meheus (ed.)(2002); zur Parakonsistenz und Dialetheismus in der Linguistik siehe McGinnis (2013), Kertész (2012), Kertész & Rákosi (2013).

1.2 Problemstellung

Es ist anzunehmen, dass die Entscheidung darüber, ob ein kohärenter Überblick über ein solches Forschungsgebiet möglich ist, kein leichtes Unterfangen sein dürfte. Der von Elena Ficara editierte Band strebt zwar keinen derartigen vollständigen Überblick an, gibt aber einen repräsentativen Einblick in die Forschungslage dieser Problematik. Folglich besteht das Ziel des vorliegenden Beitrags darin, anhand der Besprechung und der anschließenden Analyse des erwähnten Buchs folgende Frage zu untersuchen:

- (P) Können unter der Annahme, dass uns das Buch einen repräsentativen Einblick in den Kontradiktionsdiskurs gewährt, Anhaltspunkte zu einem kohärenten Überblick über diese Problematik erschlossen werden?

Dies ist an sich ein komplexes und kompliziertes Problem und aus diesem Grund wurde es in die folgenden leichter handhabbaren Teilfragen untergliedert:

- (P1) Was sind die wichtigsten Fragen, bei deren Beantwortung die Ansichten auseinandergehen?
(P2) Was sind die dominierenden Antworten, die auf diese Fragen gegeben werden?
(P3) Welche Zusammenhänge bestehen zwischen diesen dominanten Positionen?

Mit Hilfe der Antworten auf die Teilfragen (P1)-(P3) soll die Lösung für das Grundproblem (P) erarbeitet werden.

1.3 Thematik

Die Zielsetzung des von Elena Ficara vorgelegten und 2014 beim De Gruyter Verlag veröffentlichten Werks, das als sechster Band in der Schriftenreihe *Berlin Studies in Knowledge Research* erschienen ist, ist es, die Ergebnisse neuester Forschungen über Kontradiktionen darzulegen. Es basiert auf einer Konferenz, die unter demselben Titel im Sommer 2011 an der Technischen Universität Berlin stattgefunden hat. Die Verfasser der einzelnen Beiträge repräsentieren verschiedene Betrachtungsweisen. Somit wird der Gegenstand des Bu-

ches zunächst aus der Perspektive der philosophischen Logik untersucht, danach wird seine Geschichte in den entscheidenden Phasen des philosophischen Denkens (d.h. in der antiken und in der klassischen deutschen Philosophie) dargestellt und schließlich wird seine Bedeutsamkeit für die gegenwärtige politische Praxis ebenso wie für heutige philosophische Überlegungen aufgezeigt. Berücksichtigt man den Gesichtspunkt, dass Kontradiktionen an der Schnittstelle verschiedener wissenschaftlicher Gebiete und Traditionen auftreten, so wird deutlich, dass dieser interdisziplinäre Ansatz unser Verständnis vom Thema weiter vertiefen kann.

Das 221 Seiten starke Werk – die Einleitung und die Liste der Beitragenden, die am Ende des Buches zu finden ist, nicht eingerechnet – ist in drei Teile gegliedert. Im ersten Teil, *Logik*, werden die Realität von Widersprüchen und der Zusammenhang zwischen Logik und Metaphysik thematisiert. Daran anschließend wird im zweiten Teil, *Geschichte*, zur Analyse Aristoteles' Verteidigung vom Prinzip der Widerspruchsfreiheit und Hegels Argumente bezüglich der Realität und Wirksamkeit von Widersprüchen übergegangen. Schließlich werden im dritten Teil, *Gegenwart*, die Rolle und der Gebrauch von Kontradiktionen in kulturellen und politischen Kontexten behandelt. Wenngleich diese Gliederung und die Beiträge thematisch äußerst vielfältig sind, werfen sie drei zentrale Fragen auf, nämlich die nach der Irreduzibilität, der Realität und dem produktiven Charakter von Widersprüchen. Demnach steht die Bedeutung des Terminus "Kontradiktion" sowie die des Ausdrucks "echte Kontradiktion" auf dem Spiel.

In den folgenden drei Abschnitten des vorliegenden Rezensionartikels, die jeweils den Titel *Teil 1: Logik*, *Teil 2: Geschichte* und *Teil 3: Gegenwart* tragen, um die Struktur dieses Werks widerzuspiegeln, werden die wichtigsten Thesen und Schwerpunkte der Beiträge einzeln vorgestellt und danach im Hinblick auf die Teilfragen (P1)-(P3) miteinander verglichen. Somit besteht jeder Abschnitt aus zwei Unterabschnitten: im ersten geben wir einen kurzen Überblick über die Aufsätze des jeweiligen Teils und im zweiten werten wir die Beiträge aus. Schließlich werden im letzten Teil *Fazit* die Auswertungen systematisiert und zur Lösung der Grundfrage (P) herangezogen.

2 Teil 1: Logik

2.1 Überblick

Im ersten Aufsatz des ersten Teils, *Contradictory concepts* von Graham Priest, geht es zum einen darum, ob Dialetheias, d.h. wahre Widersprüche, nur durch unsere Sprache hervorgerufen werden und demnach einzig als Konzepte existieren oder ob es sie in der Wirklichkeit gibt. Anders formuliert wird hier die schwierige metaphysische Frage aufgeworfen, ob es in unserer Realität Sachverhalte gibt, welche ein Aussagenpaar der Form A und $\neg A$ wahr machen können, d.h. beide Aussagen würden gleichzeitig zutreffen. Priest vertritt in seiner Arbeit die Auffassung, dass dies nicht der Fall ist und unterstützt seinen Standpunkt mit Hilfe der folgenden Argumentation: Man gehe davon aus, dass unsere Welt aus Fakten besteht. Wenn man annimmt, dass es in der Realität Kontradiktionen gibt, so folgt daraus, dass es sowohl Tatsachen der Form A , als auch Tatsachen der Form $\neg A$ geben muss. Die Annahme dieser sogenannten negativen Tatsachen hält Priest jedoch für nicht hinnehmbar, weil er mit einer derartigen Ontologie von Fakten oder Fakten ähnlichen Strukturen nicht einverstanden ist. Zum anderen wird die Möglichkeit der Auflösung von solchen erst dank der Sprache hervorgebrachten Dialetheias durch die Veränderung unserer Sprache/unsere konzeptuellen Systems in Frage gestellt. Priest untersucht Strategien, mit deren Hilfe Konzepte verändert werden können, und kommt zu dem Schluss, dass diese alle unzureichend seien, da sie keine Garantie für eine unveränderte Ausdruckskraft übernehmen können. Selbst im Falle einer neuen konsistenten Sprache, in der man alle Situationen, die in der alten inkonsistenten Sprache formulierbar waren, wiedergeben könnte, wäre ein Verlust an konzeptueller Ausdruckskraft zwangsläufig vorhanden. Denn zumindest was das alte Konzept der irreduziblen Kontradiktion betrifft, welche auch ein notwendiger Teil unseres Konzepts der Totalität ist, wäre die neue Sprache nicht mehr in der Lage, diesem Ausdruck zu verleihen.

Der zweite Beitrag des ersten Teils, JC Bealls *Rapunzel shaves Pinocchio's beard*, geht auf eine Diskussion zurück, die sich zwischen Beall selbst und Peter Eldridge-Smith abgespielt hat. Diese hat sich um das sogenannte Pinocchio Paradoxon, eine Version des Lügner-Paradoxons, gedreht, indem allerdings auch auf die empirische Welt Bezug genommen wird. Beall konstruiert eine ähnliche Geschichte: Das Gras wächst nämlich nur dann, wenn das, was Rapunzel sagt,

falsch ist. Was passiert nun aber, wenn sie sagt "Das Gras wächst"? Offensichtlich ist dies von gleicher Art wie das Lügner-Paradoxon. Wenn das, was Rapunzel sagt, tatsächlich wahr ist, kann es nicht der Fall sein, dass das Gras wächst, und somit ist das, was sie sagt, falsch; wenn es jedoch falsch ist, dann wissen wir einerseits, dass das Gras wächst, und andererseits, dass ihre Aussage wahr ist. Auf den ersten Blick erscheint es, als ob dieses Paradoxon ein Fall von metaphysischem Dialetheias wäre, weil die darin enthaltenen Aussagen auch etwas über die empirische Welt behaupten, und zwar, dass es Sachen gibt, die die jeweilige physische Eigenschaft zum gleichen Zeitpunkt besitzen und nicht besitzen. Beall argumentiert hingegen, ähnlich wie Priest – dafür, dass Kontradiktionen einzig durch unsere Sprache ins Leben gerufen werden. Darüber hinaus weist er die angebliche Gleichartigkeit des Lügner-Paradoxons und des Pinocchio Paradoxons zurück, indem er darauf aufmerksam macht, dass Märchen keine echten Widersprüche (d.h. anscheinend wahre Prämissen und anscheinend gültige Argumente, die aber zu einer anscheinend falschen Konklusion führen) darstellen können, weil ihre Prämissen und Argumente nur der Geschichte zufolge wahr sind. Insofern kann die Wahrheit in einer Geschichte auch nicht ausreichend für die Wahrheit in einer möglichen Welt sein.

Im dritten Beitrag, *Paradoxes and the reality of contradictions*, beschäftigt sich Franca D'Agostini mit den grundlegenden Problemen der Realität von Widersprüchen sowie mit der Art von Realismus, die durch einen dialetheischen Standpunkt nahegelegt wird. D'Agostini geht zum einen davon aus, dass es keinen Grund dafür gibt, das Prinzip der Widerspruchsfreiheit als eine fundamentale Rationalitätsregel aufzufassen; zum anderen hebt sie eine andere Vernunftregel hervor, und zwar die sog. Regel der Evidenz, wonach es als rational gilt – im Falle von gewisser Evidenz – die Wahrheit einer Kontradiktion anzunehmen. Aus der empirischen Perspektive betrachtet, hat man eine Evidenz für α nur dann, wenn ein bestimmter realer Umstand α uns tatsächlich in den Glauben versetzt, dass α . Da man sich aber nicht sicher sein kann, dass die gegebene Evidenz nicht allein wegen der Sprache zustande kommt und daher die betroffene Kontradiktion auch wahr ist, ist es ratsam, der semantischen gegenüber der metaphysischen Betrachtungsweise von Dialetheias den Vorzug zu geben. Wie real, existent oder in einer objektiven Weise evident sind jedoch solche semantischen Widersprüche? Diese epistemologische und metaphysische Frage beantwortet D'Agostini wie

folgt: Sie sind alethisch real, d.h. sie beinhalten Aussagen, die nur dann wahr sind, wenn sie dem derzeitigen Stand entsprechen. Somit kann es mehrere Arten von Kontradiktionen gemäß der Verschiedenartigkeit von Fakten geben – die aus dieser Perspektive gesehen solche Sachverhalte sind, die eine Aussage wahr machen können, d.h. sie werden nicht auf einen speziellen Bereich beschränkt. Diese Auffassung des alethischen Realismus kann überdies mit dem metaphysischen Realismus in Einklang gebracht werden, weil sie sich mit den drei Thesen verträgt, welche den metaphysischen Realismus klassisch gesehen ausmachen, – damit, dass es Fakten existieren; dass es eine alleinige wahre Beschreibung dieser Fakten gibt und, dass man selbst in der Lage ist, diese zu formulieren sowie zu entscheiden, ob sie wahr oder falsch sind.

Der vierte Aufsatz des ersten Teils *Logic, ontological neutrality, and the law of non-contradiction* von Achille C. Varzi, widmet sich dem Verhältnis zwischen unseren Ansätzen zum schlüssigen Denken und dem Bedarf nach einer vollständig reinen, universellen und ontologisch neutralen Logik. Offensichtlich soll die Logik nicht durch metaphysische Voraussetzungen beeinträchtigt sein, m. a. W. soll sie nichts Wesentliches darüber sagen, was es gibt, oder, ob es überhaupt etwas gibt, wenn uns ihre Formeln universell gültige Einsichten liefern sollen. Zunächst nimmt Varzi eine historische Perspektive ein, um aufzuzeigen, wie die Geschichte der Denklehre durch den Bedarf nach ontologischer Neutralität geprägt wurde: von der traditionellen aristotelischen Logik über die moderne Quantifikationstheorie bis hin zur freien Logik geht es um die Überarbeitung problematischer inferentieller Muster durch das Explizit-Machen von existenziellen Voraussetzungen. Es lässt sich jedoch generell festhalten, dass sowohl das ontologische Prinzip vom ausgeschlossenen Dritten als auch das ontologische Prinzip der Widerspruchsfreiheit zu allen Zeiten gegeben waren. Außerdem sind einige ihrer Theoreme und inferentiellen Muster, u.a. der indirekte Beweis, stark vom Prinzip der Widerspruchsfreiheit abhängig. Steht dieses Prinzip also im Wege der ontologischen Neutralität oder nicht? An dieser Stelle betont Varzi nachdrücklich, dass der Zusammenhang zwischen der metaphysischen und der semantischen Betrachtungsweise das eigentliche Problem darstellt und, dass genau aus diesem Grund die Unterscheidung zwischen dem metaphysischen Prinzip der Widerspruchsfreiheit (nichts ist gleichzeitig P und nicht-P) und dem semantischen Prinzip der Kontravalenz (keine Aussage ist gleichzeitig wahr und

falsch) von äußerster Bedeutung ist. Wie von Varzi kurz dargelegt wird, sind Gegenbeispiele für das Prinzip der Widerspruchsfreiheit automatisch Gegenbeispiele für Kontravalenz, aber nicht umgekehrt. Daraus folgt, dass nur das semantische Prinzip in der logischen Regel enthalten ist und, dass eine entgegengesetzte Auffassung ein verbalistischer Fehlschluss wäre. Somit stellt sich die Frage, wie man diese zwei Arten von Kontradiktionen, und zwar die stärkeren *de re* und die lediglich *de-dicto*-artigen Dialetheias, voneinander trennen kann. Am Ende werden zwei provisorische Vorschläge untersucht, mit deren Hilfe dieses Ziel erreicht werden soll. Darüber hinaus zeigen diese auch, dass das Prinzip der Widerspruchsfreiheit nicht als eine Ungunst aufgefasst werden muss, von der sich die Logik zu befreien hat, wenn sie ontologische Neutralität anstrebt.

In Francesco Bertos *Representing the contradictory*, dem letzten Beitrag im ersten Teil, wird die Möglichkeit der Repräsentation im Falle von widersprüchlichen Zuständen thematisiert. Erstens nimmt Berto als gegeben an, dass menschliche Wesen im Grunde finite, fehlbare, und gelegentlich sich widersprechende kognitive Agenzien sind, d.h. sie sind selbst in einem widersprüchlichen Informationszustand imstande, erfolgreich zu argumentieren; und zweitens stellt er fest, dass unsere traditionellen logischen Prinzipien, die das Darstellen von Kontradiktionen nicht erlauben, einen idealisierten Begriff von Wissen vermitteln. Im Gegensatz hierzu präsentiert Berto eine semantische und syntaktische Erweiterung von Priests N_4 -Relevanzlogik. In dieser parakonsistenten Logik gilt das *ex falso quodlibet* nicht, somit ziehen Widersprüche keine besonderen Folgen nach sich. Es gibt daher nicht nur mögliche, sondern auch nicht mögliche Welten, und zwar gleich zweier Art: Entweder sind sie extensional oder intensional nicht möglich – in der einen können logische Regeln anders sein oder sogar fehlschlagen, in der anderen sind jedoch Sachverhalte so, wie sie absolut nicht sein können. In syntaktischer Hinsicht wird der Repräsentationsoperator eingeführt, der für die Darstellung unserer Fähigkeit des Begreifens von logischen Unmöglichkeiten zuständig ist und dessen Semantik wie folgt ist: ' wRw_1 ', anders formuliert sind Sachverhalte in der Welt w genau so, wie sie in der Welt w_1 repräsentiert oder begriffen werden. Möchte man unser intuitives Verständnis von einem kognitiven Agens besser nachbilden, wonach selbst bei einer Spekulation noch eine minimale Kohärenz in der Repräsentation vorliegt, so kann man den Repräsentations-

tionsoperator mit einigen geeigneten Restriktionen weiter einschränken.

2.2 Auswertung

Die obige Zusammenfassung legt die Zwischenbilanz nahe, dass in Teil 1 *Logik* beziehungsweise in den Ansätzen von Priest, Beall, D'Agostini, Varzi und Berto, die Realität von Widersprüchen und der Zusammenhang zwischen Logik und Metaphysik unter die Lupe genommen werden. Die Frage, an die sich die weitere Erörterung anschließt, ob es wahre Kontradiktionen geben kann, d.h. wahre Aussagen, deren Negation unter denselben Voraussetzungen ebenfalls wahr ist,⁵ beantworten alle Beitragenden mit "Ja". Auf die nächste zur Diskussion stehende Frage, und zwar die nach den möglichen metaphysischen und ontologischen Konsequenzen dieser These, wird vor allem in den Ansätzen von Priest und von Beall näher eingegangen. Beide vertreten die Auffassung, dass die mit der Annahme von realen Widersprüchen in der empirischen Welt einhergehende Metaphysik von Fakten für manche möglicherweise "zu viel zum Verdauen" wäre. Überdies ist der Sprung vom semantischen zum metaphysischen Widerspruch durch die stets lauernernde Gefahr des verbalistischen Fehlschlusses gefährdet. Diese Behauptung, dass man semantische gegenüber metaphysischen Kontradiktionen bevorzugen sollte, bleibt durchgehend erhalten.⁶ Das zwischen ihnen bestehende Ver-

⁵ Es ist wichtig, darauf hinzuweisen, dass die verschiedenen Beiträge den Terminus 'Dialetheia' nicht einheitlich verwenden. In Priests Definition bezieht sich der Begriff auf die Zweiartigkeit von Aussagen und kann im späteren Verlauf entweder für eine semantische oder für eine metaphysische Kontradiktion erklärt werden, abhängig davon ob sie erst durch die Sprache hervorgebracht wurde, oder ob sie den Sachverhalten in der Welt entspricht. Varzi hingegen verweist auf die wichtige Distinktion zwischen dem metaphysischen Prinzip der Widerspruchsfreiheit und dem semantischen Prinzip der Kontravalenz. Diese sind bei Priest jedoch gleichgestellt, und das führt zu der interessanten Situation, dass jede wahre Kontradiktion bei Priest, gleichgültig von welcher Art sie ist, ein Gegenbeispiel für Kontravalenz bei Varzi darstellt, welche aber *per definitionem* semantischer Natur sind und somit folgt, dass die metaphysischen Varianten bei Priest nach der Betrachtungsweise von Varzi nicht Dialetheias sondern Instanzen vom Prinzip der Widerspruchsfreiheit sind.

⁶ Priest geht in seiner Argumentation noch einen Schritt weiter, indem er an der Möglichkeit der Auflösung von semantischen Kontradiktionen zweifelt, weil diese mit einem Verlust an konzeptueller Ausdruckskraft verbunden ist. Allerdings basiert seine Konklusion größtenteils auf der Feststellung, dass das Konzept des

hältnis wird in erster Linie bei D'Agostini und bei Varzi thematisiert. Folgt man der Aussage des ersteren, so ist alethischer Realismus, der übrigens mit dem metaphysischen Realismus vereinbar ist, die Art von Realismus, die durch einen dialethischen Standpunkt impliziert wird. Mit anderen Worten gesagt kann ohne Weiteres vom semantischen Dialethismus ausgehen, ohne eine exakte Beschreibung der in der Welt existierenden Fakten abgeben zu müssen. Dies steht auch mit der Antwort von Varzi im Einklang, der am Ende zum Schluss kommt, dass das semantische Prinzip zwar im metaphysischen enthalten ist, aber nicht umgekehrt. Schließlich wird im Beitrag von Berto die bisherige zum größten Teil philosophische Diskussion mit einem formalen Rahmen versehen und gezeigt, wie Kontradiktionen in der formalen Semantik repräsentiert werden können.⁷

3 Teil 2: Geschichte

3.1 Überblick

Das Kernanliegen des zweiten Teils besteht darin, ein Bild über die Relevanz der Kontradiktionen in der Philosophie – mit besonderem Augenmerk auf die Philosophie der Antike und die Nachkantische Philosophie – zu entwerfen.

In *Objections to Aristotle's defence of the principle of non-contradiction* von Enrico Berti, dem ersten Aufsatz in diesem Teil, geht es hauptsächlich um das Verhältnis zwischen Dialethismus und einem speziellen Baustein von Aristoteles' Dialektik, und zwar seiner Theorie der Refutation, und auch um die Frage, ob der Dialethismus auf jegliche Form des Widerlegens verzichten muss oder nicht. Berti fängt mit der Aufzählung einiger der wichtigsten Kritiken an, die Aristoteles' Verteidigung des Prinzips der Widerspruchsfreiheit widerfahren ist. Davon sind zwei unbedingt hervorzuheben. Erstens die von Dancy, nach der die Verteidigung von Aristoteles sich allein ge-

Dialethismus für uns von großem Nutzen ist. Insofern man dieser Feststellung wiederum zustimmt, erscheint die Motiviertheit eines Unterfangens als fraglich, dessen Ziel es ist, die Sprachen von Widersprüchen zu befreien.

⁷ Dieser Beitrag ist weiterhin deswegen interessant, weil er die zwei Arten der unmöglichen Welten in Frage stellt, mit denen operiert wird, bzw. dass unmögliche Welten überhaupt im Spiel sind sowie Bealls Auffassung, nach dem die Wahrheit in einer Geschichte nicht ausreicht, um von einer semantisch relevanten Möglichkeit zu sprechen.

gen die strenge Negation richtet, wonach Aristoteles annimmt, dass die Leugnung des Prinzips der Widerspruchsfreiheit zu Theorien führt, die sich zur Aussage "alle Dinge sind widersprüchlich" bekennen – dafür, dass dies nicht unter allen Umständen der Fall sein muss, ist das Auftreten der parakonsistenten Logik ein Beispiel. Die zweite Kritik, die hervorgehoben werden soll, ist die von Richard Routley und Graham Priest, nach der die Verteidigung von Aristoteles einerseits keinen transzendentalen Rechtfertigungsgrund für das Prinzip liefert, andererseits aber auch keine überzeugenden Argumente gegen den Dialetheismus vorbringen kann. Im nächsten Schritt untersucht Berti Aristoteles' klassische Definition der Refutation – für die die Gültigkeit vom Prinzip der Widerspruchsfreiheit eine Voraussetzung ist – und weist darauf hin, dass die logischen und psychologischen Versionen des Prinzips die mögliche Existenz von Kontradiktionen im Denken und sogar in der sprachlichen Formulierung nicht ausschließen, obwohl diese dann als ein Anzeichen für Falschheit gelten. Weiterhin wird die Bedeutung der Widerlegung im geistigen Fortschritt betont: Generell werden entweder Widersprüche in einer Theorie kritisiert oder Widersprüche zwischen einer Theorie und einer anderen, die man eher für gültig hält, oder zwischen einer Theorie und einigen Aussagen über Fakten. Muss der Dialetheismus auf all das verzichten? Priest zufolge nicht, weil aus der Existenz einiger wahrer Kontradiktionen nicht folgt, dass alle anzuerkennen sind. Zudem stellt das Prinzip der Rationalität ein Kriterium für Priest dar, nach dem man wahre Widersprüche von den restlichen unterscheiden kann. Im Gegensatz dazu ergibt sich hier für Berti eine Entweder-oder-Situation: Man folgt entweder Aristoteles oder Hegel, aber die Annahme von lokalen Kontradiktionen ist seiner Ansicht nach nicht plausibel.

Im zweiten Beitrag des zweiten Teils, *The justice of contradiction*, widmet sich Angelica Nuzzo der Frage, welche Rollen in Hegels Ansatz Widersprüchen und der Negativität in der Strukturierung von logischen, praktischen und historischen Prozessen zugeschrieben werden. Hegels Vorstellung von Geschichte – ein Höhepunkt in der Bewegung der Realisation der Freiheit in der Sphäre des ethischen Lebens – lässt sich auf sein logisches Denken über Widersprüche zurückführen, lautet das Argument. Zunächst weist Nuzzo darauf hin, dass Hegel Kants Verstandeslogik seiner dialektischen Vorstellung von Kontradiktionen ablehnend gegenüberstellt und zum Schluss kommt, dass erstere ein unzureichendes Verständnisparadigma der

derzeitigen Welt darstellt, da ihre feststehenden Konzepte und leeren Formalitäten ohne Inhalt keinen Zugriff auf die sich stets verändernde und widersprüchliche Gegenwart haben. Für Hegel ist also eine neue Art der Logik ebenso wie eine auf dieser basierende praktische Philosophie von Nöten, um mit deren Hilfe das logische Problem der Konzeptualisierung von Kontradiktionen und die praktischen Probleme des Zusammenlebens mit Widersprüchen und der Aufhebung/Widerlegung von Widersprüchen zu bewältigen. Als nächstes beschäftigt sich Nuzzo mit einem anderen und späteren Aspekt von Hegels Kritik am moralischen Formalismus von Kant, bei dem die Funktion von Kontradiktionen in der Natur des Handelns im Vordergrund steht. Nach Hegels Auffassung fehlt es Kants moralischem Prinzip⁸ nicht nur an Inhalt, sondern auch an ethischer und normativer Relevanz, weil es gerade das vermeidet, was der Wille zur Realisation des Handelns in einem sozialen Kontext determiniert, nämlich Kontradiktionen. Am Ende wird das Verhältnis zwischen Hegels Logik und seiner Vorstellung von Weltgeschichte thematisiert. Die berühmte Aussage "Weltgeschichte ist Weltgericht" lässt sich so interpretieren, dass historische Prozesse durch dialektische Widersprüche bestimmt sind, und zwar indem das Fortgehen zwischen ihrem Anfang und ihrem Ende durch einen Unterschied und das darauf folgende Urteil charakterisierbar ist, welches den Unterschied in sich selbst anerkennt und zur Veränderung anstiftet. In diesem Sinne führen Widersprüche weder zum Chaos noch zum Nichts, sondern zur epochalen Transformation.

Der dritte Aufsatz des zweiten Teils, Luca Illetteratis *Limit and contradiction in Hegel*, hat die Analyse der folgenden hegelschen These zum Ziel: "Alle Dinge sind in sich inhärent widersprüchlich". Im Gegensatz zur gewöhnlichen Ansicht, nach der man Widersprüche in Realität und Wahrheit betreffenden Diskursen loswerden müsse, vertritt Hegel ein neues Paradigma, in dem Kontradiktionen als die Wurzel aller Bewegung und Lebendigkeit aufgefasst werden. Einem derartigen Ansatz wird allerdings beinahe automatisch ein nichtwissenschaftlicher Charakter zugeschrieben, weil Theorien, die Widersprüche enthalten, alles und gleichzeitig nichts beinhalten. Folglich sind sie nicht in der Lage, wissenschaftlich relevante Aussagen zu treffen. Um solche immensen Folgen nicht an Hegels System herankommen zu lassen, sind drei verschiedene Interpretationswege be-

⁸ "Handle nach einer Maxime, die zugleich als allgemeines Gesetz gelten kann."

züglich des Begriffs Kontradiktion ausgearbeitet worden: eine metaphorische Interpretation, eine logische Interpretation, in der Kontradiktionen als der kritische, d.h. notwendige und konstitutive Moment im dialektischen Prozess verstanden werden, sowie eine wörtliche und somit ontologische, in der Widersprüche als das Prinzip der Determination begriffen werden. Die ersten zwei Lesarten sind jedoch nur epistemologisch, da Kontradiktionen nicht die Realität an sich kennzeichnen, sondern allein unsere abstrakte Konzeption, die unser Verständnis von der Realität hervorbringt. Illetterati argumentiert demgegenüber dahingehend, dass die These als ein Ausdruck der ontologischen Verpflichtung zu lesen ist, denn nur auf diese Weise kann man der Art der Dinge gut Rechnung tragen. Die Determination der Grenzen befindet sich auf einer fundamentalen Ebene der logischen Strukturierung von Realität, d.h. man nimmt an, dass für die Existenz von Dingen Grenzen unabdingbar sind. In diesem Bild lassen sich Kontradiktionen dann nicht mehr beseitigen.⁹ Zum Schluss gibt Illetterati einen kurzen Überblick über die Relation zwischen dem widersprüchlichen Konzept der Grenze und dem wahrhaft Unendlichen einerseits sowie zwischen dem Konzept der Schranke¹⁰ und der schlechten Unendlichkeit andererseits.

In Klaus Viewegs Beitrag, *Zur Logik moralischer Urteile*, dem vierten Aufsatz im zweiten Teil, wird die logische Grundlegung der Hegelschen praktischen Philosophie, genauer gesagt die Theorie der Moralität als die zweite Form im Stufengang seiner Rechtsphilosophie, verdeutlicht. Hegel zufolge liegen den Stufen des moralischen Willens und Handelns in besonderer Weise die logischen Formen des Urteils zugrunde – das unmittelbare Urteil betrifft den Vorsatz und die Schuld, das Reflexionsurteil betrifft die Absicht und das Wohl, und das Begriffsurteil bezieht sich auf das Gute und das Gewissen. An dieser Stelle ist es wichtig, auf Hegels Verständnis von 'Urteil' im Sinne der ursprünglichen Teilung und des Widerspruchs zu erinnern, wobei das ursprünglich Eine in ein in sich Unterschiedenes zerlegt wird. Auf dieser Dynamik der Urteilslogik beruht also die philosophische Theorie der Moralität, wo es um das sich fortentwickelnde Verhältnis der Besonderheit zur Allgemeinheit geht. Das Prädikat 'gut'

⁹ Die Grenzen – an sich bereits widersprüchlich – sind positive und konstitutive Prinzipien dessen, was sie begrenzen, denn an jener Stelle ist etwas zum gleichen Zeitpunkt es selbst und etwas anderes ("das Außersichsein in dem In-sichsein").

¹⁰ "Das Andere einer Schranke ist eben das Hinaus über dieselbe." S. 144.

drückt aus, dass "die Sache [das jeweilige Handeln¹¹] an ihrem allgemeinen Begriffe [Freiheit] als dem schlechthin vorausgesetzten Sollen gemessen und in Übereinstimmung mit demselben ist oder nicht." Kann zum Beispiel das Schenken eines Kätzchens als dem Prinzip des Allgemeinen gemäß, somit schlechthin als gut eingeschätzt werden?¹² Laut dem Hegelschen Kerngedanken nicht, da allein wenn etwas vom subjektiven Willen als berechtigt eingesehen wird und sich zugleich das Recht des objektiven etabliert hat,¹³ was nicht mit dem gerade Bestehenden und Geltenden verwechselt werden darf – ist es auch gut. Es mag nur eine Überzeugung oder ein Glauben sein, weil die Möglichkeit der Differenz zwischen dem subjektiven Willen und dem allgemeinen dank der in der Handlung innewohnenden Intersubjektivität und Kontextualität stets vorhanden ist. Im Unterschied zu dieser Auffassung soll die Pflicht nach Kant um der Pflicht willen getan werden und die Handlung soll somit nicht aus einer besonderen Neigung des Subjekts, sondern eben lediglich in Anlehnung an dem allgemeinen Gesetz erfolgen. Eine solche Allgemeinheit des Gesetzes stellt für Hegel jedoch ein reines, abstraktes und leeres Prinzip dar, welches sowohl die Umstände des Handelns als auch das Recht des Subjekts auf Wissen des Guten ausblendet.

3.2 Auswertung

Eine abschließende Systematisierung der Beiträge des zweiten Teils *Geschichte* ergibt, dass Kontradiktionen zwar immer auf anderem Wege, aber dennoch in jeder entscheidenden Phase der antiken und der klassischen deutschen Philosophie Produktivität zugeschrieben wurde. Denn die Aufsätze von Berti, Nuzzo, Illetterati und Vieweg zeigen anhand ihrer Analysen von Aristoteles' Verteidigung des Prinzips der Widerspruchsfreiheit und Hegels Argumente bezüglich der Realität und Wirksamkeit von Widersprüchen, dass (möglichen) Kontradiktionen im geistigen Fortschritt eine Schlüsselrolle zukommt. Wie es Berti im Falle von Aristoteles thematisiert, sind Wi-

¹¹ "Handlungen sind eine, in der Freiheit ihre Bestimmung und ihren Zweck habende Gattung in einer einzelnen Wirklichkeit und von einer besonderen Beschaffenheit." S. 159.

¹² Selbstverständlich lautet hier die korrekte Antwort "Ja".

¹³ Mit anderen Worten: wenn es dasjenige ist, was unbedingt sein soll.

dersprüche, bzw. deren Ablehnung nach der Vernunftsregel des Prinzips der Widerspruchsfreiheit für die Theorie der Widerlegung, die hingegen bei der Argumentation grundlegend ist, unerlässlich. Die verschiedenen Aspekte von Kontradiktionen in Hegels Ansätzen werden in erster Linie bei Nuzzo, Illetterati und Vieweg gezeigt. Sie gehen näher darauf ein, welche Rollen diese in der Strukturierung von logischen, praktischen und historischen Prozessen einnehmen und sie beschäftigen sich mit Hegels Distanzierungsversuch vom kantischen Verständnisparadigma, welches er für feststehend, leer und inhaltslos erklärt. Auf der anderen Seite herrscht eine offenkundige Uneinigkeit zwischen Aristoteles und Hegel hinsichtlich der Einstufung von Widersprüchen: In Aristoteles' Lehren ist die Gültigkeit vom Prinzip der Widerspruchsfreiheit eine Voraussetzung und demnach können Kontradiktionen nicht von realer Natur sein – selbst in den mildesten Versionen des Prinzips finden sie nur eine mögliche Existenz in unserem Denken; im Gegensatz zu dieser Auffassung lassen sich Hegels Thesen als ein Ausdruck ontologischer Verpflichtung lesen, wo Kontradiktionen die Realität in sich kennzeichnen und als Wurzel aller Bewegung und Lebendigkeit betrachtet werden.

4 Teil 3: Gegenwart

4.1 Überblick

Der Fokus des dritten Teils liegt auf der Rolle und dem Nutzen von Widersprüchen in kulturellen und politischen Geschehnissen. Die Beitragenden arbeiten größtenteils in der europäischen Tradition und untersuchen politische, ästhetische und biologische Auswirkungen von Kontradiktionen.

Insuperable contradictions von Gianni Vattimo, der den ersten Beitrag im dritten und letzten Teil darstellt, befasst sich hauptsächlich mit dem Gedanken, dass Kontradiktionen in der Philosophie niemals geduldet wurden und selbst wenn das Denken über sie gefördert wird – wie es zum Beispiel im Falle dieses Werks erfolgt – ist es einzig deswegen der Fall, um weiterhin den traditionellen Weg der metaphysischen Elimination zu verfolgen. Die Basis für die Schlichtung von Kontradiktionen ergibt sich durch den philosophischen Standpunkt, nach dem es die "objektive" und von Eigeninteressen unabhängige Wahrheit gibt, die uns in die Lage versetzt, über Wider-

sprüche zu diskutieren und sie somit in den Griff zu bekommen. Vattimo arbeitet mit der Prämisse, dass die Philosophie sich selbst als eine Art Friedensstifter betrachtet und aus diesem Grund Konflikte, Kontradiktionen usw. zuerst klären und später beseitigen will. Er argumentiert jedoch dafür, dass es erstens irreduzible Kontradiktionen gibt und zweitens, dass unsere heutige Welt keine weitere Schlichtungen mehr durch philosophische Überlegungen benötigt. Demgegenüber wird auch hervorgehoben, dass eine derartige Ansicht, welche gegen einen absolut neutralen Punkt, der von Interessen frei ist, aber für den Relativismus spricht, in dem heute dominierenden neuen Realismus mit vielen Risiken verbunden ist. Es bringt einerseits die Gefahr mit sich, dass man als ein potentieller Terrorist betrachtet wird – da der Relativismus für eine soziale Störung gehalten wird; und andererseits, dass man deswegen als Philosoph bloßgestellt wird, weil man mit dieser Auffassung den Glauben an die offizielle wissenschaftliche Wahrheit gefährdet.

Der zweite Aufsatz des dritten Teils, Federico Vercellones *A disenchantment. Hermeneutics and morphology*, geht auf die sogenannte Verzauberung der ernüchterten Welt ein, die dank dem eindeutigen und starren Modell der technischen und instrumentellen Rationalität zustande gekommen ist, welches die Ereignisse in der Welt in einer disziplinierten und funktionalen Weise reguliert. Den Grund dafür sieht Vercellone in dem spätmodernen Bewusstsein, das Kontradiktionen zu überschreiten versucht, indem es nach einer Art Entschädigungskonzept sucht. Die Entwurzelung der Vernunft hat auf den diversesten Ebenen die Notwendigkeit von neuen Verwurzelungen verursacht, die sogar bestimmte Charakterzüge von Mythen übernehmen, insofern sie als absolute Einheiten gezeigt werden und als gründende Werte für die Existenz von Gemeinschaften fungieren. Die Forderung, das Selbst neu zu entdecken, führt somit zu neuartig verwurzelten Identitäten, die neue politische und kulturelle Strukturen haben und die das, was relativ zum jeweiligen Kontext betrachtet werden sollte, mit einem absoluten, d.h. universellen, gültigen und zwingenden Charakter versehen. Wie bereits am Anfang erwähnt wurde, ist beispielsweise die Technologie eine Instanz, die eine neue Zugehörigkeit anbietet und so die Verzauberung der Welt bewirken kann. Am Ende beschreibt Vercellone die Rolle von Abbildungen und Bildern in einer neuen Richtung der Hermeneutik: die Bilder werden gegen den Hintergrund, gegen den sie sich behaupten, erkennbar und gerade wegen diesem Hintergrund sind sie als etwas

definiert, was sich von allem anderen unterscheidet und werden "die Bilder über etwas", d.h. sie kennzeichnen etwas. Nichtsdestotrotz haben sie auch einen kollektiven Charakter, denn sie werden in eine Reihenfolge von Bildern gebracht und darin interpretiert. Auf diese Weise wird sowohl dem holistischen Konzept der Hermeneutik, als auch der Verzauberung der ernüchterten Welt Rechnung getragen.

Im dritten Aufsatz *Wie wir auf Konsistenz aus sind – und warum* setzt sich Wolfgang Welsch mit dem Gebot der Konsistenz,¹⁴ mit seiner Natur und seinem Zusammenhang mit Widersprüchen auseinander. Seinen Beobachtungen zufolge verlangen wir im Alltag innere Konsistenz von Personen, obwohl es eigentlich kein Problem sein dürfte, wenn etwas auf der Ebene der Aussagen widersprüchlich ist, solange die Person auf der Ebene der Theorien konsistent bleibt.¹⁵ Man erwartet eine eindeutige Identität und, dass jemand denselben Gedanken sukzessiv entwickelt, anreichert und verfeinert. Dies gilt auch für Gedanken, bei denen ein Konflikt gar nicht möglich wäre, weil sie sich auf unterschiedliche Fragen und Sachfelder beziehen – der Theorienpluralismus bleibt bei einer einzelnen Person irritierend, weil man befürchtet, dass die Person nicht wahrhaftig ist und uns zu täuschen versucht. Die Vereinigung einer Vielzahl von Positionen ist mit dem Risiko verbunden, dass Widersprüche auftreten, wenn mal diese, mal jene Auffassung in den Vordergrund tritt – geriete ergo die Person niemals in Widersprüche, würde es uns als inkonsistent erscheinen. Nun findet man aber neben der Konsistenz Erwartung und -befolgung auch eine Konsistenzallergie: Man ist skeptisch gegen Gedankensysteme und gegen vollkommene und bestehende Schlüssigkeit. Die Konsistenz ist einerseits die typisch moderne Sicherungsmöglichkeit. Seitdem der moderne Mensch nicht mehr an Fundamente glaubt, wird stets danach gesucht, aber andererseits wird sie auf Dauer infrage gestellt, weil schlüssige Zusammenhänge eher ver-

¹⁴ "Üblicherweise sagt man, Konsistenz sei eine logische Bestimmung, die verlangt, dass ein Verbund von Aussagen keinen Widerspruch enthält ... Kohärenz verlange hingegen mehr, nämlich inhaltlichen Zusammenhang und idealerweise eine vollständige wechselseitige Stützung der Aussagen." S. 193.

¹⁵ Diese Art der Ebenenunterscheidung bringt die Widersprüchlichkeit und Konsistenz in der Philosophie zusammen. In dieser klassischen Figur erfahren Widersprüche einer niedrigeren Ebene ihre Aufhebung auf einer höheren Ebene.

Im Falle von Kulturkreisen funktioniert die Figur der Transzendierung der Gegensätze in einer höheren Wahrheit ähnlich: zum Beispiel gibt es zwar kulturelle Unterschiede im Umgang mit Selbstwidersprüchlichkeit, aber die logische Basis, und zwar dass sie im Grunde fehlerhaft sind, ist gemeinsam.

dächtig sind. Am Ende betont Welsch, dass Konsistenz in erster Linie kein logisches oder argumentatives Gebot ist, sondern ein biologisches – Organismen sind nämlich durch ständige Kohärenzherstellung gekennzeichnet.

4.2 *Auswertung*

Die Aufsätze des dritten Teils *Gegenwart* heben sich gewissermaßen von denen der ersten zwei Teile des Buches ab, da sie sich zwar als eigenständige Gedankenfolgen über die aktuellen kulturellen, politischen und philosophischen Kontexte lesen lassen und sich dabei auch dem Thema Widersprüche zuwenden, sich aber damit nicht per se auseinandersetzen. Sie bieten noch keine Theorien an, sondern nur einige Beobachtungen, aus denen sich später eventuell einige Ausgangspunkte zu einem zusammenhängenden Bild fixieren lassen. Obwohl die drei Beitragenden dieses Teils sich nicht explizit mit den Grundfragen nach der Irreduzibilität, der Realität und dem produktiven Charakter von Widersprüchen befassen, kann man trotzdem aus ihren Beiträgen auf ihren jeweiligen Standpunkt diesbezüglich schließen. Vattimo und Vercellone sprechen sich indirekt für eine Welt voller irreduzibler und realer Kontradiktionen aus, ohne jedoch über eines der zentralen Ausgangsprobleme des ersten Teils, nämlich über die durch ihnen implizierte Art von Realismus, viele Worte zu verlieren. Es ist vor allem Vattimos Beitrag, hinter dem man eine hegelianische Sichtweise vermutet, da seine Auffassung von der Welt, in der die Ideologien die Anerkennung der Lebendigkeit von Kontradiktionen ablehnen, als ein Ausdruck der ontologischen Verpflichtung interpretierbar ist. Welsch hingegen folgt der Figur, nach der es Inkonsistenz nur scheinbar gibt und die Widersprüchlichkeit durch eine Ebenenunterscheidung stets mit der Konsistenz zusammengebracht werden kann – überhaupt ist die Idee, dass dies ein ontologisches Gebot sei.

5 **Fazit**

An dieser Stelle werden die Auswertungen der Aufsätze erneut systematisiert, wodurch die in Abschnitt 1.2 des vorliegenden Rezensionartikels gestellten Teilfragen (P1)-(P3) und anschließend die Grundfrage (P) beantwortet werden können:

- (P) Können unter der Annahme, dass uns das Buch einen repräsentativen Einblick in den Kontradiktionsdiskurs gewährt, Anhaltspunkte zu einem kohärenten Überblick über diese Problematik erschlossen werden?
- (P1) Was sind die wichtigsten Fragen, bei deren Beantwortung die Ansichten auseinandergehen?
- (P2) Was sind die dominierenden Antworten, die auf diese Fragen gegeben werden?
- (P3) Welche Zusammenhänge bestehen zwischen diesen dominanten Positionen?

Nachfolgend wird ausgeführt, was sich im Hinblick auf die Teilfragen (P1)-(P3) festhalten lässt.

5.1 Teil 1: Logik

(P1L)

- (a) Kann es wahre Kontradiktionen geben?
- (b) Was sind die metaphysischen und ontologischen Konsequenzen der möglichen Positionen?

(P2L)

Bezüglich der Frage (a):

- Nein – in keiner Form können wahre Kontradiktionen existieren.¹⁶
- Ja, aber nur auf der Ebene der Aussagen (semantische Betrachtungsweise).
- Ja, sowohl auf der Ebene der Aussagen, als auch in der empirischen Welt (metaphysische Betrachtungsweise).

Bezüglich der Frage (b):

- Jegliche Art der Realität ist frei von Kontradiktionen.
- Wahre Widersprüche werden nur durch die Sprache hervorgerufen und existieren einzig als Konzepte.¹⁷

¹⁶ Diese Position wird im ersten Teil von keinem der Beitragenden vertreten.

¹⁷ Daraus zieht D'Agostini die Schlussfolgerung, dass die Fakten, die Kontradiktionen wahr machen, für semantische Dialetheisten keine natürlichen Fakten sind, sondern lediglich linguistische, konventionelle Fakten – also nur Artefakte.

Oder: Es gibt (nicht weiterhin spezifizierte) Fakten, die unsere Aussagen wahr machen.

- Die Sachverhalte in der Welt sind solche, die bestimmte Kontradiktionen wahr machen.

(P3L)

Alle fünf Beiträge befürworten die semantische Betrachtungsweise von Kontradiktionen und, obwohl die Ansichten bei deren metaphysischen Konsequenzen auseinandergehen, schließen sich diese Positionen gegenseitig nicht zwangsläufig aus.

5.2 Teil 2: Geschichte

(P1L)

- (a) Kann es wahre Kontradiktionen geben?
- (b) Was sind die metaphysischen und ontologischen Konsequenzen der möglichen Positionen?
- (c) Welche Rollen kann man Widersprüchen zuschreiben?

(P2L)

Bezüglich der Frage (a):

- Aristotelische Tradition: Nein – in keiner Form können wahre Kontradiktionen existieren.¹⁸
- Hegelianische Tradition: Ja, sowohl auf der Ebene der Aussagen, als auch in der empirischen Welt.

Bezüglich der Frage (b):¹⁹

- Aristotelische Tradition: Kontradiktionen können nicht von realer Natur sein.
- Hegelianische Tradition: Die Sachverhalte in der Welt sind solche, die bestimmte Kontradiktionen wahr machen.

Bezüglich der Frage (c):

- Aristotelische Tradition: Die Ablehnung von Widersprüchen ist bei der Theorie der Widerlegung grundlegend. Nachdem

¹⁸ Es ist jedoch wichtig darauf hinzuweisen, dass in bestimmten Versionen des Prinzips der Widerspruchsfreiheit, Kontradiktionen im Denken oder sogar in der sprachlichen Formulierung auftreten können – sie werden aber als ein Anzeichen für Falschheit wahrgenommen.

¹⁹ Auf diese Frage wird im zweiten Teil nicht explizit eingegangen.

die Theorie der Widerlegung für jeglichen Argumentationsprozess unerlässlich ist, gilt dies auch für Kontradiktionen.

- Hegelianische Tradition: Widersprüche werden als Wurzel aller Bewegung und Lebendigkeit in der Welt aufgefasst – sie strukturieren logische, praktische und historische Prozesse.

(P3L)

Die obigen philosophischen Traditionen, um deren Analyse es hauptsächlich im zweiten Teil geht, widersprechen sich, indem sie die Existenz von Widersprüchen anderweitig beurteilen. Nichtsdestotrotz werden Widersprüche interessanterweise in jedem Fall als produktiv bewertet.

5.3 Teil 3: Gegenwart

(P1L)

- (a) Kann es wahre Kontradiktionen geben?
- (b) Was sind die metaphysischen und ontologischen Konsequenzen der möglichen Positionen?
- (d) Welche gesellschaftlichen Konsequenzen ziehen die einzelnen Positionen nach sich?

(P2L)

Bezüglich der Frage (a):

- Nein – in keiner Form können wahre Kontradiktionen existieren.²⁰
- Ja, aber nur auf der Ebene der Aussagen.
- Ja, sowohl auf der Ebene der Aussagen als auch in der empirischen Welt.

Bezüglich der Frage (b):

- Es gibt eine "objektive" und von Eigeninteressen unabhängige Wahrheit, die von Kontradiktionen frei ist.
- Wahre Widersprüche werden nur durch die Sprache hervorgehoben und sie sind nicht irreduzibel.
- Die Sachverhalte in der Welt sind solche, die bestimmte irreduzible Kontradiktionen wahr machen.

²⁰ Diese Position wird im dritten Teil von keinem der Beitragenden vertreten.

Bezüglich der Frage (c):

- Die Elimination von Widersprüchen zielt auf die Untermauerung des Standpunktes ab, wonach es eine absolut neutrale Position gibt, die von Interessen frei ist. Diese fungiert als die Basis für den heute dominierenden neuen Realismus der Searle-Bush Tradition, in der der Glaube an die wissenschaftliche Wahrheit für die soziale und ökonomische Entwicklung zentral ist.
- Der Versuch, in der Spätmoderne, Kontradiktionen zu überschreiten, zieht eine Suche nach verschiedenen Entschädigungskonzepten nach sich, die dazu dienen, den Menschen ein Zugehörigkeitsgefühl zu geben und die ernüchterte Welt erneut verzaubern. Ähnlich wie Mythen zeigen diese sich als universell gültig.
- Wir verlangen von Personen im Alltag innere Konsistenz und auch wenn dies nur auf der niedrigsten Ebene fehlt, wird es als Täuschungsversuch interpretiert. Auf der anderen Seite erscheinen uns auf Dauer schlüssige Zusammenhänge ebenfalls als verdächtig.

(P3L)

Die Aufsätze im Teil *Gegenwart* sind nur schwer auf einen gemeinsamen Nenner zu bringen, weil sie in ihren Argumentationen von verschiedenen Beobachtungen ausgehen und sich in verschiedene Richtungen entwickeln – obwohl die Akzeptanz von Kontradiktionen stets eine Prämisse bleibt.

Berücksichtigt man die auf die Teilfragen (P1)-(P3) gegebenen und eben angeführten Antworten, ergibt sich für die Grundfrage (P) die folgende Lösung:

(PL)

Die Frage lässt sich sowohl mit einem "Ja" als auch mit einem "Nein" beantworten – allerdings auf unterschiedlichen Stufen. Wie aus der Gegenüberstellung der Aufsätze aus dem Werk *Contradictions. Logic, History, Actuality* hervorgeht, ist das Forschungsgebiet, das sich mit der Problematik der Kontradiktionen auseinandersetzt, selbst nicht ohne Widersprüche – zumindest nicht auf der Ebene der Aussagen. Dies lässt sich durch eine gewisse "Entweder-Oder"-Haltung erklären, die auf höheren Ebenen überwiegt: entweder ist man der Über-

zeugung, dass Kontradiktionen nicht von realer Natur sind, oder man spricht für deren metaphysische oder zumindest sprachliche Realität.

1. Wählt man den ersten Weg, so stellt sich gleich die Frage, ob Kontradiktionen in jedem Fall zu nichtfunktionsfähigen, trivialen und zu chaotischen Ansätzen führen, oder ob man sie in manchen Fällen dulden kann. Entscheidet man sich für die erste Ansicht, kann man die Existenz von Theorien, die zwar widersprüchlich sind, aber dennoch produktiv, nicht erklären. Befürwortet man letztere Position, trifft man auf das Problem, dass wir über keine eindeutigen Kriterien verfügen, um zwischen wahren und den restlichen Widersprüchen eine Unterscheidung zu machen.
2. Wählt man den zweiten Weg, so müssen bestimmte unter (P1L) (b)-(d) angeführte Fragen, die die metaphysischen/ontologischen und die gesellschaftlichen Konsequenzen der möglichen Positionen thematisieren, eine klare plausible Antwort erhalten.

Die in (PL) geschilderte Lage ist bei einem Werk mit 12 Beiträgen zweifelsohne ein Grund für Euphorie, denn es zeigt, dass der Band thematisch äußerst vielfältig ist und für Anregung zu weiteren Diskussionen sorgen wird. Es bleibt ganz gleich, welcher Überzeugung man ist, wenn bei der Auflösung der (möglicherweise realen) Inkonsistenz neue Türen geöffnet und dabei neue Gedankenflüsse provoziert werden.

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Rezension / Review

Monika Schwarz-Friesel & Jeannette Chur: *Semantik: Ein Arbeitsbuch*. 6. Auflage. Tübingen: Narr, 2014, 237 Seiten*

Das Kernanliegen der neuesten, grundlegend überarbeiteten und erweiterten Auflage des Arbeitsbuches zur Semantik von Monika Schwarz-Friesel und Jeannette Chur besteht darin, die Leser sowohl mit dem theoretischen Teil der modernen Semantikforschung, als auch mit praxisorientierten Fragestellungen vertraut zu machen. Aus diesem Grund lässt sich das hier rezensierte Werk zweifellos als ein nützliches Buch beschreiben, das in erster Linie in Seminaren eingesetzt werden kann. Da das Buch aber eine leserfreundliche Einführung in die Semantik bietet, ist es auch für das Selbststudium gut geeignet. Die Struktur des Werkes spricht für sich, da es aus zwei, voneinander klar zu unterscheidenden Teilen besteht: in der ersten Hälfte des Buches (geschrieben von Schwarz-Friesel) wird das Ziel angestrebt, die allgemeinen theoretischen Grundlagen, Aspekte, und Fragestellungen der Semantik darzustellen, der von Chur verfasste zweite Teil ist aber eher anwendungsorientiert, und gibt einen Einblick in die formale Semantik mittels der Veranschaulichung der verschiedenen Logikansätze.

Wie im ersten Kapitel hervorgehoben wird, ist die Semantik kein modernes Forschungsgebiet, sondern ist in den antiken Zeiten verwurzelt. Es wird ein kurzer geschichtlicher Überblick darüber gegeben, wie sich die Semantikforschung bis zu den 70er Jahren entwickelt hat, als die Fragen der Semantik durch die Entstehung der Kognitiven Wissenschaft neu gedacht worden sind (S. 22-23). Das erste Kapitel ist vordergründig den jeweiligen Fragestellungen der modernen Semantikforschung gewidmet, indem die Fragen in den Mittelpunkt gestellt werden, wie, warum und unter welchen Umständen unser semantisches Wissen im Langzeitgedächtnis zu finden ist und wie wir damit umgehen können. Überdies wird hervorgehoben, dass sich die innerhalb der Semantikforschung differierenden Themenbereiche mit der zentralen Fragestellung der jeweiligen Semantiktheorien, also mit der Bedeutungsproblematik, auf verschiedene

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Art und Weise auseinandersetzen.¹ Auf die Wurzeln des engen Verhältnisses von Bedeutung und Ausdruck wird mittels der Veranschaulichung der von de Saussure eingeführten bilateralen Zeichenkonzeption, dem semiotischen Dreieck nach Ogden & Richards (1923), bzw. dem Organonmodell nach Bühler (1934) zurückgegriffen. Dass Bedeutungen versprachlichte, mit Wortformen belegte Konzepte seien, eröffnet Schwarz-Friesel zufolge eine weitere Frage in Hinblick darauf, ob bzw. in welchem Maße konzeptuelles und semantisches Wissen identisch seien. Die drei Ansätze, die sich mit dieser Frage befassen, werden in diesem Kapitel kurz dargestellt.²

Im nächsten Kapitel wird vor allem auf die Aspekte der Wortsemantik eingegangen. Schwarz-Friesel beschreibt hier die Grundlage der späteren Prototypentheorie, also die klassische Merkmaltheorie, in der Kategorien voneinander durch semantische Merkmale strikt zu unterscheiden sind.³ In der Untersuchung von Wittgenstein wurde diese Auffassung sogar erweitert, ihm zufolge seien Kategorien durch Familienähnlichkeit zustande gekommene erfahrungsbasierte Klassen. Des Weiteren werden die verschiedenen Relationen der Sinnsemantik thematisiert, also diejenigen Beziehungen, die zwischen Wörtern und zwischen Bedeutungen von Wörtern einer Sprache vorhanden sind, und somit zur Organisiertheit des mentalen Wortschatzes beitragen.⁴ Da semantische Einheiten im mentalen Lexikon nicht isoliert, sondern in komplexen Verbindungen abgespeichert sind,⁵ versucht Schwarz-Friesel zu veranschaulichen, dass dieser Tatsache sowohl in der Wortfeld-, als auch in der sog. sprachlichen Relativitätstheorie eine entscheidende Bedeutung zukommt. Als letzter wichtiger

¹ Diese Bereiche seien innerhalb des Arbeitsgebietes der Semantik die lexikalische Semantik, die Satzsemantik, die Textsemantik, die Referenzsemantik, und die kontrastive Semantikforschung. Zu den ausführlicheren Beschreibungen der einzelnen Themenbereiche siehe Schwarz-Friesel & Chur (2014: 17ff.).

² Diese Ansätze sind die Ein-Stufen-Semantik, die Zwei-Stufen-Semantik und die Drei-Stufen-Semantik.

³ Semantische Merkmale seien "angeborene Grundkategorien unserer Perzeption und Kognition" (S. 46).

⁴ Diese im mentalen Lexikon verankerte Relationen sind die Synonymie, Referenzidentität, Ambiguität, Polysemie, Hyponomie und Hyperonymie, Kohyponomie, Kontradiktion, und Antonomie.

⁵ "Semantische Einheiten sind also im LZG nicht isoliert abgespeichert, sondern werden in komplexen Zusammenhängen organisiert. Solche Organisationseinheiten im Gedächtnis nennt man semantische Felder." (S. 80)

Punkt dieses Kapitels geht die Autorin am Beispiel der Aphasiker auf die neurophysiologisch ausgerichtete Gehirnforschung ein.⁶

Dem 2. Kapitel folgt die Veranschaulichung der verschiedenen prozeduralen Aspekte der semantischen Kompetenz. Das heißt, dass hierbei die in der Referenzforschung etablierten Fragen über die referenzielle Funktion der Sprache von großem Belang sind. Die linguistischen Disziplinen Pragmatik und Semantik seien an diesem Punkt miteinander eng verknüpft, da u.a. die Kriterien der Referenzialisierung, die Perzepte und die Referenzmittel in beiden sprachwissenschaftlichen Gebieten als Forschungsgegenstand gelten. Im Unterkapitel 3.3 wird die Theorie von Grice über das Kooperationsprinzip bzw. die Konversationsmaximen dargestellt und somit wird hervorgehoben, dass man beim Referieren auch bestimmten Prinzipien folgen soll, um Referenzhandlungen erfolgreich vollziehen zu können. Um den mithilfe von koreferenten Ausdrücken gestalteten Sinn in der Aufeinanderfolge von Sätzen verstehen zu können, muss man das im Langzeitgedächtnis gespeicherte Wissen aktivieren und den Kontext kennen. In separaten Unterkapiteln beschäftigt sich Schwarz-Friesel mit der Frage der Referenz von deiktischen Ausdrücken bzw. der Rolle der mentalen Modelle bei koreferenten Ausdrücken.

Im 4. Kapitel versucht die Autorin mit Hilfe von zwei Fallbeispielen – der Metaphernbildung und der Ad-Hoc-Komposition – der semantischen Kreativität auf den Grund zu gehen. Die wichtigsten Aspekte der jeweiligen Metaphernforschung erfassend, wird in dem ersten Unterkapitel die Metaphernbildung als produktives Mittel beschrieben. Ein weiteres Unterkapitel widmet Schwarz-Friesel der Darstellung einer interdisziplinären Untersuchung, mit der das Ziel angestrebt wurde, die manipulativen bzw. persuasiven Funktionen der Sprache und Metaphern zu klären. Diese hochinteressante und aktuell politische Untersuchung, die Schwarz-Friesel und Reinhartz in ihrem Werk *Die Sprache der Judenfeindschaft im 21. Jahrhundert* (2013) zusammengefasst haben, eröffnet eine neue Perspektive im Hinblick auf die Forschung der Semantik von sprachlichen Äußerungen.⁷ Die Macht der Semantik, die sich durch Sprache manifestiert,

⁶ Aphasiker sind Menschen, die an Sprachstörungen leiden, die nach Spracherwerb durch Gehirnverletzungen oder Durchblutungsstörungen ausgelöst werden (S. 83).

⁷ "Sprache hat auch Macht, weil sie ein Instrument der Beeinflussung und Lenkung unserer Gedanken und Gefühle ist, weil durch sie diese Manipulation ausgeübt werden kann, ohne dass sie bewusst wird. Die Bedeutung von Wörtern schleicht sich oft unbemerkt in unseren Geist ein, sie hinterlässt Spuren, löst

kann sowohl im positiven als auch im negativen Sinne als gefährliches Instrument eingesetzt werden, um auf Menschen bzw. Gesellschaften einzuwirken (S. 122 f.). Außer der Metaphernbildung wird die Bildung von Ad-Hoc-Komposita als weitere Möglichkeit zum Ausdruck semantischer Kreativität betrachtet. Ad-Hoc-Komposita seien besonders interessante Belege für die sogenannte semantische Kreativität, weil sie sowohl metaphorisch, als auch konkret sein können, mehrmals mehrere Interpretationen zulassen und zweifellos an den Kontext gebunden sind.

Das relativ kurze 5. Kapitel, das von Jeannette Chur verfasst worden ist, gehört bereits zum praxisorientierten Teil des Buches, und fängt mit einer Einführung in die Satzsemantik an. Dieses Kapitel baut auf den semantischen Relationen auf, die im 2. Kapitel bereits dargestellt worden sind. Es werden hierbei aber nicht mehr semantische Relationen zwischen Wörtern, sondern zwischen Sätzen untersucht. Diese Relationen, die mit Beispielen ausführlich veranschaulicht werden, sind die Synonymie, Implikation, Kontradiktion, Kontrarität, Subkontrarität sowie die Paraphrase.

Der Schwerpunkt des 6. Kapitels liegt auf der Veranschaulichung von verschiedenen Logikansätzen, die als Einführung in die formale Semantik dient. Das Anliegen dieses Kapitels ist, den Leser mit formalen Systemen vertraut zu machen und ihm somit den Umgang mit Logiksystemen zu erleichtern. Die Grundlagen der Aussagenlogik werden in diesem Kapitel von Anfang an mittels der sog. Wahrheitswertetafeln illustriert, damit Studierende Formeln erschließen können. Für Anfänger ist dieser Teil unentbehrlich für die weitere Beschäftigung mit formaler Semantik. Des Weiteren stellt Chur die auf der Aussagenlogik basierende Prädikatenlogik dar, in deren Problemfälle und Schwachpunkte auch ein Einblick zu gewinnen ist. Das Unterkapitel 6.3 ist bereits der sog. dreiwertigen Logik gewidmet. In den darauffolgenden Unterkapiteln bietet Chur eine Einführung in die Modallogik und in die Theorie der möglichen Welten, in die Situationssemantik. Darüber hinaus werden hier die Grundzüge der intensionalen Logik erörtert.

Nach den Ebenen der Wort- und Satzsemantik ist im Kapitel 7 eine Zusammenfassung der Ansätze der Textsemantik zu finden. Auf einen weit verbreiteten Ansatz zur Semantik von Texten, auf die Dis-

Assoziationen aus, prägt zum Teil langfristig Einstellungen und Gefühle." (Schwarz-Friesel & Reinharz 2013: 40 f.)

kursrepräsentationstheorie wird ebenfalls eingegangen, um zu verdeutlichen, wie sich Texteinheiten formalisieren lassen und wie Diskursrepräsentationsstrukturen erstellt werden. Dadurch wird eine Richtung einer Forschungslandschaft aufgezeigt, die sich gerade etabliert und entfaltet.

Am Ende des Werkes lassen sich außer dem Schlusswort die Lösungsvorschläge zu den einzelnen Übungsaufgaben, eine erweiterte Bibliographie sowie ein Glossar der wichtigsten Begriffe finden, die nicht nur im Buch, sondern auch in der semantischen Fachliteratur am häufigsten vorkommen. Dank des sehr gut strukturierten Aufbaus des Werkes dürfte das Buch die Seminararbeit bzw. die Vorbereitung der Studierenden auf Prüfungen erleichtern. Die in den Stoff eingebetteten Kontrollfragen und Übungsaufgaben, sowie die dazu gehörenden Erklärungen bzw. Lösungsvorschläge dienen als Hilfe bei der Selbstkontrolle und tragen zur Erweiterung der linguistischen Kenntnisse bei. Obwohl in den Lösungsvorschlägen einige Tippfehler zu finden sind, gewährt das Buch eine übersichtliche Einführung in die Semantik. Die Autorinnen versuchen der Zielgruppe das Buch durch seinen relativ einfachen Sprachstil und manchmal lockere bzw. witzige Formulierungen näher zu bringen.

Da alle einzelnen Punkte im Werk Schritt für Schritt und auf verständliche Weise geklärt werden, kann sich dieses Buch nicht nur für Anfänger, sondern auch für diejenigen, die sich für Linguistik im Allgemeinen interessieren, als impulsgebende Grundlage für künftige Forschungen erweisen.

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Hinweise für Autoren

Sprachtheorie und germanistische Linguistik veröffentlicht Beiträge in deutscher und englischer Sprache. Autoren deutschsprachiger Beiträge werden gebeten, die neue Rechtschreibung zu verwenden. Die Manuskripte werden computergeschrieben als MS Word- oder RTF-Datei an den Herausgeber erbeten. Tabellen, Abbildungen und sonstige Grafiken sollen als selbständige Dateien beigefügt sein.

Die einzureichenden Beiträge sollen nach den in elektronischer Form vorliegenden Formatvorlagen formatiert werden. Diese sind von der Website <http://www.sugl.eu/> herunterzuladen oder von der technischen Redakteurin Frau Marianna F. Balogh zu erhalten (e-mail: balogh.marianna@arts.unideb.hu).

Aufsätze und Forschungsüberblicke sollen eine englischsprachige Zusammenfassung (max. 150 Wörter) und 3-5 Keywords enthalten.

Den Autoren wird eine Korrektur ihres Beitrags zugeschickt. Die Redaktion bittet um sorgfältige Durchsicht.

Im Text sollen alle in objektsprachlichem Sinne vorkommenden Ausdrücke (z.B. sprachliche Daten) sowie inhaltliche Hervorhebungen durch Kursivierung, vorexplikativ verwendete Begriffe bzw. uneigentlicher Wortgebrauch durch Apostrophe und Zitate durch Anführungszeichen markiert werden.

Zitierweise im Text: "[...] wie etwa in Tronka (1997: 18) erwähnt wird, liegen Befunde vor (vgl. Grewendorf et al. 1987: 250 ff.) [...]". Längere Zitate sollten als eingerückte Paragraphen angeführt werden.

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